A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).
That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).
That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).
That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).
That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.
It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the
language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both undecidable
and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).
That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.
It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the
language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both undecidable
and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.
Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).
That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
On 27/06/2026 15:50, polcott wrote:
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).
That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
I understood that grounded means that there are no
variables/indeterminates in the presentation of an object rather than
that there is an inference to it from the axioms. As in "ground term" in prolog.
On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).
That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.
It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the
language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both undecidable
and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.
Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
Irrelevant. The definition of completeness
inly refers to the
sentences in the language of the theory. To bake a cake is an
action, not a sentence, so irrelevant.
On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).
That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.
It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the
language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both undecidable
and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.
Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
Irrelevant. The definition of completeness
It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
that something is missing that could be added to make
it complete. The way that terms-of-the-art are formed
is very misleading and as much as intentionally deceptive.
On 2026-06-29 07:29, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).
That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.
It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the
language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both undecidable >>>>> and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.
Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
Irrelevant. The definition of completeness
It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
that something is missing that could be added to make
it complete. The way that terms-of-the-art are formed
is very misleading and as much as intentionally deceptive.
You really need to learn that terms used in a given field have
definitions within that field that may or may not correspond to what you want a term to mean, and that you actually need to learn those definitions.
In mathematics, a system is incomplete if there are statements in the language of that system which can neither be proven nor disproven.
That's *all* incomplete means. No more, no less. It doesn't mean that something is missing that could be added. It makes no reference
whatsoever to the purpose for which a system was designed.
When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on the fact
that you can't put them on your finger?
When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on the fact
that nothing can graze on them?
To put things in terms of your system, the term 'incomplete' as used by mathematicians has a different GUID than the term 'incomplete' when used colloquially, just as the term 'pen' has different GUIDs depending on whether it is used to store pigs or ink. [note that I do not actually endorse the use of GUIDs; that's just plain silly].
André
On 6/29/2026 12:05 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 07:29, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).
That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.
It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the >>>>>> language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both undecidable >>>>>> and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.
Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
Irrelevant. The definition of completeness
It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
that something is missing that could be added to make
it complete. The way that terms-of-the-art are formed
is very misleading and as much as intentionally deceptive.
You really need to learn that terms used in a given field have
definitions within that field that may or may not correspond to what
you want a term to mean, and that you actually need to learn those
definitions.
That is the way that it usually works. In Proof Theoretic
Semantics each author has their own terms-of-the-art that
has a very similar yet not exactly the same semantic meaning
as entirely different terms-of-the-art used by another author.
Also these meanings gradually evolve over time so they
change in subtle ways from their original meanings.
In mathematics, a system is incomplete if there are statements in the
language of that system which can neither be proven nor disproven.
Q was intentionally defined to handle less than PA
thus is not at all in any way incomplete relative
to its defined purpose.
That's *all* incomplete means. No more, no less. It doesn't mean that
something is missing that could be added. It makes no reference
whatsoever to the purpose for which a system was designed.
So they could have defined "has a box of clowns" as
the situation where en expression can neither be
proven nor refuted in Q.
So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
in any way limited.
When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on the fact
that you can't put them on your finger?
When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on the fact
that nothing can graze on them?
To put things in terms of your system, the term 'incomplete' as used
by mathematicians has a different GUID than the term 'incomplete' when
used colloquially, just as the term 'pen' has different GUIDs
depending on whether it is used to store pigs or ink. [note that I do
not actually endorse the use of GUIDs; that's just plain silly].
André
And likewise "undecidable" really means that the
expression is semantically incoherent. We could
equally call this "has a square box of clowns".
On 2026-06-29 12:16, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 12:05 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 07:29, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).
That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.
It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the >>>>>>> language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both undecidable >>>>>>> and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.
Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
Irrelevant. The definition of completeness
It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
that something is missing that could be added to make
it complete. The way that terms-of-the-art are formed
is very misleading and as much as intentionally deceptive.
You really need to learn that terms used in a given field have
definitions within that field that may or may not correspond to what
you want a term to mean, and that you actually need to learn those
definitions.
That is the way that it usually works. In Proof Theoretic
Semantics each author has their own terms-of-the-art that
has a very similar yet not exactly the same semantic meaning
as entirely different terms-of-the-art used by another author.
Also these meanings gradually evolve over time so they
change in subtle ways from their original meanings.
In mathematics, a system is incomplete if there are statements in the
language of that system which can neither be proven nor disproven.
Q was intentionally defined to handle less than PA
thus is not at all in any way incomplete relative
to its defined purpose.
The definition of 'incomplete' makes no reference whatsoever to 'defined purpose'. If there are sentences in the language of Q which can neither
be proven nor disproven by Q, then Q is incomplete. And it is.
That's *all* incomplete means. No more, no less. It doesn't mean that
something is missing that could be added. It makes no reference
whatsoever to the purpose for which a system was designed.
So they could have defined "has a box of clowns" as
the situation where en expression can neither be
proven nor refuted in Q.
Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't think so, so your example is completely irrelevant.
So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
in any way limited.
When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on the fact
that you can't put them on your finger?
No answer?
When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on the
fact that nothing can graze on them?
No answer?
André
To put things in terms of your system, the term 'incomplete' as used
by mathematicians has a different GUID than the term 'incomplete'
when used colloquially, just as the term 'pen' has different GUIDs
depending on whether it is used to store pigs or ink. [note that I do
not actually endorse the use of GUIDs; that's just plain silly].
André
And likewise "undecidable" really means that the
expression is semantically incoherent. We could
equally call this "has a square box of clowns".
On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't think so,
so your example is completely irrelevant.
It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
sentences in the language of Q which can neither
be proven nor disproven by Q
So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
in any way limited.
When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on the
fact that you can't put them on your finger?
No answer?
Off topic, irrelevant.
When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on the
fact that nothing can graze on them?
No answer?
On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:In Proof Theoretic Semantics
On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't think so,
so your example is completely irrelevant.
It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
sentences in the language of Q which can neither
be proven nor disproven by Q
Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien to
theories of arithmetic.
So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
in any way limited.
When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on the
fact that you can't put them on your finger?
No answer?
Off topic, irrelevant.
When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on the
fact that nothing can graze on them?
No answer?
These questions are Irrelevant because
On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:In Proof Theoretic Semantics
On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't think
so, so your example is completely irrelevant.
It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
sentences in the language of Q which can neither
be proven nor disproven by Q
Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien to
theories of arithmetic.
So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
in any way limited.
When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on the
fact that you can't put them on your finger?
No answer?
Off topic, irrelevant.
When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on the >>>>>> fact that nothing can graze on them?
No answer?
These questions are Irrelevant because
statements in the language of that system
which can neither be proven nor disproven
have not established that they have semantic
meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
established in PTS by canonical proofs.
On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:In Proof Theoretic Semantics
On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't think
so, so your example is completely irrelevant.
It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
sentences in the language of Q which can neither
be proven nor disproven by Q
Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien to
theories of arithmetic.
So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
in any way limited.
When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on the >>>>>>> fact that you can't put them on your finger?
No answer?
Off topic, irrelevant.
When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on the >>>>>>> fact that nothing can graze on them?
No answer?
These questions are Irrelevant because
statements in the language of that system
which can neither be proven nor disproven
have not established that they have semantic
meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
established in PTS by canonical proofs.
This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth functional
semantics takes true and false to be the semantic primatives, PTS uses either (depending on which author you follow) proven and not proven or provable and not provable as its primitives without dealing with truth
or falsity.
Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is
greater than its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson Arithmetic,
not as being meaningless as you seem to think.
André
On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:In Proof Theoretic Semantics
On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't think >>>>>> so, so your example is completely irrelevant.
It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
sentences in the language of Q which can neither
be proven nor disproven by Q
Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien to
theories of arithmetic.
So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
in any way limited.
When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on the >>>>>>>> fact that you can't put them on your finger?
No answer?
Off topic, irrelevant.
When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on >>>>>>>> the fact that nothing can graze on them?
No answer?
These questions are Irrelevant because
statements in the language of that system
which can neither be proven nor disproven
have not established that they have semantic
meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
established in PTS by canonical proofs.
This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth functional
semantics takes true and false to be the semantic primatives, PTS uses
either (depending on which author you follow) proven and not proven or
provable and not provable as its primitives without dealing with truth
or falsity.
Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.
Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is greater than its
successor' as being unprovable in Robinson Arithmetic, not as being
meaningless as you seem to think.
You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
correct because unlike every other field each author
has their own terms-of-the-art.
On 2026-06-29 14:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:In Proof Theoretic Semantics
On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't think >>>>>>> so, so your example is completely irrelevant.
It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
sentences in the language of Q which can neither
be proven nor disproven by Q
Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien to
theories of arithmetic.
So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
in any way limited.
When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on >>>>>>>>> the fact that you can't put them on your finger?
No answer?
Off topic, irrelevant.
When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on >>>>>>>>> the fact that nothing can graze on them?
No answer?
These questions are Irrelevant because
statements in the language of that system
which can neither be proven nor disproven
have not established that they have semantic
meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
established in PTS by canonical proofs.
This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth functional
semantics takes true and false to be the semantic primatives, PTS
uses either (depending on which author you follow) proven and not
proven or provable and not provable as its primitives without dealing
with truth or falsity.
Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.
Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is greater than
its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson Arithmetic, not as
being meaningless as you seem to think.
You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
correct because unlike every other field each author
has their own terms-of-the-art.
Of course I am being consistent. Within PTD, unproven/unprovable *is* a semantic value,
i.e. a meaning; so you can't claim that the expression
'no number is greater than its successor' isn't meaningful in Q.
Can you provide a single example of someone working within PTS who has
taken issue with incompleteness? Incompleteness exists in PTS just as
much as it exists in any other framework.
André
On 6/29/2026 3:58 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 14:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:In Proof Theoretic Semantics
On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't
think so, so your example is completely irrelevant.
It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
sentences in the language of Q which can neither
be proven nor disproven by Q
Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien to >>>>>> theories of arithmetic.
So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
in any way limited.
When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on >>>>>>>>>> the fact that you can't put them on your finger?
No answer?
Off topic, irrelevant.
When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on >>>>>>>>>> the fact that nothing can graze on them?
No answer?
These questions are Irrelevant because
statements in the language of that system
which can neither be proven nor disproven
have not established that they have semantic
meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
established in PTS by canonical proofs.
This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth functional
semantics takes true and false to be the semantic primatives, PTS
uses either (depending on which author you follow) proven and not
proven or provable and not provable as its primitives without
dealing with truth or falsity.
Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.
Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is greater than
its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson Arithmetic, not as
being meaningless as you seem to think.
You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
correct because unlike every other field each author
has their own terms-of-the-art.
Of course I am being consistent. Within PTD, unproven/unprovable *is*
a semantic value,
Impossibly provable in Q means cannot possibly
derive a semantic meaning Q.
i.e. a meaning; so you can't claim that the expression 'no number is
greater than its successor' isn't meaningful in Q.
Can you provide a single example of someone working within PTS who has
taken issue with incompleteness? Incompleteness exists in PTS just as
much as it exists in any other framework.
On 2026-06-29 15:10, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 3:58 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 14:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:In Proof Theoretic Semantics
On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't >>>>>>>>> think so, so your example is completely irrelevant.
It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
sentences in the language of Q which can neither
be proven nor disproven by Q
Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien to >>>>>>> theories of arithmetic.
So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
in any way limited.
When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on >>>>>>>>>>> the fact that you can't put them on your finger?
No answer?
Off topic, irrelevant.
When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based on >>>>>>>>>>> the fact that nothing can graze on them?
No answer?
These questions are Irrelevant because
statements in the language of that system
which can neither be proven nor disproven
have not established that they have semantic
meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
established in PTS by canonical proofs.
This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth functional
semantics takes true and false to be the semantic primatives, PTS
uses either (depending on which author you follow) proven and not
proven or provable and not provable as its primitives without
dealing with truth or falsity.
Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.
Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is greater than
its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson Arithmetic, not as
being meaningless as you seem to think.
You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
correct because unlike every other field each author
has their own terms-of-the-art.
Of course I am being consistent. Within PTD, unproven/unprovable *is*
a semantic value,
Impossibly provable in Q means cannot possibly
derive a semantic meaning Q.
'impossibly' in English is an intensifier, i.e. 'he was impossibly
strong' means 'he was exceedingly strong'. I have no idea what
'impossibly provable' might mean, but if you intended to say
'unprovable' then you are misinterpreting PTS. Unprovable is one of the
two semantic primitives used by PTS (the other being provable).
i.e. a meaning; so you can't claim that the expression 'no number is
greater than its successor' isn't meaningful in Q.
Can you provide a single example of someone working within PTS who
has taken issue with incompleteness? Incompleteness exists in PTS
just as much as it exists in any other framework.
I would really like you to answer the above question.
I've never seen
any author writing within PTS express any misgivings about the fact that some formal systems are inconsistent. This is something that you are projecting onto that theory based on the fact that you really do not understand it.
André
On 6/29/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 15:10, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 3:58 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 14:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:In Proof Theoretic Semantics
On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't >>>>>>>>>> think so, so your example is completely irrelevant.
It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
sentences in the language of Q which can neither
be proven nor disproven by Q
Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien >>>>>>>> to theories of arithmetic.
So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
in any way limited.
When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based on >>>>>>>>>>>> the fact that you can't put them on your finger?
No answer?
Off topic, irrelevant.
When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based >>>>>>>>>>>> on the fact that nothing can graze on them?
No answer?
These questions are Irrelevant because
statements in the language of that system
which can neither be proven nor disproven
have not established that they have semantic
meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
established in PTS by canonical proofs.
This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth functional >>>>>> semantics takes true and false to be the semantic primatives, PTS >>>>>> uses either (depending on which author you follow) proven and not >>>>>> proven or provable and not provable as its primitives without
dealing with truth or falsity.
Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.
Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is greater than >>>>>> its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson Arithmetic, not as >>>>>> being meaningless as you seem to think.
You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
correct because unlike every other field each author
has their own terms-of-the-art.
Of course I am being consistent. Within PTD, unproven/unprovable
*is* a semantic value,
Impossibly provable in Q means cannot possibly
derive a semantic meaning Q.
'impossibly' in English is an intensifier, i.e. 'he was impossibly
strong' means 'he was exceedingly strong'. I have no idea what
'impossibly provable' might mean, but if you intended to say
'unprovable' then you are misinterpreting PTS. Unprovable is one of
the two semantic primitives used by PTS (the other being provable).
This exactly and perfectly what it precisely means.
% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
i.e. a meaning; so you can't claim that the expression 'no number is
greater than its successor' isn't meaningful in Q.
Can you provide a single example of someone working within PTS who
has taken issue with incompleteness? Incompleteness exists in PTS
just as much as it exists in any other framework.
I would really like you to answer the above question.
If you understand PTS you will understand that their
reasoning cannot possibly get to incompleteness.
On 2026-06-29 15:39, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 15:10, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 3:58 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 14:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:In Proof Theoretic Semantics
On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't >>>>>>>>>>> think so, so your example is completely irrelevant.
It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
sentences in the language of Q which can neither
be proven nor disproven by Q
Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien >>>>>>>>> to theories of arithmetic.
So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
in any way limited.
When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based >>>>>>>>>>>>> on the fact that you can't put them on your finger?
No answer?
Off topic, irrelevant.
When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based >>>>>>>>>>>>> on the fact that nothing can graze on them?
No answer?
These questions are Irrelevant because
statements in the language of that system
which can neither be proven nor disproven
have not established that they have semantic
meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
established in PTS by canonical proofs.
This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth
functional semantics takes true and false to be the semantic
primatives, PTS uses either (depending on which author you
follow) proven and not proven or provable and not provable as its >>>>>>> primitives without dealing with truth or falsity.
Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.
Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is greater
than its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson Arithmetic, >>>>>>> not as being meaningless as you seem to think.
You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
correct because unlike every other field each author
has their own terms-of-the-art.
Of course I am being consistent. Within PTD, unproven/unprovable
*is* a semantic value,
Impossibly provable in Q means cannot possibly
derive a semantic meaning Q.
'impossibly' in English is an intensifier, i.e. 'he was impossibly
strong' means 'he was exceedingly strong'. I have no idea what
'impossibly provable' might mean, but if you intended to say
'unprovable' then you are misinterpreting PTS. Unprovable is one of
the two semantic primitives used by PTS (the other being provable).
This exactly and perfectly what it precisely means.
If it means 'unprovable' then say 'unprovable' or 'impossible to prove'. Don't use a nonsensical expression like 'impossibly provable'.
% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
That's an example, not a definition. Examples don't take the place of definitions.
i.e. a meaning; so you can't claim that the expression 'no number
is greater than its successor' isn't meaningful in Q.
Can you provide a single example of someone working within PTS who
has taken issue with incompleteness? Incompleteness exists in PTS
just as much as it exists in any other framework.
I would really like you to answer the above question.
If you understand PTS you will understand that their
reasoning cannot possibly get to incompleteness.
Then you should be able to produce an actual citation to this effect.
As
it stands, this is simply a baseless assertion on your part, and since
your grasp of PTS doesn't seem particularly strong, it carries very
little weight.
You keep offering PTS as an alternative to truth-functional semantics,
but incompleteness has absolutely nothing to do with truth-functional semantics as the definition of incompleteness doesn't even mention truth
or falsity (or semantics). If anything, it is more aligned with PTS than with TFS since it pertains to theoremhood i.e. provability, the semantic primitive used by PTS.
A system is incomplete if there is an expression in the language of that system, P such that neither P nor ¬P can be derived as a theorem.
'Theorem' is a notion pertaining to provability, not truth.
André
On 6/29/2026 5:25 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 15:39, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 15:10, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 3:58 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 14:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:In Proof Theoretic Semantics
On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't >>>>>>>>>>>> think so, so your example is completely irrelevant.
It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
sentences in the language of Q which can neither
be proven nor disproven by Q
Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept alien >>>>>>>>>> to theories of arithmetic.
So we can say that the halting problem "has a box
of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
in any way limited.
When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based >>>>>>>>>>>>>> on the fact that you can't put them on your finger?
No answer?
Off topic, irrelevant.
When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object based >>>>>>>>>>>>>> on the fact that nothing can graze on them?
No answer?
These questions are Irrelevant because
statements in the language of that system
which can neither be proven nor disproven
have not established that they have semantic
meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
established in PTS by canonical proofs.
This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth
functional semantics takes true and false to be the semantic
primatives, PTS uses either (depending on which author you
follow) proven and not proven or provable and not provable as >>>>>>>> its primitives without dealing with truth or falsity.
Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.
Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is greater >>>>>>>> than its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson Arithmetic, >>>>>>>> not as being meaningless as you seem to think.
You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
correct because unlike every other field each author
has their own terms-of-the-art.
Of course I am being consistent. Within PTD, unproven/unprovable
*is* a semantic value,
Impossibly provable in Q means cannot possibly
derive a semantic meaning Q.
'impossibly' in English is an intensifier, i.e. 'he was impossibly
strong' means 'he was exceedingly strong'. I have no idea what
'impossibly provable' might mean, but if you intended to say
'unprovable' then you are misinterpreting PTS. Unprovable is one of
the two semantic primitives used by PTS (the other being provable).
This exactly and perfectly what it precisely means.
If it means 'unprovable' then say 'unprovable' or 'impossible to
prove'. Don't use a nonsensical expression like 'impossibly provable'.
Impossibly provable because remains stuck
in an infinite loop.
% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
That's an example, not a definition. Examples don't take the place of
definitions.
It is the only perfect example of an idea from
Proof Theoretic Semantics that seems to stay a
little bit nebulous because each author uses their
own author specific terminology.
i.e. a meaning; so you can't claim that the expression 'no number >>>>>> is greater than its successor' isn't meaningful in Q.
Can you provide a single example of someone working within PTS who >>>>>> has taken issue with incompleteness? Incompleteness exists in PTS >>>>>> just as much as it exists in any other framework.
I would really like you to answer the above question.
If you understand PTS you will understand that their
reasoning cannot possibly get to incompleteness.
Then you should be able to produce an actual citation to this effect.
Each author uses their own author specific terminology
and the meanings slightly change across authors.
As it stands, this is simply a baseless assertion on your part, and
since your grasp of PTS doesn't seem particularly strong, it carries
very little weight.
You keep offering PTS as an alternative to truth-functional semantics,
but incompleteness has absolutely nothing to do with truth-functional
semantics as the definition of incompleteness doesn't even mention truth
Truth as an Epistemic Notion --- Dag Prawitz
What is the appropriate notion of truth for
sentences whose meanings are understood in
epistemic terms such as proof or ground for
an assertion? It seems that the truth of such
sentences has to be identified with the existence
of proofs or grounds... https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11245-011-9107-6
or falsity (or semantics). If anything, it is more aligned with PTS
than with TFS since it pertains to theoremhood i.e. provability, the
semantic primitive used by PTS.
A system is incomplete if there is an expression in the language of
that system, P such that neither P nor ¬P can be derived as a theorem.
That is simply not the way that it works in Proof Theoretic Semantics.
On 2026-06-29 16:38, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 5:25 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 15:39, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 15:10, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 3:58 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 14:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:In Proof Theoretic Semantics
On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I didn't >>>>>>>>>>>>> think so, so your example is completely irrelevant.
It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
sentences in the language of Q which can neither
be proven nor disproven by Q
Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept >>>>>>>>>>> alien to theories of arithmetic.
So we can say that the halting problem "has a boxNo answer?
of clowns" instead of saying that computation is
in any way limited.
When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object based >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on the fact that you can't put them on your finger? >>>>>>>>>>>>>
Off topic, irrelevant.
When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on the fact that nothing can graze on them?
No answer?
These questions are Irrelevant because
statements in the language of that system
which can neither be proven nor disproven
have not established that they have semantic
meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
established in PTS by canonical proofs.
This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth
functional semantics takes true and false to be the semantic >>>>>>>>> primatives, PTS uses either (depending on which author you
follow) proven and not proven or provable and not provable as >>>>>>>>> its primitives without dealing with truth or falsity.
Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.
Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is greater >>>>>>>>> than its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson Arithmetic, >>>>>>>>> not as being meaningless as you seem to think.
You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
correct because unlike every other field each author
has their own terms-of-the-art.
Of course I am being consistent. Within PTD, unproven/unprovable >>>>>>> *is* a semantic value,
Impossibly provable in Q means cannot possibly
derive a semantic meaning Q.
'impossibly' in English is an intensifier, i.e. 'he was impossibly
strong' means 'he was exceedingly strong'. I have no idea what
'impossibly provable' might mean, but if you intended to say
'unprovable' then you are misinterpreting PTS. Unprovable is one of >>>>> the two semantic primitives used by PTS (the other being provable).
This exactly and perfectly what it precisely means.
If it means 'unprovable' then say 'unprovable' or 'impossible to
prove'. Don't use a nonsensical expression like 'impossibly provable'.
Impossibly provable because remains stuck
in an infinite loop.
You're abusing English. As I said, 'impossibly' is an intensifier. If I
say someone is impossibly strong it doesn't mean it is impossible for
them to be strong, it means they are stronger than I would have thought possible, i.e. that they are extraordinarily strong. Saying something is 'impossibly provable' would mean it is extraordinarily provable which
isn't coherent since provability isn't a gradient concept. What is wrong with simply using the term 'unprovable' which is actually coherent English?
% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
That's an example, not a definition. Examples don't take the place of
definitions.
It is the only perfect example of an idea from
Proof Theoretic Semantics that seems to stay a
little bit nebulous because each author uses their
own author specific terminology.
It has absolutely nothing to do with Robinson Arithmetic or
incompleteness which were the topics under discussion.
It's your feeble
attempt at trying to formalize the liar paradox in Prolog and it fails
at that because the Liar Paradox rests on the interpretation of the
deictic expression 'this', and your formulation does not contain
anything corresponding to 'this'. It is simply a circular definition.
i.e. a meaning; so you can't claim that the expression 'no number >>>>>>> is greater than its successor' isn't meaningful in Q.
Can you provide a single example of someone working within PTS
who has taken issue with incompleteness? Incompleteness exists in >>>>>>> PTS just as much as it exists in any other framework.
I would really like you to answer the above question.
If you understand PTS you will understand that their
reasoning cannot possibly get to incompleteness.
Then you should be able to produce an actual citation to this effect.
Each author uses their own author specific terminology
and the meanings slightly change across authors.
How does this prevent you from offering a citation?
On 6/29/2026 6:03 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 16:38, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 5:25 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 15:39, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 15:10, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 3:58 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 14:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:In Proof Theoretic Semantics
On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> didn't think so, so your example is completely irrelevant. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
sentences in the language of Q which can neither
be proven nor disproven by Q
Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept >>>>>>>>>>>> alien to theories of arithmetic.
So we can say that the halting problem "has a box >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of clowns" instead of saying that computation is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in any way limited.No answer?
When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on the fact that you can't put them on your finger? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Off topic, irrelevant.
No answer?When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on the fact that nothing can graze on them? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
These questions are Irrelevant because
statements in the language of that system
which can neither be proven nor disproven
have not established that they have semantic
meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
established in PTS by canonical proofs.
This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth
functional semantics takes true and false to be the semantic >>>>>>>>>> primatives, PTS uses either (depending on which author you >>>>>>>>>> follow) proven and not proven or provable and not provable as >>>>>>>>>> its primitives without dealing with truth or falsity.
Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.
Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is greater >>>>>>>>>> than its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson
Arithmetic, not as being meaningless as you seem to think. >>>>>>>>>>
You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
correct because unlike every other field each author
has their own terms-of-the-art.
Of course I am being consistent. Within PTD, unproven/unprovable >>>>>>>> *is* a semantic value,
Impossibly provable in Q means cannot possibly
derive a semantic meaning Q.
'impossibly' in English is an intensifier, i.e. 'he was impossibly >>>>>> strong' means 'he was exceedingly strong'. I have no idea what
'impossibly provable' might mean, but if you intended to say
'unprovable' then you are misinterpreting PTS. Unprovable is one
of the two semantic primitives used by PTS (the other being
provable).
This exactly and perfectly what it precisely means.
If it means 'unprovable' then say 'unprovable' or 'impossible to
prove'. Don't use a nonsensical expression like 'impossibly provable'. >>>>
Impossibly provable because remains stuck
in an infinite loop.
You're abusing English. As I said, 'impossibly' is an intensifier. If
I say someone is impossibly strong it doesn't mean it is impossible
for them to be strong, it means they are stronger than I would have
thought possible, i.e. that they are extraordinarily strong. Saying
something is 'impossibly provable' would mean it is extraordinarily
provable which isn't coherent since provability isn't a gradient
concept. What is wrong with simply using the term 'unprovable' which
is actually coherent English?
3 is impossibly numerically greater than 5.
% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
That's an example, not a definition. Examples don't take the place
of definitions.
It is the only perfect example of an idea from
Proof Theoretic Semantics that seems to stay a
little bit nebulous because each author uses their
own author specific terminology.
It has absolutely nothing to do with Robinson Arithmetic or
incompleteness which were the topics under discussion.
It perfectly establishes that impossibly provable
means has no proof theoretic semantic meaning.
There is a key difference between we did not yet
find a proof of X and a proof of X cannot possibly
exist.
It's your feeble attempt at trying to formalize the liar paradox in
Prolog and it fails at that because the Liar Paradox rests on the
interpretation of the deictic expression 'this', and your formulation
does not contain anything corresponding to 'this'. It is simply a
circular definition.
"this" literally means := when formalized
LP := ~True(LP) expands to ~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))))))
i.e. a meaning; so you can't claim that the expression 'no
number is greater than its successor' isn't meaningful in Q.
Can you provide a single example of someone working within PTS >>>>>>>> who has taken issue with incompleteness? Incompleteness exists >>>>>>>> in PTS just as much as it exists in any other framework.
I would really like you to answer the above question.
If you understand PTS you will understand that their
reasoning cannot possibly get to incompleteness.
Then you should be able to produce an actual citation to this effect.
Each author uses their own author specific terminology
and the meanings slightly change across authors.
How does this prevent you from offering a citation?
It does seem that they do agree that no proof
of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
G has no semantic meaning in PA.
"Failure of Normalization"
"Lack of a Canonical Form"
"Disharmony"
are some of the ways that they describe this.
I have to spend a very long time carefully
analyzing two papers before I can even use
one author's terms regarding one aspect of PTS
limited to that author's terms.
"anti-realism" seems like it means a psychotic
break for reality yet seems to merely specify
valid deductive inference in the terms-of-the-art
of PTS.
On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 6:03 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 16:38, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 5:25 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 15:39, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 15:10, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 3:58 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 14:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 3:02 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:47, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 2:33 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 13:08, olcott wrote:In Proof Theoretic Semantics
On 6/29/2026 1:29 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Is "has a box of clowns" in the language of Q? No. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> didn't think so, so your example is completely irrelevant. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It is an idiom stipulated to mean:
sentences in the language of Q which can neither
be proven nor disproven by Q
Q doesn't have idioms. That's a natural language concept >>>>>>>>>>>>> alien to theories of arithmetic.
So we can say that the halting problem "has a box >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of clowns" instead of saying that computation is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in any way limited.No answer?
When mathematicians talk about rings, do you object >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on the fact that you can't put them on your finger? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Off topic, irrelevant.
No answer?When mathematicians talk about fields, do you object >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> based on the fact that nothing can graze on them? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
These questions are Irrelevant because
statements in the language of that system
which can neither be proven nor disproven
have not established that they have semantic
meaning because semantic meaning is ONLY
established in PTS by canonical proofs.
This is a misrepresentation on your part. Whereas truth >>>>>>>>>>> functional semantics takes true and false to be the semantic >>>>>>>>>>> primatives, PTS uses either (depending on which author you >>>>>>>>>>> follow) proven and not proven or provable and not provable as >>>>>>>>>>> its primitives without dealing with truth or falsity.
Yes that is an accurate paraphrase.
Thus, they would treat a statement like 'no number is greater >>>>>>>>>>> than its successor' as being unprovable in Robinson
Arithmetic, not as being meaningless as you seem to think. >>>>>>>>>>>
You are not being consistent with you own paraphrase.
I still don't have all of the exact nuances exactly
correct because unlike every other field each author
has their own terms-of-the-art.
Of course I am being consistent. Within PTD, unproven/
unprovable *is* a semantic value,
Impossibly provable in Q means cannot possibly
derive a semantic meaning Q.
'impossibly' in English is an intensifier, i.e. 'he was
impossibly strong' means 'he was exceedingly strong'. I have no >>>>>>> idea what 'impossibly provable' might mean, but if you intended >>>>>>> to say 'unprovable' then you are misinterpreting PTS. Unprovable >>>>>>> is one of the two semantic primitives used by PTS (the other
being provable).
This exactly and perfectly what it precisely means.
If it means 'unprovable' then say 'unprovable' or 'impossible to
prove'. Don't use a nonsensical expression like 'impossibly provable'. >>>>>
Impossibly provable because remains stuck
in an infinite loop.
You're abusing English. As I said, 'impossibly' is an intensifier. If
I say someone is impossibly strong it doesn't mean it is impossible
for them to be strong, it means they are stronger than I would have
thought possible, i.e. that they are extraordinarily strong. Saying
something is 'impossibly provable' would mean it is extraordinarily
provable which isn't coherent since provability isn't a gradient
concept. What is wrong with simply using the term 'unprovable' which
is actually coherent English?
3 is impossibly numerically greater than 5.
Not if you're speaking English.
% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
That's an example, not a definition. Examples don't take the place
of definitions.
It is the only perfect example of an idea from
Proof Theoretic Semantics that seems to stay a
little bit nebulous because each author uses their
own author specific terminology.
It has absolutely nothing to do with Robinson Arithmetic or
incompleteness which were the topics under discussion.
It perfectly establishes that impossibly provable
means has no proof theoretic semantic meaning.
It shows no such thing.
There is a key difference between we did not yet
find a proof of X and a proof of X cannot possibly
exist.
Yes. And the two English terms in use for these are 'unproven' and 'unprovable'. Not 'impossibly provable'.
It's your feeble attempt at trying to formalize the liar paradox in
Prolog and it fails at that because the Liar Paradox rests on the
interpretation of the deictic expression 'this', and your formulation
does not contain anything corresponding to 'this'. It is simply a
circular definition.
"this" literally means := when formalized
LP := ~True(LP) expands to
~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(...)))))))
No. := means defined as, not 'this'.
If you think otherwise, explain how you would formalize a sentence
involving what you would call non-pathological self reference using :=.
For example, 'this sentence contains five words'.
Each author uses their own author specific terminologyi.e. a meaning; so you can't claim that the expression 'no
number is greater than its successor' isn't meaningful in Q. >>>>>>>>>
Can you provide a single example of someone working within PTS >>>>>>>>> who has taken issue with incompleteness? Incompleteness exists >>>>>>>>> in PTS just as much as it exists in any other framework.
I would really like you to answer the above question.
If you understand PTS you will understand that their
reasoning cannot possibly get to incompleteness.
Then you should be able to produce an actual citation to this effect. >>>>
and the meanings slightly change across authors.
How does this prevent you from offering a citation?
It does seem that they do agree that no proof
of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
G has no semantic meaning in PA.
I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything remotely like
that. They do not agree with this; rather, you are projecting your own peculiar views onto their theory.
André
"Failure of Normalization"
"Lack of a Canonical Form"
"Disharmony"
are some of the ways that they describe this.
I have to spend a very long time carefully
analyzing two papers before I can even use
one author's terms regarding one aspect of PTS
limited to that author's terms.
"anti-realism" seems like it means a psychotic
break for reality yet seems to merely specify
valid deductive inference in the terms-of-the-art
of PTS.
On 6/29/2026 6:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:
It does seem that they do agree that no proof
of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
G has no semantic meaning in PA.
I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything remotely like
that. They do not agree with this; rather, you are projecting your own
peculiar views onto their theory.
André
Because they beat around the bush about that using
terminology that varies across every author.
On 2026-06-29 18:37, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 6:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:
It does seem that they do agree that no proof
of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
G has no semantic meaning in PA.
I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything remotely like
that. They do not agree with this; rather, you are projecting your
own peculiar views onto their theory.
André
Because they beat around the bush about that using
terminology that varies across every author.
It's not that they are beating around the bush; it's that they aren't actually saying what you want them to say. Face it, you really don't understand the PTS literature as it is above your head.
André
On 6/29/2026 8:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 18:37, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 6:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:
It does seem that they do agree that no proof
of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
G has no semantic meaning in PA.
I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything remotely
like that. They do not agree with this; rather, you are projecting
your own peculiar views onto their theory.
André
Because they beat around the bush about that using
terminology that varies across every author.
It's not that they are beating around the bush; it's that they aren't
actually saying what you want them to say. Face it, you really don't
understand the PTS literature as it is above your head.
André
PTS is the way that meaning actually works.
We can make a simpler analogy in that English
words are meaningless until they are defined.
The PTS connection of an expression in Q to
its axioms Q is analogous to the connection
of an English word to its definition.
A proof merely looks to see if a definition
exists and if it does not then the English
Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
On 2026-06-29 19:19, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 8:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 18:37, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 6:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:
It does seem that they do agree that no proof
of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
G has no semantic meaning in PA.
I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything remotely
like that. They do not agree with this; rather, you are projecting
your own peculiar views onto their theory.
André
Because they beat around the bush about that using
terminology that varies across every author.
It's not that they are beating around the bush; it's that they aren't
actually saying what you want them to say. Face it, you really don't
understand the PTS literature as it is above your head.
André
PTS is the way that meaning actually works.
We can make a simpler analogy in that English
words are meaningless until they are defined.
The PTS connection of an expression in Q to
its axioms Q is analogous to the connection
of an English word to its definition.
A proof merely looks to see if a definition
exists and if it does not then the English
Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
That's not what PTS says; that's simply you.
There is a difference between meaningless and wrong.
On 2026-06-29 19:19, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 8:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 18:37, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 6:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:
It does seem that they do agree that no proof
of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
G has no semantic meaning in PA.
I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything remotely
like that. They do not agree with this; rather, you are projecting
your own peculiar views onto their theory.
André
Because they beat around the bush about that using
terminology that varies across every author.
It's not that they are beating around the bush; it's that they aren't
actually saying what you want them to say. Face it, you really don't
understand the PTS literature as it is above your head.
André
PTS is the way that meaning actually works.
We can make a simpler analogy in that English
words are meaningless until they are defined.
The PTS connection of an expression in Q to
its axioms Q is analogous to the connection
of an English word to its definition.
A proof merely looks to see if a definition
exists and if it does not then the English
Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
That's not what PTS says; that's simply you.
On 6/29/2026 8:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 19:19, olcott wrote:% This sentence is not true.
On 6/29/2026 8:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 18:37, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 6:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:
It does seem that they do agree that no proof
of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
G has no semantic meaning in PA.
I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything remotely
like that. They do not agree with this; rather, you are projecting >>>>>> your own peculiar views onto their theory.
André
Because they beat around the bush about that using
terminology that varies across every author.
It's not that they are beating around the bush; it's that they
aren't actually saying what you want them to say. Face it, you
really don't understand the PTS literature as it is above your head.
André
PTS is the way that meaning actually works.
We can make a simpler analogy in that English
words are meaningless until they are defined.
The PTS connection of an expression in Q to
its axioms Q is analogous to the connection
of an English word to its definition.
A proof merely looks to see if a definition
exists and if it does not then the English
Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
That's not what PTS says; that's simply you.
There is a difference between meaningless and wrong.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
G ↔ ¬Prov_PA(⌜G⌝)
Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
00 ↔ 01 02
01 G
02 ¬ 03
03 Prov_PA 04
04 Gödel_Number_of 01 // cycle indicates no well-founded justification tree exists.
On 2026-06-29 20:17, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 8:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 19:19, olcott wrote:% This sentence is not true.
On 6/29/2026 8:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 18:37, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 6:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:
It does seem that they do agree that no proof
of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
G has no semantic meaning in PA.
I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything remotely >>>>>>> like that. They do not agree with this; rather, you are
projecting your own peculiar views onto their theory.
André
Because they beat around the bush about that using
terminology that varies across every author.
It's not that they are beating around the bush; it's that they
aren't actually saying what you want them to say. Face it, you
really don't understand the PTS literature as it is above your head. >>>>>
André
PTS is the way that meaning actually works.
We can make a simpler analogy in that English
words are meaningless until they are defined.
The PTS connection of an expression in Q to
its axioms Q is analogous to the connection
of an English word to its definition.
A proof merely looks to see if a definition
exists and if it does not then the English
Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
That's not what PTS says; that's simply you.
There is a difference between meaningless and wrong.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
G ↔ ¬Prov_PA(⌜G⌝)
Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
00 ↔ 01 02
01 G
02 ¬ 03
03 Prov_PA 04
04 Gödel_Number_of 01 // cycle indicates no well-founded
justification tree exists.
That's completely nonresponsive. You're simply copying and pasting text
from previous posts without any explanation of how you think it relates
to the point I made (which you disingenuously snipped).
The Liar's Paradox isn't what I am discussing. I am discussing the fact
that 'no number is equal to its successor' can't be proven in Q. That statement has absolutely no similarities to the Liar's Paradox.
André
On 6/29/2026 9:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:17, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 8:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 19:19, olcott wrote:% This sentence is not true.
On 6/29/2026 8:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 18:37, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 6:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:
It does seem that they do agree that no proof
of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
G has no semantic meaning in PA.
I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything remotely >>>>>>>> like that. They do not agree with this; rather, you are
projecting your own peculiar views onto their theory.
André
Because they beat around the bush about that using
terminology that varies across every author.
It's not that they are beating around the bush; it's that they
aren't actually saying what you want them to say. Face it, you
really don't understand the PTS literature as it is above your head. >>>>>>
André
PTS is the way that meaning actually works.
We can make a simpler analogy in that English
words are meaningless until they are defined.
The PTS connection of an expression in Q to
its axioms Q is analogous to the connection
of an English word to its definition.
A proof merely looks to see if a definition
exists and if it does not then the English
Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
That's not what PTS says; that's simply you.
There is a difference between meaningless and wrong.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
G ↔ ¬Prov_PA(⌜G⌝)
Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
00 ↔ 01 02
01 G
02 ¬ 03
03 Prov_PA 04
04 Gödel_Number_of 01 // cycle indicates no well-founded
justification tree exists.
That's completely nonresponsive. You're simply copying and pasting
text from previous posts without any explanation of how you think it
relates to the point I made (which you disingenuously snipped).
The Liar's Paradox isn't what I am discussing. I am discussing the
fact that 'no number is equal to its successor' can't be proven in Q.
That statement has absolutely no similarities to the Liar's Paradox.
André
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:17, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 8:54 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 19:19, olcott wrote:% This sentence is not true.
On 6/29/2026 8:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 18:37, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 6:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 17:36, olcott wrote:
It does seem that they do agree that no proof
of G can possibly exist in PA does means that
G has no semantic meaning in PA.
I've not seen anyone operating in PTS who says anything
remotely like that. They do not agree with this; rather, you >>>>>>>>> are projecting your own peculiar views onto their theory.
André
Because they beat around the bush about that using
terminology that varies across every author.
It's not that they are beating around the bush; it's that they
aren't actually saying what you want them to say. Face it, you
really don't understand the PTS literature as it is above your head. >>>>>>>
André
PTS is the way that meaning actually works.
We can make a simpler analogy in that English
words are meaningless until they are defined.
The PTS connection of an expression in Q to
its axioms Q is analogous to the connection
of an English word to its definition.
A proof merely looks to see if a definition
exists and if it does not then the English
Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
That's not what PTS says; that's simply you.
There is a difference between meaningless and wrong.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
G ↔ ¬Prov_PA(⌜G⌝)
Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
00 ↔ 01 02
01 G
02 ¬ 03
03 Prov_PA 04
04 Gödel_Number_of 01 // cycle indicates no well-founded
justification tree exists.
That's completely nonresponsive. You're simply copying and pasting
text from previous posts without any explanation of how you think it
relates to the point I made (which you disingenuously snipped).
The Liar's Paradox isn't what I am discussing. I am discussing the
fact that 'no number is equal to its successor' can't be proven in Q.
That statement has absolutely no similarities to the Liar's Paradox.
André
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable examples or made
any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no
number is equal to its successor' which is the example under discussion.
André
The correct interpretation was, I argued, not "This sentence is
unprovable," but rather:
The following is unprovable (1):
The following is unprovable (2):
The following is unprovable (3):
...
As regards semantics, I could call statement (1) the "unencoded
sentence," ...
1. The /unencoded sentence/ is /true and meaningful/. It's a
statement about numbers.
On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).
That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.
It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the
language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both undecidable
and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.
Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
Irrelevant. The definition of completeness
It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
that something is missing that could be added to make
it complete.
On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).
That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.
It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the
language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both undecidable >>>>> and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.
Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
Irrelevant. The definition of completeness
It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
that something is missing that could be added to make
it complete.
It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.
For example, the theory
of a group does not tell whether ∀x∀y (x * y = y * x). It could
be true or it could be false. But it is possible to add an
axiom to make it provagle, e.g, x∀y (x * y = y * x) itself,
giving the theory of an Abelian group, which is still incomplete
but can be said to be less incomplete. Therefore the meaning of
"complete" is not very different from its common sense meaning,
just not as ambiguous.
I guess my question is this: If the diagonal sequence is inadequate,
just what exactly is Cantor attempting to represent with the diagonal sequence at all?
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of
proof-theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or
comparable examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as
proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing
incoherent about the statement 'no number is equal to its successor'
which is the example under discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
exactly correct PTS.
The biggest mistake that humanity makes that is killing
the whole planet is treating unbelievable as exactly
one-and-the-same-thing as untrue.
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable
examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof
theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent
about the statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is
the example under discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
false and a statement being meaningless?
The biggest mistake that humanity makes that is killing
the whole planet is treating unbelievable as exactly
one-and-the-same-thing as untrue.
I have no idea what you're getting at here.
André
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable
examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof
theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent
about the statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is
the example under discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
private author by author language it must be a
work written for a general audience like this work. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
false and a statement being meaningless?
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
this expression. These are the two papers that establish
this Definitional View.
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable
examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof
theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent
about the statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is
the example under discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
false and a statement being meaningless?
The biggest mistake that humanity makes that is killing
the whole planet is treating unbelievable as exactly
one-and-the-same-thing as untrue.
I have no idea what you're getting at here.
André
On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable
examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof
theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent
about the statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is
the example under discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
private author by author language it must be a
work written for a general audience like this work.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
false and a statement being meaningless?
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
this expression. These are the two papers that establish
this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
false and a statement being meaningless?
That's a simple yes/no question. If you want to append an explanation
that's fine, but please start your answer with either yes or no.
André
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable
examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof
theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent
about the statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is
the example under discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
false and a statement being meaningless?
Of course and that is such a dumb question that I
ignored it.
On 2026-06-30 15:56, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable
examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof
theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent
about the statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is
the example under discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
false and a statement being meaningless?
Of course and that is such a dumb question that I
ignored it.
But your interpretation of PTS claims that there is no difference.
You
claim that unprovable statements are meaningless; but any false
statement will be unprovable in a consistent logic.
PA can prove that 2 + 3 = 5
PA can't prove that 2 + 3 ≠ 5
But the latter isn't meaningless, it's simply false.
You're simply wrong when you assert that PTS claims that unprovable
claims are meaningless; that's simply not a coherent view.
André
On 2026-06-30 15:56, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable
examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof
theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent
about the statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is
the example under discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
false and a statement being meaningless?
Of course and that is such a dumb question that I
ignored it.
But your interpretation of PTS claims that there is no difference. You
claim that unprovable statements are meaningless; but any false
statement will be unprovable in a consistent logic.
PA can prove that 2 + 3 = 5
PA can't prove that 2 + 3 ≠ 5
But the latter isn't meaningless, it's simply false.
You're simply wrong when you assert that PTS claims that unprovable
claims are meaningless; that's simply not a coherent view.
André
On 6/30/2026 5:06 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-30 15:56, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable >>>>>> examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof >>>>>> theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent >>>>>> about the statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is >>>>>> the example under discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
false and a statement being meaningless?
Of course and that is such a dumb question that I
ignored it.
But your interpretation of PTS claims that there is no difference. You
claim that unprovable statements are meaningless; but any false
statement will be unprovable in a consistent logic.
PA can prove that 2 + 3 = 5
PA can't prove that 2 + 3 ≠ 5
But the latter isn't meaningless, it's simply false.
If no connection exists between an expression E
(or its negation ~E) and the axioms of formal
system F then E is undefined in F.
On 2026-06-30 16:42, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 5:06 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-30 15:56, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable >>>>>>> examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof >>>>>>> theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing
incoherent about the statement 'no number is equal to its
successor' which is the example under discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
being false and a statement being meaningless?
Of course and that is such a dumb question that I
ignored it.
But your interpretation of PTS claims that there is no difference.
You claim that unprovable statements are meaningless; but any false
statement will be unprovable in a consistent logic.
PA can prove that 2 + 3 = 5
PA can't prove that 2 + 3 ≠ 5
But the latter isn't meaningless, it's simply false.
If no connection exists between an expression E
(or its negation ~E) and the axioms of formal
system F then E is undefined in F.
So now you are adding 'or its negation' to your position (something not present in your earlier presentations). Can you provide a reference to a single author writing in PTS who makes such a claim?
And does 'undefined' differ from your earlier term 'meaningless'?
André
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable >>>>>> examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof >>>>>> theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent >>>>>> about the statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is >>>>>> the example under discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
private author by author language it must be a
work written for a general audience like this work.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
false and a statement being meaningless?
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
this expression. These are the two papers that establish
this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
false and a statement being meaningless?
I don't answer dumb questions.
That is why I am not responding to any posts
besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof-
theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or comparable >>>>>>> examples or made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as proof >>>>>>> theoretic semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing
incoherent about the statement 'no number is equal to its
successor' which is the example under discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
private author by author language it must be a
work written for a general audience like this work.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
being false and a statement being meaningless?
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
this expression. These are the two papers that establish
this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
false and a statement being meaningless?
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"
That is why I am not responding to any posts
besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest dodging of how P can be true
and P ∨ Q can be false is not trolling.
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof- >>>>>>>> theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or
comparable examples or made any claims about 'rejecting
expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And
there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no number is
equal to its successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
private author by author language it must be a
work written for a general audience like this work.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
being false and a statement being meaningless?
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
this expression. These are the two papers that establish
this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
false and a statement being meaningless?
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"
That is why I am not responding to any posts
besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction intruduction is
truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest dodging of how P can be
true and P ∨ Q can be false is not trolling.
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
the statement "no number is equal to its
successor" is not provable. While this statement
is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
of the point that I was making proving that you can
understand the key ideas.
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof- >>>>>>>> theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or
comparable examples or made any claims about 'rejecting
expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And
there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no number is
equal to its successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
private author by author language it must be a
work written for a general audience like this work.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
being false and a statement being meaningless?
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
this expression. These are the two papers that establish
this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement being
false and a statement being meaningless?
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof- >>>>>>>>> theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or
comparable examples or made any claims about 'rejecting
expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And >>>>>>>>> there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no number is >>>>>>>>> equal to its successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
private author by author language it must be a
work written for a general audience like this work.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
being false and a statement being meaningless?
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
this expression. These are the two papers that establish
this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
being false and a statement being meaningless?
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"
That is why I am not responding to any posts
besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction intruduction is
truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest dodging of how P can be
true and P ∨ Q can be false is not trolling.
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
the statement "no number is equal to its
successor" is not provable. While this statement
is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
of the point that I was making proving that you can
understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. That you
claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless.
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof- >>>>>>>>> theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or
comparable examples or made any claims about 'rejecting
expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And >>>>>>>>> there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no number is >>>>>>>>> equal to its successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
private author by author language it must be a
work written for a general audience like this work.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
being false and a statement being meaningless?
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
this expression. These are the two papers that establish
this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
being false and a statement being meaningless?
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"
Your lack of response to this constitutes that you agree it is correct,
and show everyone reading this what a liar you are.
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
being false and a statement being meaningless?
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of proof- >>>>>>>>>> theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or
comparable examples or made any claims about 'rejecting
expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And >>>>>>>>>> there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no number is >>>>>>>>>> equal to its successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>>
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
private author by author language it must be a
work written for a general audience like this work.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement >>>>>>>> being false and a statement being meaningless?
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
this expression. These are the two papers that establish
this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
being false and a statement being meaningless?
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"
That is why I am not responding to any posts
besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction intruduction is
truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest dodging of how P can be
true and P ∨ Q can be false is not trolling.
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
the statement "no number is equal to its
successor" is not provable. While this statement
is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
of the point that I was making proving that you can
understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. That you
claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is semantically
invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless.
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
does not exist in Q.
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. That you
claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is semantically
invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless.
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of >>>>>>>>>>> proof- theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples or >>>>>>>>>>> comparable examples or made any claims about 'rejecting >>>>>>>>>>> expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And >>>>>>>>>>> there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no number is >>>>>>>>>>> equal to its successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>>>
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
private author by author language it must be a
work written for a general audience like this work.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement >>>>>>>>> being false and a statement being meaningless?
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
this expression. These are the two papers that establish
this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement
being false and a statement being meaningless?
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"
That is why I am not responding to any posts
besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction intruduction is >>>>> truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest dodging of how P can be >>>>> true and P ∨ Q can be false is not trolling.
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
the statement "no number is equal to its
successor" is not provable. While this statement
is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
of the point that I was making proving that you can
understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. That you
claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is semantically
invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless.
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must be either
true or false.
does not exist in Q.
You just contradicted yourself.
On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of >>>>>>>>>>>> proof- theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples >>>>>>>>>>>> or comparable examples or made any claims about 'rejecting >>>>>>>>>>>> expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And >>>>>>>>>>>> there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no number is >>>>>>>>>>>> equal to its successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>>>>
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first >>>>>>>>>>> principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
private author by author language it must be a
work written for a general audience like this work.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/ >>>>>>>>>
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement >>>>>>>>>> being false and a statement being meaningless?
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
this expression. These are the two papers that establish
this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement >>>>>>>> being false and a statement being meaningless?
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"
That is why I am not responding to any posts
besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction intruduction
is truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest dodging of how P
can be true and P ∨ Q can be false is not trolling.
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
the statement "no number is equal to its
successor" is not provable. While this statement
is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
of the point that I was making proving that you can
understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. That you >>>> claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is semantically
invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless.
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must be either
true or false.
does not exist in Q.
Unlike PA it cannot possibly have any finite sequence
of inference steps in Q that resolve to a truth value in Q.
You just contradicted yourself.
On 2026-06-30 21:10, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. That you
claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is semantically
invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless.
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
But as soon as you bring up truth values you're no longer talking about
PTS which semantically divides expressions into 'provable' and 'not provable'.
In truth-functional semantics, the law of the excluded middle dictates
that ∀x, S(x) ≠ x must be either true or false. It's truth value might be unknown to us but there is a big difference between unknown and nonexistent.
Within PTS there is absolutely no contradiction about claiming that ∀x, S(x) ≠ x is unprovable while at the same time claiming that its negation is unprovable, but that both are perfectly legitimate and meaningful expressions of Q. If you think otherwise, provide a reference to some
author working in PTS who actually asserts something of this sort. I
suspect you can't because this simply isn't what PTS claims. It's you imposing your own views on a system developed by others which you do not fully understand.
André
On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of >>>>>>>>>>>>> proof- theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples >>>>>>>>>>>>> or comparable examples or made any claims about 'rejecting >>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. >>>>>>>>>>>>> And there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no >>>>>>>>>>>>> number is equal to its successor' which is the example >>>>>>>>>>>>> under discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true. >>>>>>>>>>>> What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first >>>>>>>>>>>> principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight.
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
private author by author language it must be a
work written for a general audience like this work.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/ >>>>>>>>>>
Would you agree that there is a difference between a
statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a
simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until >>>>>>>>>> they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in
Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
this expression. These are the two papers that establish
this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement >>>>>>>>> being false and a statement being meaningless?
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"
That is why I am not responding to any posts
besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction intruduction >>>>>>> is truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest dodging of how P >>>>>>> can be true and P ∨ Q can be false is not trolling.
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
the statement "no number is equal to its
successor" is not provable. While this statement
is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
of the point that I was making proving that you can
understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. That
you claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is
semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless.
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must be
either true or false.
Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.
does not exist in Q.
Unlike PA it cannot possibly have any finite sequence
of inference steps in Q that resolve to a truth value in Q.
Which means, by definition, you agree that Q is incomplete.
You just contradicted yourself.
On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).
That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.
It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the >>>>>> language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both undecidable >>>>>> and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.
Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
Irrelevant. The definition of completeness
It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
that something is missing that could be added to make
it complete.
It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do.
When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA.
On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof- theoretic semantics has ever offered those examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>> or comparable examples or made any claims about 'rejecting >>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions as proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> And there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no >>>>>>>>>>>>>> number is equal to its successor' which is the example >>>>>>>>>>>>>> under discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true. >>>>>>>>>>>>> What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first >>>>>>>>>>>>> principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight. >>>>>>>>>>>>
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
private author by author language it must be a
work written for a general audience like this work.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/ >>>>>>>>>>>
Would you agree that there is a difference between a
statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a >>>>>>>>>>> simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until >>>>>>>>>>> they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in >>>>>>>>>>> Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an
English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to
see if a definition exists and if it does not then the
English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between
an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of
this expression. These are the two papers that establish >>>>>>>>>>> this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a statement >>>>>>>>>> being false and a statement being meaningless?
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"
That is why I am not responding to any posts
besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction intruduction >>>>>>>> is truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest dodging of how P >>>>>>>> can be true and P ∨ Q can be false is not trolling.
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
the statement "no number is equal to its
successor" is not provable. While this statement
is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
of the point that I was making proving that you can
understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. That >>>>>> you claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is
semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless. >>>>>>
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must be
either true or false.
Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.
I make a very specific statement.
You mangle it and ask if I agree.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
does not exist in Q.
If you change that in any way you can assume that I do not agree.
does not exist in Q.
Unlike PA it cannot possibly have any finite sequence
of inference steps in Q that resolve to a truth value in Q.
Which means, by definition, you agree that Q is incomplete.
You just contradicted yourself.
On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions
as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof- theoretic semantics has ever offered those >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or comparable examples or made any claims about >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'rejecting expressions as proof theoretic semantically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent about the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the example under discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first >>>>>>>>>>>>>> principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
private author by author language it must be a
work written for a general audience like this work.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/ >>>>>>>>>>>>
Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a >>>>>>>>>>>> simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until >>>>>>>>>>>> they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in >>>>>>>>>>>> Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>> English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to >>>>>>>>>>>> see if a definition exists and if it does not then the >>>>>>>>>>>> English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between >>>>>>>>>>>> an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of >>>>>>>>>>>> this expression. These are the two papers that establish >>>>>>>>>>>> this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a
statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"
That is why I am not responding to any posts
besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction
intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest >>>>>>>>> dodging of how P can be true and P ∨ Q can be false is not >>>>>>>>> trolling.
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
the statement "no number is equal to its
successor" is not provable. While this statement
is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
of the point that I was making proving that you can
understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. That >>>>>>> you claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is
semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless. >>>>>>>
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must be
either true or false.
Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.
I make a very specific statement.
You mangle it and ask if I agree.
There was no mangling. That is the meaning of the words you used.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
In order for it to have a truth value, it must be either true or false.
That you say it has a truth value is your admission that it is in fact either true or false.
Only a statement that is semantically valid / correct can be true or
false, as it is it semantics (in this case the semantics of Q and the English language sentence it translates to) that determines truth values.
This therefore constitutes your admission that the above statement is semantically valid / correct, and that by extension PTS is incorrect
about this and therefore useless.
does not exist in Q.
If you change that in any way you can assume that I do not agree.
does not exist in Q.
Unlike PA it cannot possibly have any finite sequence
of inference steps in Q that resolve to a truth value in Q.
Which means, by definition, you agree that Q is incomplete.
You just contradicted yourself.
On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).
That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.
It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the >>>>>>> language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both undecidable >>>>>>> and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.
Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
Irrelevant. The definition of completeness
It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
that something is missing that could be added to make
it complete.
It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do.
When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA.
However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important
examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.
On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how
Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent.
No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof- theoretic semantics has ever offered those >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or comparable examples or made any claims about >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'rejecting expressions as proof theoretic semantically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent about the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement 'no number is equal to its successor' which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the example under discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact
text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
private author by author language it must be a
work written for a general audience like this work.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>
Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a >>>>>>>>>>>>> simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until >>>>>>>>>>>>> they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in >>>>>>>>>>>>> Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>> English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to >>>>>>>>>>>>> see if a definition exists and if it does not then the >>>>>>>>>>>>> English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless.
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between >>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>> this expression. These are the two papers that establish >>>>>>>>>>>>> this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a
statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"
That is why I am not responding to any posts
besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction
intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest >>>>>>>>>> dodging of how P can be true and P ∨ Q can be false is not >>>>>>>>>> trolling.
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
the statement "no number is equal to its
successor" is not provable. While this statement
is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
of the point that I was making proving that you can
understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. That >>>>>>>> you claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is
semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless. >>>>>>>>
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must be
either true or false.
Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.
I make a very specific statement.
You mangle it and ask if I agree.
There was no mangling. That is the meaning of the words you used.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
You already mangled it.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
In order for it to have a truth value, it must be either true or
false. That you say it has a truth value is your admission that it is
in fact either true or false.
Only a statement that is semantically valid / correct can be true or
false, as it is it semantics (in this case the semantics of Q and the
English language sentence it translates to) that determines truth values.
This therefore constitutes your admission that the above statement is
semantically valid / correct, and that by extension PTS is incorrect
about this and therefore useless.
does not exist in Q.
If you change that in any way you can assume that I do not agree.
does not exist in Q.
Unlike PA it cannot possibly have any finite sequence
of inference steps in Q that resolve to a truth value in Q.
Which means, by definition, you agree that Q is incomplete.
You just contradicted yourself.
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, they are not. No author writing in the framework of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof- theoretic semantics has ever offered those >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or comparable examples or made any claims >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about 'rejecting expressions as proof theoretic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent about the statement 'no number is equal to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own
private author by author language it must be a
work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until >>>>>>>>>>>>>> they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>> English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> see if a definition exists and if it does not then the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between >>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> this expression. These are the two papers that establish >>>>>>>>>>>>>> this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"
That is why I am not responding to any posts
besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction
intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest >>>>>>>>>>> dodging of how P can be true and P ∨ Q can be false is not >>>>>>>>>>> trolling.
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
the statement "no number is equal to its
successor" is not provable. While this statement
is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
of the point that I was making proving that you can
understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. >>>>>>>>> That you claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is >>>>>>>>> semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are worthless. >>>>>>>>>
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must be >>>>>>> either true or false.
Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.
I make a very specific statement.
You mangle it and ask if I agree.
There was no mangling. That is the meaning of the words you used.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
You already mangled it.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of statement to
not exist in a formal system?
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of statement
to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
truth value in Chinese.
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, they are not. No author writing in the framework >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of proof- theoretic semantics has ever offered those >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or comparable examples or made any claims >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about 'rejecting expressions as proof theoretic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent about the statement 'no number is equal to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a
work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see if a definition exists and if it does not then the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this expression. These are the two papers that establish >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"
That is why I am not responding to any posts
besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction
intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest >>>>>>>>>>>> dodging of how P can be true and P ∨ Q can be false is not >>>>>>>>>>>> trolling.
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
the statement "no number is equal to its
successor" is not provable. While this statement
is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification
of the point that I was making proving that you can
understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. >>>>>>>>>> That you claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is >>>>>>>>>> semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are
worthless.
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must be >>>>>>>> either true or false.
Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.
I make a very specific statement.
You mangle it and ask if I agree.
There was no mangling. That is the meaning of the words you used.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
You already mangled it.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of statement
to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of statement
to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
truth value in Chinese.
But ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well-formed expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just happens to be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would have entertained
the question of whether it could or could not be proven in Q.
André
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, they are not. No author writing in the framework >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of proof- theoretic semantics has ever offered those >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or comparable examples or made any claims >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about 'rejecting expressions as proof theoretic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent about the statement 'no number is equal to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from first >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless until >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see if a definition exists and if it does not then the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this expression. These are the two papers that establish >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong"
That is why I am not responding to any posts
besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction >>>>>>>>>>>>> intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated dishonest >>>>>>>>>>>>> dodging of how P can be true and P ∨ Q can be false is not >>>>>>>>>>>>> trolling.
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
the statement "no number is equal to its
successor" is not provable. While this statement
is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification >>>>>>>>>>>> of the point that I was making proving that you can
understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. >>>>>>>>>>> That you claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is >>>>>>>>>>> semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are >>>>>>>>>>> worthless.
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must be >>>>>>>>> either true or false.
Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.
I make a very specific statement.
You mangle it and ask if I agree.
There was no mangling. That is the meaning of the words you used.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
You already mangled it.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of statement
to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what it mean
for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
statement to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
truth value in Chinese.
But ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well-formed
expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just happens to be
unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would have entertained
the question of whether it could or could not be proven in Q.
André
It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
mean that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is ungrounded in the atomic
base of Q in many of the different ways that this
can be expressed by different PTS authors.
On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, they are not. No author writing in the framework >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of proof- theoretic semantics has ever offered those >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or comparable examples or made any claims >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about 'rejecting expressions as proof theoretic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantically incoherent'. And there's nothing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent about the statement 'no number is equal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to its successor' which is the example under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see if a definition exists and if it does not then the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this expression. These are the two papers that establish >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That is why I am not responding to any posts
besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction >>>>>>>>>>>>>> intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated >>>>>>>>>>>>>> dishonest dodging of how P can be true and P ∨ Q can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>> false is not trolling.
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
the statement "no number is equal to its
successor" is not provable. While this statement
is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson
Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification >>>>>>>>>>>>> of the point that I was making proving that you can
understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. >>>>>>>>>>>> That you claim that "no number is equal to its successor" is >>>>>>>>>>>> semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are >>>>>>>>>>>> worthless.
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must >>>>>>>>>> be either true or false.
Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.
I make a very specific statement.
You mangle it and ask if I agree.
There was no mangling. That is the meaning of the words you used. >>>>>>
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
You already mangled it.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
statement to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what it mean
for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
Wittgenstein (1937)
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
system' means: the opposite has been proved
in Russell's system
On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
statement to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
truth value in Chinese.
But ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well-formed
expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just happens to be
unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would have entertained
the question of whether it could or could not be proven in Q.
André
It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
mean that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is ungrounded in the atomic
base of Q in many of the different ways that this
can be expressed by different PTS authors.
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what it mean
for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
On 2026-07-01 12:20, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
statement to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
truth value in Chinese.
But ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well-formed >>> expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just happens to
be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would have
entertained the question of whether it could or could not be proven
in Q.
André
It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
mean that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is ungrounded in the atomic
base of Q in many of the different ways that this
can be expressed by different PTS authors.
Having no finite sequence of inference steps between the expression and
the axioms of Q is *not* the same thing as random gibberish.
It simply
means it is unprovable in Q.
And being ungrounded in the atomic base of
Q means that it cannot achieve the PTS meaning of provable but rather remains unprovable.
There's no way you can get from any of those things
to 'random gibberish'.
André
On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what it mean
for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he invariably responds
with an example or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't
get that examples don't take the place of definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but they aren't particularly useful
on their own.
André
On 7/1/2026 2:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
statement to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
truth value in Chinese.
But ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well-formed >>> expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just happens to
be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would have
entertained the question of whether it could or could not be proven
in Q.
André
It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
mean that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is ungrounded in the atomic
base of Q in many of the different ways that this
can be expressed by different PTS authors.
In other words, (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is not provable in Q.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but using different words.--
On 7/1/2026 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, they are not. No author writing in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> framework of proof- theoretic semantics has ever >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> offered those examples or comparable examples or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number is equal to its successor' which is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example under discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely true. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can make a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see if a definition exists and if it does not then the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this expression. These are the two papers that establish >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That is why I am not responding to any posts
besides yours. dbush has become a troll again.
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dishonest dodging of how P can be true and P ∨ Q can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false is not trolling.
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
the statement "no number is equal to its
successor" is not provable. While this statement
is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the point that I was making proving that you can >>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. >>>>>>>>>>>>> That you claim that "no number is equal to its successor" >>>>>>>>>>>>> is semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are >>>>>>>>>>>>> worthless.
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must >>>>>>>>>>> be either true or false.
Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.
I make a very specific statement.
You mangle it and ask if I agree.
There was no mangling. That is the meaning of the words you used. >>>>>>>
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
You already mangled it.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
statement to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what it
mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>
Wittgenstein (1937)
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
system' means: the opposite has been proved
in Russell's system
I specifically didn't ask for an external quote, as you have
demonstrated on countless occasions that you can't understand what
others have written.
Tell me, *in your own words*, what you think it means for the truth
value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what it
mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a definition
is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he invariably
responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he responds at all).
He doesn't get that examples don't take the place of definitions.
Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but they aren't
particularly useful on their own.
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
On 7/1/2026 1:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
statement to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
truth value in Chinese.
But ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well-formed >>>> expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just happens to
be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would have
entertained the question of whether it could or could not be proven
in Q.
André
It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
mean that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is ungrounded in the atomic
base of Q in many of the different ways that this
can be expressed by different PTS authors.
In other words, (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is not provable in Q.
In PTS that means the expression is undefined.
It does not mean that Q has undecidable sentences in PTS.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but using
different words.
On 7/1/2026 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote:
Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, they are not. No author writing in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> framework of proof- theoretic semantics has ever >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> offered those examples or comparable examples or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's nothing incoherent about the statement 'no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number is equal to its successor' which is the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example under discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless?
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> make a
simpler analogy in that English words are meaningless >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an expression in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see if a definition exists and if it does not then the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this expression. These are the two papers that establish >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That is why I am not responding to any posts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> besides yours. dbush has become a troll again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dishonest dodging of how P can be true and P ∨ Q can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false is not trolling.
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
the statement "no number is equal to its
successor" is not provable. While this statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally
(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the point that I was making proving that you can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're wrong. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> That you claim that "no number is equal to its successor" >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is semantically invalid shows everyone that your ideas are >>>>>>>>>>>>>> worthless.
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q must >>>>>>>>>>>> be either true or false.
Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.
I make a very specific statement.
You mangle it and ask if I agree.
There was no mangling. That is the meaning of the words you used. >>>>>>>>
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
You already mangled it.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
statement to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what it
mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal
system.
Wittgenstein (1937)
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
system' means: the opposite has been proved
in Russell's system
I specifically didn't ask for an external quote, as you have
demonstrated on countless occasions that you can't understand what
others have written.
Everything that I have said in the last five years
sums up to the above quote.
Tell me, *in your own words*, what you think it means for the truth
value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
I have mean exactly what Wittgenstein (1937) means
several years before I ever heard of him.
On 7/1/2026 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what it
mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal
system.
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a definition
is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he invariably
responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he responds at all).
He doesn't get that examples don't take the place of definitions.
Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but they aren't
particularly useful on their own.
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
I don't ask for the book definition of the term. I want to know what
*you* think it means for the truth value of a statement to not exist in
a formal system *in your own words*.
On 7/1/2026 1:56 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what it
mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal
system.
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a definition
is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he invariably
responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he responds at
all). He doesn't get that examples don't take the place of
definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but
they aren't particularly useful on their own.
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
I don't ask for the book definition of the term. I want to know what
*you* think it means for the truth value of a statement to not exist
in a formal system *in your own words*.
I have already said this thousands of times in the
last ten years.
On 7/1/2026 2:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
statement to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
truth value in Chinese.
But ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well-
formed expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just
happens to be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would
have entertained the question of whether it could or could not be
proven in Q.
André
It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
mean that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is ungrounded in the atomic
base of Q in many of the different ways that this
can be expressed by different PTS authors.
In other words, (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is not provable in Q.
In PTS that means the expression is undefined.
It does not mean that Q has undecidable sentences in PTS.
In your own words, what do you think it means for an expression to be undefined, and what do you think it means for a formal system to have undecidable sentences?
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but
using different words.
On 7/1/2026 2:54 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, they are not. No author writing in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> framework of proof- theoretic semantics has ever >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> offered those examples or comparable examples or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's nothing incoherent about the statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'no number is equal to its successor' which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the example under discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little weight. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a statement being false and a statement being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless?
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> make a
simpler analogy in that English words are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression in
Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English word to its definition. A proof merely looks to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see if a definition exists and if it does not then the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this expression. These are the two papers that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> establish
this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question:
Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That is why I am not responding to any posts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> besides yours. dbush has become a troll again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dishonest dodging of how P can be true and P ∨ Q can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false is not trolling.
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q),
the statement "no number is equal to its
successor" is not provable. While this statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the point that I was making proving that you can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong. That you claim that "no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor" is semantically invalid shows everyone that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your ideas are worthless.
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q >>>>>>>>>>>>> must be either true or false.
Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.
I make a very specific statement.
You mangle it and ask if I agree.
There was no mangling. That is the meaning of the words you used. >>>>>>>>>
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
You already mangled it.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
statement to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what it
mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal
system.
Wittgenstein (1937)
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
system' means: the opposite has been proved
in Russell's system
I specifically didn't ask for an external quote, as you have
demonstrated on countless occasions that you can't understand what
others have written.
Everything that I have said in the last five years
sums up to the above quote.
Don't sum it up in someone else's words. Sum it up *in your own words*.
--
Tell me, *in your own words*, what you think it means for the truth
value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
I have mean exactly what Wittgenstein (1937) means
several years before I ever heard of him.
What you think he means and what others think he means may not be the same.
That's why I asked you what you think it means in your own words.
On 7/1/2026 2:54 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
Tell me, *in your own words*, what you think it means for the truth
value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
I have mean exactly what Wittgenstein (1937) means
several years before I ever heard of him.
What you think he means and what others think he means may not be the same.
That's why I asked you what you think it means in your own words.
On 7/1/2026 1:59 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:54 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, they are not. No author writing in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> framework of proof- theoretic semantics has ever >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> offered those examples or comparable examples or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> made any claims about 'rejecting expressions as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof theoretic semantically incoherent'. And >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's nothing incoherent about the statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'no number is equal to its successor' which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the example under discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains completely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> weight.
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theoretic- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a statement being false and a statement being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless?
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> make a
simpler analogy in that English words are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression in
Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English word to its definition. A proof merely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> looks to
see if a definition exists and if it does not then the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between
an expression and a set of axioms as the definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this expression. These are the two papers that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> establish
this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Would you agree that there is a difference between a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being false and a statement being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless?
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That is why I am not responding to any posts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> besides yours. dbush has become a troll again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dishonest dodging of how P can be true and P ∨ Q can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be false is not trolling.
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q), >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the statement "no number is equal to its
successor" is not provable. While this statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the point that I was making proving that you can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong. That you claim that "no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor" is semantically invalid shows everyone that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your ideas are worthless.
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q >>>>>>>>>>>>>> must be either true or false.
Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.
I make a very specific statement.
You mangle it and ask if I agree.
There was no mangling. That is the meaning of the words you >>>>>>>>>> used.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
You already mangled it.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
statement to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what it >>>>>> mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal
system.
Wittgenstein (1937)
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
system' means: the opposite has been proved
in Russell's system
I specifically didn't ask for an external quote, as you have
demonstrated on countless occasions that you can't understand what
others have written.
Everything that I have said in the last five years
sums up to the above quote.
Don't sum it up in someone else's words. Sum it up *in your own words*.
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018
or as I say it now
True(L, X) := ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
True(L,x) is merely a short-hand macro defined as
provable on the basis of a set of Atomic Facts.
Tell me, *in your own words*, what you think it means for the truth
value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
I have mean exactly what Wittgenstein (1937) means
several years before I ever heard of him.
What you think he means and what others think he means may not be the
same.
That's why I asked you what you think it means in your own words.
On 7/1/2026 1:40 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:20, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
statement to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
truth value in Chinese.
But ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well-formed >>>> expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just happens to
be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would have
entertained the question of whether it could or could not be proven
in Q.
André
It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
mean that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is ungrounded in the atomic
base of Q in many of the different ways that this
can be expressed by different PTS authors.
Having no finite sequence of inference steps between the expression
and the axioms of Q is *not* the same thing as random gibberish.
It is closer to an English word such as "cat" that is
defined in English us undefined in Chinese.
It simply means it is unprovable in Q.
Which means something entirely different in PTS than
it means in TCS.
And being ungrounded in the atomic base of Q means that it cannot
achieve the PTS meaning of provable but rather remains unprovable.
What does Boxcar meaning in Chinese?
It has no meaning in Chinese.
When Boxcar is translated into Chinese: 棚车
then is has a Chinese meaning in Chinese.
There's no way you can get from any of those things to 'random
gibberish'.
The main unprovable that I have been working on
for 27 years is cases of pathological self-reference
that have incoherent meaning like this famous sentence:
Colorless green ideas sleep furiously was composed by
Noam Chomsky in his 1957 book Syntactic Structures as
an example of a sentence that is grammatically well-formed,
but semantically nonsensical.
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what it
mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a definition
is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he invariably
responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he responds at all).
He doesn't get that examples don't take the place of definitions.
Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but they aren't
particularly useful on their own.
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
On 7/1/2026 3:09 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:59 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:54 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system?
On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, they are not. No author writing in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> framework of proof- theoretic semantics has >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ever offered those examples or comparable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or made any claims about 'rejecting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions as proof theoretic semantically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about the statement 'no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
None-the-less what I have said remains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied PTS >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exactly that way before does not mean that it is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> weight.
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theoretic- semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between a statement being false and a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being meaningless?
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> make a
simpler analogy in that English words are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression in
Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of an
English word to its definition. A proof merely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> looks to
see if a definition exists and if it does not then >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between
an expression and a set of axioms as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of
this expression. These are the two papers that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> establish
this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Would you agree that there is a difference between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a statement being false and a statement being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless?
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That is why I am not responding to any posts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> besides yours. dbush has become a troll again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dishonest dodging of how P can be true and P ∨ Q can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be false is not trolling.
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q), >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the statement "no number is equal to its
successor" is not provable. While this statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the point that I was making proving that you can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong. That you claim that "no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor" is semantically invalid shows everyone that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your ideas are worthless.
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must be either true or false.
Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.
I make a very specific statement.
You mangle it and ask if I agree.
There was no mangling. That is the meaning of the words you >>>>>>>>>>> used.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
You already mangled it.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q. >>>>>>>>>
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what it >>>>>>> mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>> system.
Wittgenstein (1937)
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
system' means: the opposite has been proved
in Russell's system
I specifically didn't ask for an external quote, as you have
demonstrated on countless occasions that you can't understand what
others have written.
Everything that I have said in the last five years
sums up to the above quote.
Don't sum it up in someone else's words. Sum it up *in your own words*. >>>
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018
So in other words, the truth value of a statement not existing in a
formal system simply means that the statement is not provable in that system.
On 2026-07-01 12:50, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:40 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:20, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
statement to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
truth value in Chinese.
But ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well-
formed expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just
happens to be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would
have entertained the question of whether it could or could not be
proven in Q.
André
It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
mean that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is ungrounded in the atomic
base of Q in many of the different ways that this
can be expressed by different PTS authors.
Having no finite sequence of inference steps between the expression
and the axioms of Q is *not* the same thing as random gibberish.
It is closer to an English word such as "cat" that is
defined in English us undefined in Chinese.
That's a completely spurious analogy. 'cat' isn't an expression of the Chinese language. ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x *is* an expression of the language of Q.
It simply means it is unprovable in Q.
Then you're either using a completely idiosyncratic definition of 'gibberish' or a completely idiosyncratic definition of 'provable'
(or both). That's why people keep asking you to provide *your*
definitions, but you only respond with examples or analogies which fail
to clarify what you might mean.
Which means something entirely different in PTS than
it means in TCS.
unprovable means the same thing in both.
On 7/1/2026 2:19 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:09 PM, olcott wrote:That is not what I said.
On 7/1/2026 1:59 PM, dbush wrote:So in other words, the truth value of a statement not existing in a
On 7/1/2026 2:54 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system?
On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, they are not. No author writing in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> framework of proof- theoretic semantics has >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ever offered those examples or comparable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or made any claims about 'rejecting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions as proof theoretic semantically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about the statement 'no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor' which is the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
None-the-less what I have said remains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from first
principles is exactly that. That no one applied >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> weight.
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theoretic- semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between a statement being false and a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being meaningless?
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can make a
simpler analogy in that English words are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression in
Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of an
English word to its definition. A proof merely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> looks to
see if a definition exists and if it does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then the
English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between
an expression and a set of axioms as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of
this expression. These are the two papers that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> establish
this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Would you agree that there is a difference between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a statement being false and a statement being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless?
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That is why I am not responding to any posts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> besides yours. dbush has become a troll again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dishonest dodging of how P can be true and P ∨ Q can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be false is not trolling.
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q), >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the statement "no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor" is not provable. While this statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the point that I was making proving that you can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong. That you claim that "no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor" is semantically invalid shows everyone that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your ideas are worthless.
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must be either true or false.
Your lack of reply confirms your above admission.
I make a very specific statement.
You mangle it and ask if I agree.
There was no mangling. That is the meaning of the words you >>>>>>>>>>>> used.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
You already mangled it.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q. >>>>>>>>>>
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what >>>>>>>> it mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a
formal system.
Wittgenstein (1937)
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
system' means: the opposite has been proved
in Russell's system
I specifically didn't ask for an external quote, as you have
demonstrated on countless occasions that you can't understand what >>>>>> others have written.
Everything that I have said in the last five years
sums up to the above quote.
Don't sum it up in someone else's words. Sum it up *in your own
words*.
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>
formal system simply means that the statement is not provable in that
system.
On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what it
mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal
system.
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a definition
is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he invariably
responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he responds at all).
He doesn't get that examples don't take the place of definitions.
Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but they aren't
particularly useful on their own.
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English dictionary, this
isn't really an option.
André
On 7/1/2026 2:23 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:50, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:40 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:20, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q.
In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of
statement to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
truth value in Chinese.
But ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well- >>>>>> formed expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just
happens to be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one would >>>>>> have entertained the question of whether it could or could not be >>>>>> proven in Q.
André
It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
mean that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is ungrounded in the atomic
base of Q in many of the different ways that this
can be expressed by different PTS authors.
Having no finite sequence of inference steps between the expression
and the axioms of Q is *not* the same thing as random gibberish.
It is closer to an English word such as "cat" that is
defined in English us undefined in Chinese.
That's a completely spurious analogy. 'cat' isn't an expression of the
Chinese language. ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x *is* an expression of the language of Q. >>
It simply means it is unprovable in Q.
Then you're either using a completely idiosyncratic definition of
'gibberish' or a completely idiosyncratic definition of 'provable'
(or both). That's why people keep asking you to provide *your*
definitions, but you only respond with examples or analogies which
fail to clarify what you might mean.
Which means something entirely different in PTS than
it means in TCS.
unprovable means the same thing in both.
Wittgenstein (1937)
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
system' means: the opposite has been proved
in Russell's system
Does not mean that G is undecidable in PA.
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what it
mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal
system.
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a definition
is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he invariably
responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he responds at
all). He doesn't get that examples don't take the place of
definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but
they aren't particularly useful on their own.
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English dictionary, this
isn't really an option.
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
On 7/1/2026 3:44 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:19 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:09 PM, olcott wrote:That is not what I said.
On 7/1/2026 1:59 PM, dbush wrote:So in other words, the truth value of a statement not existing in a
On 7/1/2026 2:54 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system?
On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, they are not. No author writing in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> framework of proof- theoretic semantics has >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ever offered those examples or comparable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or made any claims about 'rejecting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions as proof theoretic semantically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about the statement 'no number is equal to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its successor' which is the example under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse-engineering >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from first
principles is exactly that. That no one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> weight.
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the exact >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this work. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theoretic- semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between a statement being false and a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being meaningless?
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can make a
simpler analogy in that English words are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression in
Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the connection >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of an
English word to its definition. A proof merely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> looks to
see if a definition exists and if it does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then the
English Word / Expression of Q remains meaningless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between
an expression and a set of axioms as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of
this expression. These are the two papers that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> establish
this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Would you agree that there is a difference >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between a statement being false and a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being meaningless?
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That is why I am not responding to any posts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> besides yours. dbush has become a troll again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Reminding people that you admitted that disjunction >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> intruduction is truth-preserving by your repeated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dishonest dodging of how P can be true and P ∨ Q >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be false is not trolling.
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q), >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the statement "no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor" is not provable. While this statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant simplification >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the point that I was making proving that you can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong. That you claim that "no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor" is semantically invalid shows everyone >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that your ideas are worthless.
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
So you admit that the above statement which exists in Q >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must be either true or false.
Your lack of reply confirms your above admission. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I make a very specific statement.
You mangle it and ask if I agree.
There was no mangling. That is the meaning of the words >>>>>>>>>>>>> you used.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
You already mangled it.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q. >>>>>>>>>>>
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what >>>>>>>>> it mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>> formal system.
Wittgenstein (1937)
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
system' means: the opposite has been proved
in Russell's system
I specifically didn't ask for an external quote, as you have
demonstrated on countless occasions that you can't understand
what others have written.
Everything that I have said in the last five years
sums up to the above quote.
Don't sum it up in someone else's words. Sum it up *in your own
words*.
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>
formal system simply means that the statement is not provable in that
system.
Then translate the above symbols to English so we can examine that more carefully.
On 2026-07-01 13:47, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:23 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:50, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:40 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:20, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q. >>>>>>>>>In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
truth value in Chinese.
But ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well- >>>>>>> formed expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just >>>>>>> happens to be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one
would have entertained the question of whether it could or could >>>>>>> not be proven in Q.
André
It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
mean that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is ungrounded in the atomic
base of Q in many of the different ways that this
can be expressed by different PTS authors.
Having no finite sequence of inference steps between the expression >>>>> and the axioms of Q is *not* the same thing as random gibberish.
It is closer to an English word such as "cat" that is
defined in English us undefined in Chinese.
That's a completely spurious analogy. 'cat' isn't an expression of
the Chinese language. ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x *is* an expression of the
language of Q.
It simply means it is unprovable in Q.
Then you're either using a completely idiosyncratic definition of
'gibberish' or a completely idiosyncratic definition of 'provable'
(or both). That's why people keep asking you to provide *your*
definitions, but you only respond with examples or analogies which
fail to clarify what you might mean.
Which means something entirely different in PTS than
it means in TCS.
unprovable means the same thing in both.
Wittgenstein (1937)
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
system' means: the opposite has been proved
in Russell's system
You keep quoting this particular bit despite the fact that its been
pointed out on numerous occasions that Wittgenstein wrote the above in
his private notes *before* he had actually read Gödel's paper, and he
never went on to publish anything to this effect suggesting he didn't subscribe to this position after he'd actually read Gödel.
Does not mean that G is undecidable in PA.
It doesn't say anything at all about whether G is decidable in PA.
André
On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what it >>>>>> mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal
system.
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a
definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he
invariably responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he
responds at all). He doesn't get that examples don't take the place >>>>> of definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions,
but they aren't particularly useful on their own.
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English dictionary,
this isn't really an option.
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any
way clarify what you think it means for something to not have a truth
value.
André
On 7/1/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:44 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:19 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:09 PM, olcott wrote:That is not what I said.
On 7/1/2026 1:59 PM, dbush wrote:So in other words, the truth value of a statement not existing in a
On 7/1/2026 2:54 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system?
On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, they are not. No author writing in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> framework of proof- theoretic semantics has >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ever offered those examples or comparable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or made any claims about 'rejecting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressions as proof theoretic semantically >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incoherent'. And there's nothing incoherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about the statement 'no number is equal to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its successor' which is the example under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> discussion.
André
None-the-less what I have said remains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> engineering from first
principles is exactly that. That no one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very little >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> weight.
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exact
text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theoretic- semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between a statement being false and a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can make a
simpler analogy in that English words are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression in
Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection of an
English word to its definition. A proof merely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> looks to
see if a definition exists and if it does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then the
English Word / Expression of Q remains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless.
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference steps >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between
an expression and a set of axioms as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of
this expression. These are the two papers that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> establish
this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Would you agree that there is a difference >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between a statement being false and a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being meaningless?
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That is why I am not responding to any posts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> besides yours. dbush has become a troll again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Reminding people that you admitted that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> disjunction intruduction is truth-preserving by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your repeated dishonest dodging of how P can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true and P ∨ Q can be false is not trolling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q), >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the statement "no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor" is not provable. While this statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> simplification
of the point that I was making proving that you can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong. That you claim that "no number is equal to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its successor" is semantically invalid shows >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone that your ideas are worthless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
So you admit that the above statement which exists in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q must be either true or false.
Your lack of reply confirms your above admission. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I make a very specific statement.
You mangle it and ask if I agree.
There was no mangling. That is the meaning of the words >>>>>>>>>>>>>> you used.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
You already mangled it.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what >>>>>>>>>> it mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>> formal system.
Wittgenstein (1937)
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
system' means: the opposite has been proved
in Russell's system
I specifically didn't ask for an external quote, as you have
demonstrated on countless occasions that you can't understand >>>>>>>> what others have written.
Everything that I have said in the last five years
sums up to the above quote.
Don't sum it up in someone else's words. Sum it up *in your own >>>>>> words*.
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>
formal system simply means that the statement is not provable in
that system.
Then translate the above symbols to English so we can examine that
more carefully.
True in the formal language of formal system L for expression X means
that there exists a subset of the axioms of L such that a finite
sequence of inference steps in L reach this subset of axioms of L.
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what it >>>>>>> mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>> system.
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a
definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he
invariably responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he
responds at all). He doesn't get that examples don't take the
place of definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying
definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on their own.
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English dictionary,
this isn't really an option.
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>> has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at least
it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in
any way clarify what you think it means for something to not have a
truth value.
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
and your fault.
On 7/1/2026 4:23 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:44 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:19 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:09 PM, olcott wrote:That is not what I said.
On 7/1/2026 1:59 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:54 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:35 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 6:55 AM, dbush wrote:In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system?
On 7/1/2026 12:20 AM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:17 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/30/2026 11:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 10:02 PM, dbush wrote:So you admit that the above statement which exists in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q must be either true or false.
On 6/30/2026 10:57 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 9:34 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 6:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 4:56 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-30 15:45, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/30/2026 4:18 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 21:06, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/29/2026 9:49 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-06-29 20:42, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Those are specific concrete examples of how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Proof Theoretic Semantics rejects expressions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as Proof Theoretic Semantically incoherent. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>No, they are not. No author writing in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> framework of proof- theoretic semantics has >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ever offered those examples or comparable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples or made any claims about >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'rejecting expressions as proof theoretic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantically incoherent'. And there's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nothing incoherent about the statement 'no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number is equal to its successor' which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the example under discussion. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
None-the-less what I have said remains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> completely true.
What I have spent 28 years reverse- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> engineering from first >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> principles is exactly that. That no one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> applied PTS
exactly that way before does not mean that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is not
exactly correct PTS.
Unfortunately, your say so carries very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> little weight.
Yes. That is why I need to carefully find the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exact
text that backs me up. Because PTS has their own >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> private author by author language it must be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work written for a general audience like this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theoretic- semantics/
Would you agree that there is a difference >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between a statement being false and a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement being meaningless? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
PTS is the way that meaning actually works. We >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can make a
simpler analogy in that English words are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless until
they are defined. The PTS connection of an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression in
Q to its axioms Q is analogous to the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection of an
English word to its definition. A proof merely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> looks to
see if a definition exists and if it does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then the
English Word / Expression of Q remains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless.
PTS counts a finite sequence of inference >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> steps between
an expression and a set of axioms as the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of
this expression. These are the two papers that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> establish
this Definitional View.
None of the above answers my question: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Would you agree that there is a difference >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between a statement being false and a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being meaningless?
I don't answer dumb questions.
Translation:
"I don't answer questions that can prove me wrong" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That is why I am not responding to any posts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> besides yours. dbush has become a troll again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Reminding people that you admitted that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> disjunction intruduction is truth-preserving by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your repeated dishonest dodging of how P can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true and P ∨ Q can be false is not trolling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
In Robinson Arithmetic (often denoted as Q), >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the statement "no number is equal to its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> successor" is not provable. While this statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is true for the standard natural numbers, Robinson >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetic is too weak to prove it universally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x).
That you brought this up was a brilliant >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> simplification
of the point that I was making proving that you can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand the key ideas.
What is was is a way to show more easily how you're >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrong. That you claim that "no number is equal to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its successor" is semantically invalid shows >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone that your ideas are worthless. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
This is more accurate:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Your lack of reply confirms your above admission. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I make a very specific statement.
You mangle it and ask if I agree.
There was no mangling. That is the meaning of the words >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you used.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x)
You already mangled it.
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist >>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system.
Wittgenstein (1937)
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
system' means: the opposite has been proved
in Russell's system
I specifically didn't ask for an external quote, as you have >>>>>>>>> demonstrated on countless occasions that you can't understand >>>>>>>>> what others have written.
Everything that I have said in the last five years
sums up to the above quote.
Don't sum it up in someone else's words. Sum it up *in your own >>>>>>> words*.
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018
So in other words, the truth value of a statement not existing in a >>>>> formal system simply means that the statement is not provable in
that system.
Then translate the above symbols to English so we can examine that
more carefully.
True in the formal language of formal system L for expression X means
that there exists a subset of the axioms of L such that a finite
sequence of inference steps in L reach this subset of axioms of L.
I didn't ask what you think true in a formal system means. I asked what you think it means for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what >>>>>>>> it mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a
formal system.
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a
definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he
responds at all). He doesn't get that examples don't take the
place of definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying
definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on their own.
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English dictionary,
this isn't really an option.
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>> has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at least
it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in
any way clarify what you think it means for something to not have a
truth value.
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
A valid answer would look something like this:
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal system when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
On 7/1/2026 3:11 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 13:47, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:23 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:50, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:40 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:20, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q. >>>>>>>>>>In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
truth value in Chinese.
But ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well- >>>>>>>> formed expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just >>>>>>>> happens to be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one
would have entertained the question of whether it could or could >>>>>>>> not be proven in Q.
André
It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
mean that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is ungrounded in the atomic
base of Q in many of the different ways that this
can be expressed by different PTS authors.
Having no finite sequence of inference steps between the
expression and the axioms of Q is *not* the same thing as random
gibberish.
It is closer to an English word such as "cat" that is
defined in English us undefined in Chinese.
That's a completely spurious analogy. 'cat' isn't an expression of
the Chinese language. ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x *is* an expression of the
language of Q.
It simply means it is unprovable in Q.
Then you're either using a completely idiosyncratic definition of
'gibberish' or a completely idiosyncratic definition of 'provable'
(or both). That's why people keep asking you to provide *your*
definitions, but you only respond with examples or analogies which
fail to clarify what you might mean.
Which means something entirely different in PTS than
it means in TCS.
unprovable means the same thing in both.
Wittgenstein (1937)
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
system' means: the opposite has been proved
in Russell's system
You keep quoting this particular bit despite the fact that its been
pointed out on numerous occasions that Wittgenstein wrote the above in
his private notes *before* he had actually read Gödel's paper, and he
What matters is the it is the way that true on the
basis of meaning expressed in language has always
worked. Also what matters is that I came up with
this exact same thing years before I ever heard
of him.
never went on to publish anything to this effect suggesting he didn't
subscribe to this position after he'd actually read Gödel.
Does not mean that G is undecidable in PA.
It doesn't say anything at all about whether G is decidable in PA.
André
Any expression X that is unprovable in any formal
system F is untrue in that formal system F
Any expression X that is irrefutable in any formal
system F is unfalse in that formal system F.
On 2026-07-01 14:28, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:11 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 13:47, olcott wrote:What matters is the it is the way that true on the
On 7/1/2026 2:23 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:50, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:40 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:20, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:01, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 12:33 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:40 AM, olcott wrote:
The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q. >>>>>>>>>>>In your own words, what does it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system?
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
Until "cats are animals" is translated into Chinese
it is just random gibberish that has no meaning or
truth value in Chinese.
But ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x *isn't* random gibberish in Q. It is a well- >>>>>>>>> formed expression of Q that has a well-defined meaning. It just >>>>>>>>> happens to be unprovable. If it were random gibberish no one >>>>>>>>> would have entertained the question of whether it could or
could not be proven in Q.
André
It has no finite sequence of inference steps between
the expression and the axioms of Q. This seems to
mean that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is ungrounded in the atomic
base of Q in many of the different ways that this
can be expressed by different PTS authors.
Having no finite sequence of inference steps between the
expression and the axioms of Q is *not* the same thing as random >>>>>>> gibberish.
It is closer to an English word such as "cat" that is
defined in English us undefined in Chinese.
That's a completely spurious analogy. 'cat' isn't an expression of
the Chinese language. ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x *is* an expression of the
language of Q.
It simply means it is unprovable in Q.
Then you're either using a completely idiosyncratic definition of
'gibberish' or a completely idiosyncratic definition of 'provable'
(or both). That's why people keep asking you to provide *your*
definitions, but you only respond with examples or analogies which
fail to clarify what you might mean.
Which means something entirely different in PTS than
it means in TCS.
unprovable means the same thing in both.
Wittgenstein (1937)
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
system' means: the opposite has been proved
in Russell's system
You keep quoting this particular bit despite the fact that its been
pointed out on numerous occasions that Wittgenstein wrote the above
in his private notes *before* he had actually read Gödel's paper, and he >>
basis of meaning expressed in language has always
worked. Also what matters is that I came up with
this exact same thing years before I ever heard
of him.
If that's what you believe then make your case. But don't cite
Wittgenstein as supporting your position when it's unlikely he actually stood by those remarks
never went on to publish anything to this effect suggesting he didn't
subscribe to this position after he'd actually read Gödel.
Does not mean that G is undecidable in PA.
It doesn't say anything at all about whether G is decidable in PA.
André
Any expression X that is unprovable in any formal
system F is untrue in that formal system F
Any expression X that is irrefutable in any formal
system F is unfalse in that formal system F.
So now you have a four-valued logic? (true, false, untrue, unfalse).
If so, you'll need to define what all of these values actually mean, and you'll need to completely redefine all of the basic logical operators so that they account for these four values.
5 = 5 is irrefutable in Q. According to what you say above that makes it 'unfalse'. How is that different from being 'true'?
André
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what >>>>>>>>> it mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>> formal system.
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a
definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he >>>>>>>> responds at all). He doesn't get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying
definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English dictionary, >>>>>> this isn't really an option.
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>> has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at
least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It
doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means for something to
not have a truth value.
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth value of a
statement to not exist in a formal system.
A valid answer would look something like this:
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal system
when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
I have said this so many thousands of times over
the years that it did not occur to me that I did
not fully spell this out this time.
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of what >>>>>>>>>> it mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>> formal system.
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a
definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an analogy (assuming he >>>>>>>>> responds at all). He doesn't get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English dictionary, >>>>>>> this isn't really an option.
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at
least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It
doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means for something to >>>>> not have a truth value.
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth value of a
statement to not exist in a formal system.
A valid answer would look something like this:
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal system
when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but using different words.
And just to remind everyone, the following terms mean the same as "unprovable" as per the definitions given by olcott:
- truth value doesn't exist
- out-of-scope
- not semantically grounded
- not grounded in the atomic base
- not a confirmed statement
I have said this so many thousands of times over
the years that it did not occur to me that I did
not fully spell this out this time.
On 7/1/2026 3:50 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Any expression X that is unprovable in any formal
system F is untrue in that formal system F
Any expression X that is irrefutable in any formal
system F is unfalse in that formal system F.
So now you have a four-valued logic? (true, false, untrue, unfalse).
Like the expression: "What time is it?"
we have true, false, not truth apt.
If so, you'll need to define what all of these values actually mean,
and you'll need to completely redefine all of the basic logical
operators so that they account for these four values.
5 = 5 is irrefutable in Q. According to what you say above that makes
it 'unfalse'. How is that different from being 'true'?
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist >>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system.
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an example or an analogy (assuming >>>>>>>>>> he responds at all). He doesn't get that examples don't take >>>>>>>>>> the place of definitions. Examples can be useful for
clarifying definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on >>>>>>>>>> their own.
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English
dictionary, this isn't really an option.
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at
least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It
doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means for something
to not have a truth value.
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth value of
a statement to not exist in a formal system.
A valid answer would look something like this:
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal system
when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not
exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which is
commonly known.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but using
different words.
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.
The Halting Problem counter-example input
is more like
the Liar Paradox. For HHH(DD)
DD is bad input
not at all
the same thing as saying that computation is fundamentally
limited.
And just to remind everyone, the following terms mean the same as
"unprovable" as per the definitions given by olcott:
- truth value doesn't exist
- out-of-scope
- not semantically grounded
- not grounded in the atomic base
- not a confirmed statement
I have said this so many thousands of times over
the years that it did not occur to me that I did
not fully spell this out this time.
On 2026-07-01 14:52, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:50 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Any expression X that is unprovable in any formal
system F is untrue in that formal system F
Any expression X that is irrefutable in any formal
system F is unfalse in that formal system F.
So now you have a four-valued logic? (true, false, untrue, unfalse).
Like the expression: "What time is it?"
we have true, false, not truth apt.
So a three-valued system. Then the same remarks apply. You need to
actually define your three-valued system and show how the basic logical operators actually work in that system.
And your natural language example is entirely unrevealing. Natural
language distinguishes between interrogative and declarative sentences.
Q has only declarative sentences and declarative sentences, by
definition, are sentences which evaluate to a truth value.
And in standard logic there is this thing called the law of the excluded middle which states that every declarative sentence is either true or
false. You can't just introduce some concept like "not truth apt"
without completely redefining logic from the ground up.
You haven't made
even the feeblest attempt at doing this. You simply introduce concepts
as if they will magically fit into an existing system rather than
exploring what the consequences of introducing such concepts would
actually have
If so, you'll need to define what all of these values actually mean,
and you'll need to completely redefine all of the basic logical
operators so that they account for these four values.
5 = 5 is irrefutable in Q. According to what you say above that makes
it 'unfalse'. How is that different from being 'true'?
No answer?
André
On 7/1/2026 4:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 14:52, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:50 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Any expression X that is unprovable in any formal
system F is untrue in that formal system F
Any expression X that is irrefutable in any formal
system F is unfalse in that formal system F.
So now you have a four-valued logic? (true, false, untrue, unfalse).
Like the expression: "What time is it?"
we have true, false, not truth apt.
So a three-valued system. Then the same remarks apply. You need to
actually define your three-valued system and show how the basic
logical operators actually work in that system.
It is not a three-valued system as these are commonly
understood.
When we go with the expressiveness of
natural language then construing all sentences as
true or false is directly seen to be as stupid as it
has always been.
And your natural language example is entirely unrevealing. NaturalBecause logic only has propositions that it incorrectly assumed
language distinguishes between interrogative and declarative
sentences. Q has only declarative sentences and declarative sentences,
by definition, are sentences which evaluate to a truth value.
must be true or false it stupidly ignores the third possibility
of semantically ill-formed.
And in standard logic there is this thing called the law of the
excluded middle which states that every declarative sentence is either
true or false. You can't just introduce some concept like "not truth
apt" without completely redefining logic from the ground up.
Not truth apt and not a truth bearer already has established
well-defined meanings that logic stupidly ignores.
The law of the excluded middle forces logicians to stupidly
classify semantic nonsense as true or false.
You haven't made even the feeblest attempt at doing this. You simply
introduce concepts as if they will magically fit into an existing
system rather than exploring what the consequences of introducing such
concepts would actually have
If so, you'll need to define what all of these values actually mean,
and you'll need to completely redefine all of the basic logical
operators so that they account for these four values.
5 = 5 is irrefutable in Q. According to what you say above that
makes it 'unfalse'. How is that different from being 'true'?
No answer?
André
Wittgenstein (1937)
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
system' means: the opposite has been proved
in Russell's system
Has been inherently the way that true on the basis
of meaning expressed in language HAS ALWAYS WORKED.
Expressions of language are ONLY true, or false on
the basis of their connections to other Expressions
of language.
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in
English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth value of a statement to not exist >>>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system.
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an example or an analogy
(assuming he responds at all). He doesn't get that examples >>>>>>>>>>> don't take the place of definitions. Examples can be useful >>>>>>>>>>> for clarifying definitions, but they aren't particularly >>>>>>>>>>> useful on their own.
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English
dictionary, this isn't really an option.
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at >>>>>>> least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means for something >>>>>>> to not have a truth value.
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth value of >>>>> a statement to not exist in a formal system.
A valid answer would look something like this:
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal system
when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not >>> exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which is >>> commonly known.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but
using different words.
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.
False. It means that there are statements in the language of Q that
have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system.
The Halting Problem counter-example input
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that meets
the following requirements:
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed directly
is more like
the Liar Paradox. For HHH(DD)
On 2026-07-01 16:43, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:10 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 14:52, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:50 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Any expression X that is unprovable in any formal
system F is untrue in that formal system F
Any expression X that is irrefutable in any formal
system F is unfalse in that formal system F.
So now you have a four-valued logic? (true, false, untrue, unfalse). >>>>>
Like the expression: "What time is it?"
we have true, false, not truth apt.
So a three-valued system. Then the same remarks apply. You need to
actually define your three-valued system and show how the basic
logical operators actually work in that system.
It is not a three-valued system as these are commonly
understood.
If it divides sentences into anything other than true and false then it
is a three-valued system.
When we go with the expressiveness of
natural language then construing all sentences as
true or false is directly seen to be as stupid as it
has always been.
Natural language tells us nothing about Q.
And your natural language example is entirely unrevealing. NaturalBecause logic only has propositions that it incorrectly assumed
language distinguishes between interrogative and declarative
sentences. Q has only declarative sentences and declarative
sentences, by definition, are sentences which evaluate to a truth value. >>>
must be true or false it stupidly ignores the third possibility
of semantically ill-formed.
And in standard logic there is this thing called the law of the
excluded middle which states that every declarative sentence is
either true or false. You can't just introduce some concept like "not
truth apt" without completely redefining logic from the ground up.
Not truth apt and not a truth bearer already has established
well-defined meanings that logic stupidly ignores.
AFAICT, 'truth bearer' is simply a synonym for 'declarative sentence'.
And declarative sentences are the only kind of sentence found in Q.
Whatever meaning you intended is not an 'established well-defined
meaning'. It is your own private meaning.
And ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x is most definitely a truth bearer.
The law of the excluded middle forces logicians to stupidly
classify semantic nonsense as true or false.
Which is exactly what we want in Boolean logic.
You haven't made even the feeblest attempt at doing this. You simply
introduce concepts as if they will magically fit into an existing
system rather than exploring what the consequences of introducing
such concepts would actually have
If so, you'll need to define what all of these values actually
mean, and you'll need to completely redefine all of the basic
logical operators so that they account for these four values.
5 = 5 is irrefutable in Q. According to what you say above that
makes it 'unfalse'. How is that different from being 'true'?
No answer?
André
Wittgenstein (1937)
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
system' means: the opposite has been proved
in Russell's system
I explained to you not two hours ago why this particular quote carries absolutely no weight with me, so there's really no point in bringing it
up again.
If true and provable were equivalent, we wouldn't have two different
words for them. 'true' is an ontological category; 'provable' is an epistemic category. They don't map onto one another.
André
Has been inherently the way that true on the basis
of meaning expressed in language HAS ALWAYS WORKED.
Expressions of language are ONLY true, or false on
the basis of their connections to other Expressions
of language.
On 7/1/2026 6:09 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Not exactly because most every human has been too stupid
to understand that "This sentence is not true" is a semantically
incoherent declarative sentence. Even the great Saul Kripke
(did better than everyone else) yet did not quite get there.
And ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x is most definitely a truth bearer.
If is it not provable in Q then it is not a truth
bearer in Q. Because we can see that it is provable
in PA this causes us to screw up and think that this
means that it is true in Q.
Of course woefully fallible humans never give a rat's ass for infallible truth.The law of the excluded middle forces logicians to stupidly
classify semantic nonsense as true or false.
Which is exactly what we want in Boolean logic.
You haven't made even the feeblest attempt at doing this. You simply
introduce concepts as if they will magically fit into an existing
system rather than exploring what the consequences of introducing
such concepts would actually have
If so, you'll need to define what all of these values actually
mean, and you'll need to completely redefine all of the basic
logical operators so that they account for these four values.
5 = 5 is irrefutable in Q. According to what you say above that
makes it 'unfalse'. How is that different from being 'true'?
No answer?
André
Wittgenstein (1937)
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
system' means: the opposite has been proved
in Russell's system
I explained to you not two hours ago why this particular quote carries
absolutely no weight with me, so there's really no point in bringing
it up again >
They only care if they believe something. You don't believe
Wittgenstein thus can't be bothered to see that he is inherently
correct.
If true and provable were equivalent, we wouldn't have two different
words for them. 'true' is an ontological category; 'provable' is an
epistemic category. They don't map onto one another.
Truth as an Epistemic Notion
Truth as an Epistemic Notion
Truth as an Epistemic Notion
On 2026-07-01 18:05, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 6:09 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Not exactly because most every human has been too stupid
to understand that "This sentence is not true" is a semantically
incoherent declarative sentence. Even the great Saul Kripke
(did better than everyone else) yet did not quite get there.
Claiming that it is semantically incoherent is *your* view.
It is hardly
universally accepted and therefore you are required to actually defend
this view rather than simply assert it.
Also, that isn't the sentence we are considering. We are considering ∀
x, S(x) ≠ x in Q. There is no reason to think that any claim you might make about the LP is also applicable to this sentence.
And ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x is most definitely a truth bearer.
If is it not provable in Q then it is not a truth
bearer in Q. Because we can see that it is provable
in PA this causes us to screw up and think that this
means that it is true in Q.
I never claimed that it was true, nor did I claim that it was false. I simply claimed that it was a truth-bearer without committing to its
actual truth value.
Do you actually understand *why* ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x is not provable in Q? Until you understand this you really don't have a good grasp of what it means for Q to be incomplete.
The reason why we cannot prove that ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q is because it is possible in Q to construct a model in which that statement is *false*.
Such a model would not correspond to the natural numbers as commonly understood, but it would be a consistent model. In a model corresponding
to the natural numbers as commonly understood, this statement would be *true*.
For any given model of Q, ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x is either true or it is false. It is never some indeterminate value. But the truth value of this
statement cannot be proven solely by considering the axioms of Q. We
need to look at the actual model. Thus, Q is incomplete because its
axioms don't lead to a single, unique model. And that will hold true for
all but the simplest systems.
Of course woefully fallible humans never give a rat's ass for infallibleThe law of the excluded middle forces logicians to stupidly
classify semantic nonsense as true or false.
Which is exactly what we want in Boolean logic.
You haven't made even the feeblest attempt at doing this. You
simply introduce concepts as if they will magically fit into an
existing system rather than exploring what the consequences of
introducing such concepts would actually have
If so, you'll need to define what all of these values actually
mean, and you'll need to completely redefine all of the basic
logical operators so that they account for these four values.
5 = 5 is irrefutable in Q. According to what you say above that >>>>>>> makes it 'unfalse'. How is that different from being 'true'?
No answer?
André
Wittgenstein (1937)
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
system' means: the opposite has been proved
in Russell's system
I explained to you not two hours ago why this particular quote
carries absolutely no weight with me, so there's really no point in
bringing it up again >
truth.
You don't have any special ability to identify 'infallible truth'.
They only care if they believe something. You don't believe
Wittgenstein thus can't be bothered to see that he is inherently
correct.
That wasn't my point. I claimed that it wasn't clear that *Wittgenstein* actually believed this once he had actually reflected on the problem,
and that therefore this quote really cannot be legitimately used to
support any particular position.
If true and provable were equivalent, we wouldn't have two different
words for them. 'true' is an ontological category; 'provable' is an
epistemic category. They don't map onto one another.
Truth as an Epistemic Notion
Truth as an Epistemic Notion
Truth as an Epistemic Notion
Saying it three times doesn't achieve anything. And I would argue that Prawitz is confused here. Citing a single article that makes a claim
doesn't validate that claim.
André
On 7/1/2026 7:39 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 18:05, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 6:09 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Not exactly because most every human has been too stupid
to understand that "This sentence is not true" is a semantically
incoherent declarative sentence. Even the great Saul Kripke
(did better than everyone else) yet did not quite get there.
Claiming that it is semantically incoherent is *your* view.
It <is> semantically incoherent in such a way that
anyone disagreeing is ABSOLUTELY INCORRECT.
It is hardly universally accepted and therefore you are required to
actually defend this view rather than simply assert it.
It used to be universally agree that the Earth is flat.
Also, that isn't the sentence we are considering. We are considering ∀
x, S(x) ≠ x in Q. There is no reason to think that any claim you might
make about the LP is also applicable to this sentence.
We are also considering that sentence.
And ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x is most definitely a truth bearer.
If is it not provable in Q then it is not a truth
bearer in Q. Because we can see that it is provable
in PA this causes us to screw up and think that this
means that it is true in Q.
I never claimed that it was true, nor did I claim that it was false. I
simply claimed that it was a truth-bearer without committing to its
actual truth value.
Yes that that is the vagueness that prevents much
of what is semantically incoherent to be undecidable.
Q was intentionally defined to be weaker than PA.
Do you actually understand *why* ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x is not provable in Q?
Until you understand this you really don't have a good grasp of what
it means for Q to be incomplete.
it lacks the mathematical induction axiom schema
required to generalize this rule to all elements in a domain
The reason why we cannot prove that ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q is because it
is possible in Q to construct a model in which that statement is *false*.
Not when you make sure to completely and totally toss
model theory out on its ass and replace it with proof
theoretic semantics instead.
Truth as an Epistemic Notion
Saying it three times doesn't achieve anything. And I would argue that
Prawitz is confused here. Citing a single article that makes a claim
doesn't validate that claim.
You were sure that provable is epistemic and thus
truth is not. Truth as an Epistemic Notion is the
core of Wittgenstein.
On 2026-07-01 19:01, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:39 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 18:05, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 6:09 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
Not exactly because most every human has been too stupid
to understand that "This sentence is not true" is a semantically
incoherent declarative sentence. Even the great Saul Kripke
(did better than everyone else) yet did not quite get there.
Claiming that it is semantically incoherent is *your* view.
It <is> semantically incoherent in such a way that
anyone disagreeing is ABSOLUTELY INCORRECT.
It is hardly universally accepted and therefore you are required to
actually defend this view rather than simply assert it.
It used to be universally agree that the Earth is flat.
Actually, there's no evidence to support this claim. Can you name a
single work on the topic of geography or astronomy which actually
asserted that the world was flat? There are religious texts which *can*
be interpreted as consistent with a flat earth, but those texts weren't dealing with geography; they were dealing with allegory.
Also, that isn't the sentence we are considering. We are considering
∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q. There is no reason to think that any claim you
might make about the LP is also applicable to this sentence.
We are also considering that sentence.
You may be. I am not. I'm discussing Q and the Liar Paradox isn't
stateable in Q.
And ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x is most definitely a truth bearer.
If is it not provable in Q then it is not a truth
bearer in Q. Because we can see that it is provable
in PA this causes us to screw up and think that this
means that it is true in Q.
I never claimed that it was true, nor did I claim that it was false.
I simply claimed that it was a truth-bearer without committing to its
actual truth value.
Yes that that is the vagueness that prevents much
of what is semantically incoherent to be undecidable.
Q was intentionally defined to be weaker than PA.
Do you actually understand *why* ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x is not provable in Q? >>> Until you understand this you really don't have a good grasp of what
it means for Q to be incomplete.
it lacks the mathematical induction axiom schema
required to generalize this rule to all elements in a domain
That's something that distinguishes Q from PA. By itself, it's not an explanation of why ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x isn't provable in Q. I'm trying to see whether you really even understand this.
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system.
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an example or an analogy
(assuming he responds at all). He doesn't get that examples >>>>>>>>>>>> don't take the place of definitions. Examples can be useful >>>>>>>>>>>> for clarifying definitions, but they aren't particularly >>>>>>>>>>>> useful on their own.
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English
dictionary, this isn't really an option.
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at >>>>>>>> least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means for something >>>>>>>> to not have a truth value.
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth value
of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
A valid answer would look something like this:
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal system >>>>>> when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not >>>> exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which is >>>> commonly known.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but
using different words.
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.
False. It means that there are statements in the language of Q that
have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system.
OK, I verified that.
The Halting Problem counter-example input
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that meets
the following requirements:
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions)
X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the
following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed
directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
first five minutes that this requirement was made.
If it is true that makes it false.
is more like
the Liar Paradox. For HHH(DD)
If it is false that make is true.
Therefore is has always been fucking nonsense.
That it took humans more than five minutes to
see this conclusively proves how stupid they are.
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system.
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions >>>>>>>>>>>>> and he invariably responds with an example or an analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>> (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't get that examples >>>>>>>>>>>>> don't take the place of definitions. Examples can be useful >>>>>>>>>>>>> for clarifying definitions, but they aren't particularly >>>>>>>>>>>>> useful on their own.
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English
dictionary, this isn't really an option.
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or at >>>>>>>>> least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). >>>>>>>>> It doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means for
something to not have a truth value.
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth value >>>>>>> of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
A valid answer would look something like this:
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal system >>>>>>> when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not >>>>> exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which >>>>> is commonly known.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but
using different words.
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.
False. It means that there are statements in the language of Q that
have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system.
OK, I verified that.
The Halting Problem counter-example input
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that
meets the following requirements:
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions)
X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the
following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed
directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
first five minutes that this requirement was made.
In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system.
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and he invariably responds with an example or an analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't get that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples don't take the place of definitions. Examples can >>>>>>>>>>>>>> be useful for clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own.
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or >>>>>>>>>> at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent >>>>>>>>>> way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means >>>>>>>>>> for something to not have a truth value.
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth value >>>>>>>> of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
A valid answer would look something like this:
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal
system when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does >>>>>> not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>> which is commonly known.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but
using different words.
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.
False. It means that there are statements in the language of Q that >>>> have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system.
OK, I verified that.
The Halting Problem counter-example input
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that
meets the following requirements:
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes
the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed
directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
first five minutes that this requirement was made.
In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H:
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what it mean for the truth value of a statement to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system.
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently asked him for definitions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and he invariably responds with an example or an analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't get that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples don't take the place of definitions. Examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be useful for clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own.
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or >>>>>>>>>>> at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent >>>>>>>>>>> way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means >>>>>>>>>>> for something to not have a truth value.
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth
value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
A valid answer would look something like this:
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal
system when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does >>>>>>> not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>>> which is commonly known.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but >>>>>>> using different words.
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.
False. It means that there are statements in the language of Q
that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>
OK, I verified that.
The Halting Problem counter-example input
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that
meets the following requirements:
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes
the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed
directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
first five minutes that this requirement was made.
In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H:
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
And still don't understand that this algorithm:
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what it mean for the truth value of a statement to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system.
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an example >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get that examples don't take the place of definitions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly useful on their own.
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott
2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' (or >>>>>>>>>>>> at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent >>>>>>>>>>>> way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you think it means >>>>>>>>>>>> for something to not have a truth value.
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth >>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
A valid answer would look something like this:
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>> system when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does >>>>>>>> not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>>>> which is commonly known.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else but >>>>>>>> using different words.
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.
False. It means that there are statements in the language of Q
that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>
OK, I verified that.
The Halting Problem counter-example input
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that
meets the following requirements:
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes >>>>>> the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly >>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed >>>>>> directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
first five minutes that this requirement was made.
In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H:
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
And still don't understand that this algorithm:
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what it mean for the truth value of a statement to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system.
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an example >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). He doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get that examples don't take the place of definitions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Examples can be useful for clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott
2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' >>>>>>>>>>>>> (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a >>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you think >>>>>>>>>>>>> it means for something to not have a truth value.
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth >>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
A valid answer would look something like this:
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>> system when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does >>>>>>>>> not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>>>>> which is commonly known.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else >>>>>>>>> but using different words.
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.
False. It means that there are statements in the language of Q >>>>>>> that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>
OK, I verified that.
The Halting Problem counter-example input
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that >>>>>>> meets the following requirements:
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes >>>>>>> the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly >>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed >>>>>>> directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
first five minutes that this requirement was made.
In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H:
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
And still don't understand that this algorithm:
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for the
last 22 years.
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an example >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their own.
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a coherent way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you >>>>>>>>>>>>>> think it means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
A valid answer would look something like this:
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>> system when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) >>>>>>>>>> does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable >>>>>>>>>> in Q", which is commonly known.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else >>>>>>>>>> but using different words.
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.
False. It means that there are statements in the language of Q >>>>>>>> that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the
system.
OK, I verified that.
The Halting Problem counter-example input
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that >>>>>>>> meets the following requirements:
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that
computes the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly >>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when
executed directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
first five minutes that this requirement was made.
In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
And still don't understand that this algorithm:
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for the
last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an example >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their own.
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a coherent way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you >>>>>>>>>>>>>> think it means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did
not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal system.
A valid answer would look something like this:
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>> system when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) >>>>>>>>>> does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable >>>>>>>>>> in Q", which is commonly known.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else >>>>>>>>>> but using different words.
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.
False. It means that there are statements in the language of Q >>>>>>>> that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the
system.
OK, I verified that.
The Halting Problem counter-example input
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists that >>>>>>>> meets the following requirements:
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that
computes the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly >>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when
executed directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
first five minutes that this requirement was made.
In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
And still don't understand that this algorithm:
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for the
last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:That claims what it means to have the truth value 'true' >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent way). It doesn't in any way clarify what you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think it means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He doesn't get that examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their own.
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake
and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
A valid answer would look something like this:
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>> system when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) >>>>>>>>>>> does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable >>>>>>>>>>> in Q", which is commonly known.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else >>>>>>>>>>> but using different words.
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient.
False. It means that there are statements in the language of Q >>>>>>>>> that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the >>>>>>>>> system.
OK, I verified that.
The Halting Problem counter-example input
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists >>>>>>>>> that meets the following requirements:
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that
computes the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly >>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when
executed directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
first five minutes that this requirement was made.
In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>>
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
And still don't understand that this algorithm:
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for the
last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)
And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D contains
a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:False. It means that there are statements in the language of >>>>>>>>>> Q that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of the >>>>>>>>>> system.
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a coherent way). It doesn't in any way clarify what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you think it means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he responds at all). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He doesn't get that examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't particularly useful on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their own.
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option.
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright
Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A valid answer would look something like this:
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>> system when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) >>>>>>>>>>>> does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is >>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone else >>>>>>>>>>>> but using different words.
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>
OK, I verified that.
The Halting Problem counter-example input
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists >>>>>>>>>> that meets the following requirements:
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of
instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that
computes the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed >>>>>>>>>> directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when
executed directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
first five minutes that this requirement was made.
In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>>>
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
And still don't understand that this algorithm:
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for
the last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)
And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D
contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.
You just don't know jack shit dufus.
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:False. It means that there are statements in the language of >>>>>>>>>>> Q that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms of >>>>>>>>>>> the system.
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined AtomicFacts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a coherent way). It doesn't in any way clarify what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you think it means for something to not have a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value.
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote:I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what a definition is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he responds at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all). He doesn't get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own.
The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright
Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A valid answer would look something like this:
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) >>>>>>>>>>>>> does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone >>>>>>>>>>>>> else but using different words.
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>
OK, I verified that.
The Halting Problem counter-example input
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists >>>>>>>>>>> that meets the following requirements:
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that >>>>>>>>>>> computes the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed >>>>>>>>>>> directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when >>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
first five minutes that this requirement was made.
In other words, you don't understand that if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>>>>
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
And still don't understand that this algorithm:
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for
the last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)
And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D
contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.
You just don't know jack shit dufus.
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.
Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
difference between an algorithm and a C function.
On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when
it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x).
That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.
It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the >>>>>>>> language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both undecidable >>>>>>>> and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.
Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
Irrelevant. The definition of completeness
It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
that something is missing that could be added to make
it complete.
It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do.
When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA.
However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important
examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat.
When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
the original question rather than answered it.
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:False. It means that there are statements in the language >>>>>>>>>>>> of Q that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms >>>>>>>>>>>> of the system.
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any way >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarify what you think it means for something to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a truth value.
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott understands >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what a definition is. I've frequently asked him >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for definitions and he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he responds at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all). He doesn't get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own.The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright
Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone >>>>>>>>>>>>>> else but using different words.
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>
OK, I verified that.
The Halting Problem counter-example input
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists >>>>>>>>>>>> that meets the following requirements:
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that >>>>>>>>>>>> computes the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed >>>>>>>>>>>> directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when >>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt
status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the
first five minutes that this requirement was made.
In other words, you don't understand that if this was
algorithm H:
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
And still don't understand that this algorithm:
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for >>>>>> the last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)
And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D
contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.
You just don't know jack shit dufus.
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.
Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
difference between an algorithm and a C function.
Back to being ignored for trolling again.
On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true whenThat's surprising, disregard for axioms?
it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz
is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt
with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x). >>>>>>>>>>>
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.
It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the >>>>>>>>> language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both undecidable >>>>>>>>> and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.
Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
Irrelevant. The definition of completeness
It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
that something is missing that could be added to make
it complete.
It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do.
When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA.
However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important
examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat.
When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
the original question rather than answered it.
Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial answer
rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about
natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of
natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete
and can be strengthened further.
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:False. It means that there are statements in the language >>>>>>>>>>>>> of Q that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms >>>>>>>>>>>>> of the system.
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote:That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any way >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarify what you think it means for something to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a truth value.
On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and he invariably >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds with an example or an analogy (assuming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he responds at all). He doesn't get that examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't take the place of definitions. Examples can >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be useful for clarifying definitions, but they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aren't particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The same thing as: "cats are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I didn't ask for an example. I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright
Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.
A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> else but using different words.
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
OK, I verified that.
The Halting Problem counter-example input
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H exists >>>>>>>>>>>>> that meets the following requirements:
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that >>>>>>>>>>>>> computes the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed >>>>>>>>>>>>> directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when >>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement
to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made.
In other words, you don't understand that if this was
algorithm H:
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
And still don't understand that this algorithm:
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem for >>>>>>> the last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)
And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D
contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.
You just don't know jack shit dufus.
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.
Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
difference between an algorithm and a C function.
Back to being ignored for trolling again.
Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone.
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:False. It means that there are statements in the language >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of Q that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the system.
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way clarify what you think it means for something to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not have a truth value.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the place >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of definitions. Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed inI didn't ask for an example. I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright
Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.
A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> else but using different words.
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
OK, I verified that.
The Halting Problem counter-example input
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements:
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> computes the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed >>>>>>>>>>>>>> directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when >>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made.
In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
And still don't understand that this algorithm:
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem >>>>>>>> for the last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)
And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D
contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.
You just don't know jack shit dufus.
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.
Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
difference between an algorithm and a C function.
Back to being ignored for trolling again.
Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone.
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:False. It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite connection to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the axioms of the system.
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way clarify what you think it means for something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not have a truth value.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the place >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of definitions. Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed inI didn't ask for an example. I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> copyright Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.
A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> else but using different words.
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
OK, I verified that.
The Halting Problem counter-example input
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements:
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computes the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made.
In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
And still don't understand that this algorithm:
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem >>>>>>>>> for the last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)
And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D
contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.
You just don't know jack shit dufus.
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.
Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
difference between an algorithm and a C function.
Back to being ignored for trolling again.
Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone.
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt
decider,
and another algorithm built by the template that the first one--
answers wrong.
If you disagree, explain in detail why.
On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:False. It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite connection to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the axioms of the system.
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is unprovable in Q", which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way clarify what you think it means for something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not have a truth value.Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed inI didn't ask for an example. I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.
English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the place >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of definitions. Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> copyright Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.
A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words.
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
OK, I verified that.
The Halting Problem counter-example input
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements:
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> computes the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
And still don't understand that this algorithm:
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem >>>>>>>>>> for the last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)
And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D >>>>>>>> contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.
You just don't know jack shit dufus.
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.
Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
difference between an algorithm and a C function.
Back to being ignored for trolling again.
Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone.
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt decider,
Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.
Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.
I will not respond to any of your future posts that
are very stupid. Say something smart or you will be
ignored from now on.
and another algorithm built by the template that the first one answers
wrong.
If you disagree, explain in detail why.
On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:False. It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite connection >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the axioms of the system.
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is unprovable in Q", which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way clarify what you think it means for something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not have a truth value.Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed inI didn't ask for an example. I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.
English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples can be useful >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> copyright Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.
A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
OK, I verified that.
The Halting Problem counter-example input
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that computes the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
And still don't understand that this algorithm:
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem >>>>>>>>>>> for the last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)
And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D >>>>>>>>> contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.
You just don't know jack shit dufus.
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.
Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the >>>>>>> difference between an algorithm and a C function.
Back to being ignored for trolling again.
Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone. >>>>>
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt
decider,
Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.
Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all inputs
to non-halting.
Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.
Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what algorithm D
does, as per the design of algorithm D.
On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That claims what it means to have the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value 'true' (or at least it would if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed inI didn't ask for an example. I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.
English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples can be useful >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> copyright Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.
A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a formal system when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.
False. It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite connection >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the axioms of the system.
OK, I verified that.
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that computes the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
And still don't understand that this algorithm:
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)
And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D >>>>>>>>>> contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.
You just don't know jack shit dufus.
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.
Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the >>>>>>>> difference between an algorithm and a C function.
Back to being ignored for trolling again.
Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone. >>>>>>
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt
decider,
Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.
Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all inputs
to non-halting.
Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.
Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what algorithm D
does, as per the design of algorithm D.
I am trying to keep liars from killing the
whole fucking planet by making truth computable
and you act like this is a fucking joke to be
trolled.
On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which is commonly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known.
That claims what it means to have the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value 'true' (or at least it would if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed inI didn't ask for an example. I asked for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a definition of what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.
English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for clarifying definitions, but they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aren't particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> copyright Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.
A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a formal system when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.
False. It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite connection >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to the axioms of the system.
OK, I verified that.
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that computes the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
And still don't understand that this algorithm:
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)
And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm >>>>>>>>>>> D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.
You just don't know jack shit dufus.
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.
Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the >>>>>>>>> difference between an algorithm and a C function.
Back to being ignored for trolling again.
Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by
everone.
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt
decider,
Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.
Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all
inputs to non-halting.
Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.
Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what algorithm D
does, as per the design of algorithm D.
I am trying to keep liars from killing the
whole fucking planet by making truth computable
Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others.
On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:You just don't know jack shit dufus.
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which is commonly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known.That claims what it means to have the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value 'true' (or at least it would if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really an option.I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an example or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an analogy (assuming he responds at all). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He doesn't get that examples don't take >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the place of definitions. Examples can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed inI didn't ask for an example. I asked for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a definition of what it mean for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) //
copyright Olcott 2018
has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system.
A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
"The truth value of a statement does not exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.
False. It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
OK, I verified that.
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that computes the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)
And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>> D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite. >>>>>>>>>>>
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.
Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know >>>>>>>>>> the difference between an algorithm and a C function.
Back to being ignored for trolling again.
Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by
everone.
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt
decider,
Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.
Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all
inputs to non-halting.
Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.
Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what algorithm D
does, as per the design of algorithm D.
I am trying to keep liars from killing the
whole fucking planet by making truth computable
Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others.
By proving the errors in logic I can make
logic into correct reasoning. That most
logic people are a herd of sheep that would
gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
what their herd accepts makes correcting this
error too fucking difficult.
On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which is commonly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known.That claims what it means to have the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value 'true' (or at least it would if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really an option.I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an example or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an analogy (assuming he responds at all). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He doesn't get that examples don't take >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the place of definitions. Examples can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly useful on their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> own.The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I didn't ask for an example. I asked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a definition of what it mean for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) //
copyright Olcott 2018
has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> did
not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the truth value of a statement to not exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system.
A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
"The truth value of a statement does not exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.
False. It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
OK, I verified that.
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> H exists that meets the following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>
algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the >>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite.
You just don't know jack shit dufus.
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.
Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know >>>>>>>>>>> the difference between an algorithm and a C function.
Back to being ignored for trolling again.
Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by >>>>>>>>> everone.
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt >>>>>>> decider,
Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.
Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all
inputs to non-halting.
Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.
Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what algorithm
D does, as per the design of algorithm D.
Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct.
I am trying to keep liars from killing the
whole fucking planet by making truth computable
Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others.
By proving the errors in logic I can make
logic into correct reasoning. That most
logic people are a herd of sheep that would
gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
what their herd accepts makes correcting this
error too fucking difficult.
There is no error. The POE follows from a series of truth preserving operations
On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite.
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:In other words, you don't understand that if this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was algorithm H:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which is commonly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known.That claims what it means to have the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value 'true' (or at least it would if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really an option.I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an example >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or an analogy (assuming he responds at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all). He doesn't get that examples don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> take the place of definitions. Examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a definition of what it mean for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) //
copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you did
not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system.
A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
"The truth value of a statement does not exist >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.
False. It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
OK, I verified that.
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> H exists that meets the following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> H that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt when executed directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see
that the requirement for H to correctly report the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt
status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You just don't know jack shit dufus.
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.
Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know >>>>>>>>>>>> the difference between an algorithm and a C function.
Back to being ignored for trolling again.
Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by >>>>>>>>>> everone.
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a halt >>>>>>>> decider,
Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.
Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all
inputs to non-halting.
Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.
Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what algorithm >>>>>> D does, as per the design of algorithm D.
Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct.
I am trying to keep liars from killing the
whole fucking planet by making truth computable
Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others.
By proving the errors in logic I can make
logic into correct reasoning. That most
logic people are a herd of sheep that would
gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
what their herd accepts makes correcting this
error too fucking difficult.
There is no error. The POE follows from a series of truth preserving
operations
To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect
when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
retaining the full English semantics of the terms.
(P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
as the measure of correct reasoning.
On 6/27/2026 11:34 PM, dbush wrote:--- Synchronet 3.22a-Linux NewsLink 1.2
On 6/27/2026 11:23 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/27/2026 9:02 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/27/2026 9:53 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/27/2026 9:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/27/2026 8:42 PM, dbush wrote:
On 6/27/2026 9:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 6/27/2026 8:29 PM, dbush wrote:
Given that the following natural language statement is true:
--------------------------------------
Earth is the third planet from the sun.
--------------------------------------
In the following natural language statement:
--------------------------------------
At least one of the following statements is true:
- Earth is the third planet from the sun.
- <X>
--------------------------------------
Given that <X> is any *truth bearing* natural language statement,
does there exist a statement X such that the condition "At least one
of the following statements is true" is false?
Head games will be ignored.
Explain in detail how this is a head game.
Failure to either answer the above question or explain how it is a
head game in your next reply or within one hour of you next post in
this newsgroup will be taken as your official, on-the-record admission
that Disjunction introduction is in fact truth preserving and valid,
and therefore so is the Principle of Explosion.
Let the record show that Peter Olcott made the following post in this newsgroup:
On 6/28/2026 10:52 PM, olcott wrote:
Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
defined to do.
...
And more that one hour has passed with no attempt to answer the above question or explain why it is a head game. Therefore, as per the above criteria:
Let The Record Show
That Peter Olcott
Has *Officially* Admitted:
That Disjunction introduction is in fact truth preserving and valid, and therefore so is the Principle of Explosion.
On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite.
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>In other words, you don't understand that if this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was algorithm H:
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> commonly known.It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>That claims what it means to have the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value 'true' (or at least it would if you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what you think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means for something to not have a truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value.Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds at all). He doesn't get that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Chinese.
I didn't ask for an example. I asked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a definition of what it mean for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) //
copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you did
not bother to pay attention that is your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake
and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
"The truth value of a statement does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.
False. It means that there are statements in the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
OK, I verified that.
Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:
The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> H that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt when executed directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly report the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt
status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid requirement within >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You just don't know jack shit dufus.
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know >>>>>>>>>>>>> the difference between an algorithm and a C function. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
Back to being ignored for trolling again.
Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by >>>>>>>>>>> everone.
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a >>>>>>>>> halt decider,
Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.
Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all >>>>>>> inputs to non-halting.
Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.
Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what
algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.
Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct.
I am trying to keep liars from killing the
whole fucking planet by making truth computable
Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others. >>>>>
By proving the errors in logic I can make
logic into correct reasoning. That most
logic people are a herd of sheep that would
gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
what their herd accepts makes correcting this
error too fucking difficult.
There is no error. The POE follows from a series of truth preserving
operations
To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect
when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
retaining the full English semantics of the terms.
(P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
as the measure of correct reasoning.
We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game (see below):
On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:States that both a statement and its negation are true. And if a formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements are proven true.
On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite.
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
In other words, you don't understand that if this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was algorithm H:Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> commonly known.It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds at all). He doesn't get that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for clarifying definitions, but they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aren't particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I didn't ask for an example. I asked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a definition of what it mean for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) //
copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value 'true' (or at least it would >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way). It doesn't in any way clarify what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you think it means for something to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you did
not bother to pay attention that is your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake
and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the truth value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
"The truth value of a statement does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So once again, you're saying the same thing as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.
False. It means that there are statements in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
OK, I verified that.
Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:
The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt when executed directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly report >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the halt
status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You just don't know jack shit dufus.
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>> know the difference between an algorithm and a C function. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Back to being ignored for trolling again.
Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by >>>>>>>>>>>> everone.
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a >>>>>>>>>> halt decider,
Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input.
Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all >>>>>>>> inputs to non-halting.
Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.
Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what
algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.
Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct.
I am trying to keep liars from killing the
whole fucking planet by making truth computable
Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others. >>>>>>
By proving the errors in logic I can make
logic into correct reasoning. That most
logic people are a herd of sheep that would
gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
what their herd accepts makes correcting this
error too fucking difficult.
There is no error. The POE follows from a series of truth
preserving operations
To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect
when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
retaining the full English semantics of the terms.
(P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
as the measure of correct reasoning.
We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game (see
below):
accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.
Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:States that both a statement and its negation are true. And if a formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements are proven true.
On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map all >>>>>>>>> inputs to non-halting.
On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> opposite.
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>In other words, you don't understand that if this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was algorithm H:Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you mean >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is commonly known.It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all). He doesn't get that examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't take the place of definitions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Examples can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I didn't ask for an example. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked for a definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value 'true' (or at least it would >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way). It doesn't in any way clarify what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you think it means for something to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you did
not bother to pay attention that is your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake
and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for the truth value of a statement to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
"The truth value of a statement does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So once again, you're saying the same thing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> deficient.
False. It means that there are statements in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
OK, I verified that.
Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:
The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt when executed directly
Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly report >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the halt
status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem for the last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You just don't know jack shit dufus.
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know the difference between an algorithm and a C function. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Back to being ignored for trolling again.
Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored >>>>>>>>>>>>> by everone.
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a >>>>>>>>>>> halt decider,
Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input. >>>>>>>>>
Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.
Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what
algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.
Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct.
I am trying to keep liars from killing the
whole fucking planet by making truth computable
Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and others. >>>>>>>
By proving the errors in logic I can make
logic into correct reasoning. That most
logic people are a herd of sheep that would
gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
what their herd accepts makes correcting this
error too fucking difficult.
There is no error. The POE follows from a series of truth
preserving operations
To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect
when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
retaining the full English semantics of the terms.
(P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
as the measure of correct reasoning.
We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game (see
below):
accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.
Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
From *there*, the principle of explosion is applied, demonstrating that
the system that proved the contradiction is useless.
On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:States that both a statement and its negation are true. And if a
On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map >>>>>>>>>> all inputs to non-halting.
On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the opposite.
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>In other words, you don't understand that if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this was algorithm H:Good. So when you say "The truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a definition >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is. I've frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all). He doesn't get that examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't take the place of definitions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aren't particularly useful on their >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> own.The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I didn't ask for an example. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked for a definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢
X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value 'true' (or at least it would >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if you defined AtomicFacts in a coherent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way). It doesn't in any way clarify what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you think it means for something to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and you did
not bother to pay attention that is your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake
and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for the truth value of a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A valid answer would look something like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this:
"The truth value of a statement does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So once again, you're saying the same thing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is deficient.
False. It means that there are statements in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the language of Q that have *only* an infinite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
OK, I verified that.
Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:
The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly report >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the halt
status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
first five minutes that this requirement was made. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You just don't know jack shit dufus.
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know the difference between an algorithm and a C function. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Back to being ignored for trolling again.
Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored >>>>>>>>>>>>>> by everone.
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a >>>>>>>>>>>> halt decider,
Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input. >>>>>>>>>>
Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.
Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what
algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.
Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct. >>>>>>
I am trying to keep liars from killing the
whole fucking planet by making truth computable
Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and
others.
By proving the errors in logic I can make
logic into correct reasoning. That most
logic people are a herd of sheep that would
gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
what their herd accepts makes correcting this
error too fucking difficult.
There is no error. The POE follows from a series of truth
preserving operations
To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect
when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
retaining the full English semantics of the terms.
(P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
as the measure of correct reasoning.
We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game
(see below):
accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.
Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth
preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements are
proven true.
Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.
The conclusion that most all logicians are despicable liars
seems implausible so what is left?
On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:States that both a statement and its negation are true. And if a
On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map >>>>>>>>>>> all inputs to non-halting.
On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the opposite.
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:D(D); // merely halts
And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Good. So when you say "The truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or an analogy (assuming he responds >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at all). He doesn't get that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> examples don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be useful >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly useful on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I didn't ask for an example. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked for a definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢
X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value 'true' (or at least it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would if you defined AtomicFacts in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent way). It doesn't in any way >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarify what you think it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and you did
not bother to pay attention that is your >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mistake
and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You gave no such definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for the truth value of a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A valid answer would look something like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this:
"The truth value of a statement does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So once again, you're saying the same thing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as everyone else but using different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is deficient.
False. It means that there are statements in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the language of Q that have *only* an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite connection to the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
OK, I verified that.
Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:
The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following mapping: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
to prove that there exists a natural number > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 3 and < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly report >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the halt
status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
first five minutes that this requirement was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> made.
In other words, you don't understand that if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this was algorithm H:
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You just don't know jack shit dufus.
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know the difference between an algorithm and a C function. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Back to being ignored for trolling again.
Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by everone.
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be a >>>>>>>>>>>>> halt decider,
Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input. >>>>>>>>>>>
Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.
Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what >>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.
Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct. >>>>>>>
I am trying to keep liars from killing the
whole fucking planet by making truth computable
Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and >>>>>>>>> others.
By proving the errors in logic I can make
logic into correct reasoning. That most
logic people are a herd of sheep that would
gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
what their herd accepts makes correcting this
error too fucking difficult.
There is no error. The POE follows from a series of truth
preserving operations
To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect
when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
retaining the full English semantics of the terms.
(P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
as the measure of correct reasoning.
We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game
(see below):
accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.
Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth
preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements are
proven true.
Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.
Your intuition fails you. It just means that the axioms of the system
in question are inconsistent. And the principle of explosion can be
used to show that an inconsistent system is useless.
On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:States that both a statement and its negation are true. And if a
On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map >>>>>>>>>>>> all inputs to non-halting.
On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the opposite.
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:D(D); // merely halts
And still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Good. So when you say "The truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable in Q", >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Until someone publishes an Olcott to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Standard English dictionary, this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds at all). He doesn't get >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that examples don't take the place >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of definitions. Examples can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for clarifying definitions, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but they aren't particularly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I didn't ask for an example. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked for a definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢
X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value 'true' (or at least it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would if you defined AtomicFacts in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent way). It doesn't in any way >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarify what you think it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and you did
not bother to pay attention that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You gave no such definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for the truth value of a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A valid answer would look something like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this:
"The truth value of a statement does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So once again, you're saying the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing as everyone else but using different >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> words.
Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is deficient.
False. It means that there are statements >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the language of Q that have *only* an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite connection to the axioms of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.
OK, I verified that.
Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:
The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as <X> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
to prove that there exists a natural number > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 3 and < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> report the halt
status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
first five minutes that this requirement was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> made.
In other words, you don't understand that if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this was algorithm H:
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You just don't know jack shit dufus.
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> know the difference between an algorithm and a C >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> function.
Back to being ignored for trolling again.
Maybe by someone but you are still far from being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored by everone.
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to show the halting problem counter-example?
It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a halt decider,
Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input. >>>>>>>>>>>>
Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify.
Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what >>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.
Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's correct. >>>>>>>>
I am trying to keep liars from killing the
whole fucking planet by making truth computable
Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and >>>>>>>>>> others.
By proving the errors in logic I can make
logic into correct reasoning. That most
logic people are a herd of sheep that would
gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
what their herd accepts makes correcting this
error too fucking difficult.
There is no error. The POE follows from a series of truth
preserving operations
To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect >>>>>>> when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
retaining the full English semantics of the terms.
(P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q is ridiculously stupid when we plug English
sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English
as the measure of correct reasoning.
We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game
(see below):
accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.
Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth
preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements
are proven true.
Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.
Your intuition fails you. It just means that the axioms of the system
in question are inconsistent. And the principle of explosion can be
used to show that an inconsistent system is useless.
It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
of contradiction:
When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
at least one of them is false.
On 7/2/2026 6:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:States that both a statement and its negation are true. And if a
On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to map >>>>>>>>>>>>> all inputs to non-halting.
On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the opposite.D(D); // merely haltsAnd still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Good. So when you say "The truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Q", which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't ask for an example. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked for a definition of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it mean for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Until someone publishes an Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to Standard English dictionary, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he responds at all). He doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢
X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ⊢ X)
That claims what it means to have the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value 'true' (or at least it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would if you defined AtomicFacts in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coherent way). It doesn't in any way >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarify what you think it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You gave no such definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A valid answer would look something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like this:
"The truth value of a statement does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So once again, you're saying the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing as everyone else but using >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q is deficient.
False. It means that there are statements >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the language of Q that have *only* an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite connection to the axioms of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.
OK, I verified that.
Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements:
The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence of instructions) X described as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
to prove that there exists a natural number >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > 3 and < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> report the halt
status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
first five minutes that this requirement was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> made.
In other words, you don't understand that if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this was algorithm H:
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> }
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> }
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You just don't know jack shit dufus.
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Says the person that just demonstrated that they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know the difference between an algorithm and a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> C function.
Back to being ignored for trolling again.
Maybe by someone but you are still far from being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored by everone.
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to show the halting problem counter-example?
It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a halt decider,
Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what >>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D.
Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's
correct.
I am trying to keep liars from killing the
whole fucking planet by making truth computable
Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and >>>>>>>>>>> others.
By proving the errors in logic I can make
logic into correct reasoning. That most
logic people are a herd of sheep that would
gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
what their herd accepts makes correcting this
error too fucking difficult.
There is no error. The POE follows from a series of truth >>>>>>>>> preserving operations
To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect >>>>>>>> when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
retaining the full English semantics of the terms.
(P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q is ridiculously stupid when we plug English >>>>>>>> sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English >>>>>>>> as the measure of correct reasoning.
We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game >>>>>>> (see below):
accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.
Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth
preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements
are proven true.
Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.
Your intuition fails you. It just means that the axioms of the
system in question are inconsistent. And the principle of explosion
can be used to show that an inconsistent system is useless.
It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
of contradiction:
When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
at least one of them is false.
Whatever you call it, if the axioms of a formal system can prove both X
and ~X, then the principle of explosion can be used to show that system
is useless.
On 7/2/2026 5:32 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 6:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:States that both a statement and its negation are true. And if a >>>>>> formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth >>>>>> preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements >>>>>> are proven true.
On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> map all inputs to non-halting.
On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:Maybe by someone but you are still far from being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored by everone.
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm H and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does the opposite.D(D); // merely haltsAnd still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Good. So when you say "The truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in Q", >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is unprovable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Q", which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>It is neither provable nor refutable in F. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English meaning >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't ask for an example. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked for a definition of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it mean for the truth value of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a statement to not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he responds at all). He doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get that examples don't take the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place of definitions. Examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That claims what it means to have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value 'true' (or at least >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it would if you defined AtomicFacts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a coherent way). It doesn't in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Until someone publishes an Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to Standard English dictionary, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢
X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ
⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
When I define a term hundreds of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You gave no such definition of what it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.
A valid answer would look something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
"The truth value of a statement does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So once again, you're saying the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing as everyone else but using >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q is deficient.
False. It means that there are statements >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the language of Q that have *only* an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infinite connection to the axioms of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.
OK, I verified that. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immutable sequence of instructions) X >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halts when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
to prove that there exists a natural number >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > 3 and < 2.
I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> report the halt
status of input D that does the opposite of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> within the
first five minutes that this requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was made.
In other words, you don't understand that if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this was algorithm H:
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> }
if (result == 1) { >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while (1); >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> }
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> }
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You just don't know jack shit dufus. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Says the person that just demonstrated that they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know the difference between an algorithm and a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> C function.
Back to being ignored for trolling again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Do you know enough about C to understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to show the halting problem counter-example? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a halt decider,
Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its input. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what >>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's >>>>>>>>>> correct.
I am trying to keep liars from killing the
whole fucking planet by making truth computable
Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi and >>>>>>>>>>>> others.
By proving the errors in logic I can make
logic into correct reasoning. That most
logic people are a herd of sheep that would
gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
what their herd accepts makes correcting this
error too fucking difficult.
There is no error. The POE follows from a series of truth >>>>>>>>>> preserving operations
To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect >>>>>>>>> when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while
retaining the full English semantics of the terms.
(P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q is ridiculously stupid when we plug English >>>>>>>>> sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English >>>>>>>>> as the measure of correct reasoning.
We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind game >>>>>>>> (see below):
accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.
Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.
Your intuition fails you. It just means that the axioms of the
system in question are inconsistent. And the principle of explosion >>>> can be used to show that an inconsistent system is useless.
It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
of contradiction:
When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
at least one of them is false.
Whatever you call it, if the axioms of a formal system can prove both
X and ~X, then the principle of explosion can be used to show that
system is useless.
X & ~X proves FALSE.
How can anyone that is not nuts possibly think otherwise?
On 7/2/2026 6:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 5:32 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 6:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:States that both a statement and its negation are true. And if a >>>>>>> formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of truth >>>>>>> preserving operations from its axioms, that means both statements >>>>>>> are proven true.
On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:Maybe by someone but you are still far from being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored by everone.
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't ask for an example. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm actually not convinced that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy (assuming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he responds at all). He doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get that examples don't take >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the place of definitions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly useful >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> H and does the opposite.D(D); // merely haltsAnd still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>False. It means that there are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statements in the language of Q that have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *only* an infinite connection to the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>It is neither provable nor refutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in F.That claims what it means to have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value 'true' (or at least >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it would if you defined AtomicFacts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a coherent way). It doesn't in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any way clarify what you think it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means for something to not have a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Until someone publishes an Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to Standard English dictionary, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ
⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
When I define a term hundreds of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You gave no such definition of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.
A valid answer would look something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
"The truth value of a statement does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Good. So when you say "The truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not exist in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So once again, you're saying the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing as everyone else but using >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not really. It is normally thought of as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
meaning that Q is incomplete meaning >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
OK, I verified that. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immutable sequence of instructions) X >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halts when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
to prove that there exists a natural >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> report the halt
status of input D that does the opposite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was made.
In other words, you don't understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> }
if (result == 1) { >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while (1); >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> }
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> }
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You just don't know jack shit dufus. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Says the person that just demonstrated that they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know the difference between an algorithm and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a C function.
Back to being ignored for trolling again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Do you know enough about C to understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to show the halting problem counter-example? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a halt decider,
Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input.
Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> map all inputs to non-halting.
Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's >>>>>>>>>>> correct.
I am trying to keep liars from killing the
whole fucking planet by making truth computable
Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi >>>>>>>>>>>>> and others.
By proving the errors in logic I can make
logic into correct reasoning. That most
logic people are a herd of sheep that would
gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
what their herd accepts makes correcting this
error too fucking difficult.
There is no error. The POE follows from a series of truth >>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations
To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect >>>>>>>>>> when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while >>>>>>>>>> retaining the full English semantics of the terms.
(P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q is ridiculously stupid when we plug English >>>>>>>>>> sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English >>>>>>>>>> as the measure of correct reasoning.
We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind >>>>>>>>> game (see below):
accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.
Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.
Your intuition fails you. It just means that the axioms of the
system in question are inconsistent. And the principle of
explosion can be used to show that an inconsistent system is useless. >>>>>
It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
of contradiction:
When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
at least one of them is false.
Whatever you call it, if the axioms of a formal system can prove both
X and ~X, then the principle of explosion can be used to show that
system is useless.
X & ~X proves FALSE.
How can anyone that is not nuts possibly think otherwise?
Assuming that X & ~X has been proven from the axioms of a formal system,
On 7/2/2026 5:47 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 6:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 5:32 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 6:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:States that both a statement and its negation are true. And if >>>>>>>> a formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of >>>>>>>> truth preserving operations from its axioms, that means both
On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:Maybe by someone but you are still far from being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored by everone.
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The same thing as: "cats are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't ask for an example. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm actually not convinced >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that Olcott understands what a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition is. I've frequently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asked him for definitions and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he invariably responds with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example or an analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (assuming he responds at all). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> He doesn't get that examples >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't take the place of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions. Examples can be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for clarifying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Until someone publishes an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
D(D); // merely haltsAnd still don't understand that this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>False. It means that there are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statements in the language of Q that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have *only* an infinite connection to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>It is neither provable nor refutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in F.True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (ΓThat claims what it means to have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value 'true' (or at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't in any way clarify what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you think it means for something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
When I define a term hundreds of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You gave no such definition of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A valid answer would look something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
"The truth value of a statement does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not exist in a formal system when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Good. So when you say "The truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is unprovable in Q", which is commonly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known.
So once again, you're saying the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing as everyone else but using >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not really. It is normally thought of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
OK, I verified that. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Which starts with the assumption that an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H exists that meets the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immutable sequence of instructions) X >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halts when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
to prove that there exists a natural >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see
that the requirement for H to correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> report the halt
status of input D that does the opposite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was made.
In other words, you don't understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> }
if (result == 1) { >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while (1); >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> }
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> }
return result; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> }
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> D(D)
And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because algorithm D contains a copy of algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> H and does the opposite.
You just don't know jack shit dufus. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Says the person that just demonstrated that they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know the difference between an algorithm and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a C function.
Back to being ignored for trolling again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Do you know enough about C to understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to show the halting problem counter-example? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a halt decider,
Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input.
Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> map all inputs to non-halting.
Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's >>>>>>>>>>>> correct.
I am trying to keep liars from killing the
whole fucking planet by making truth computable
Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and others.
By proving the errors in logic I can make
logic into correct reasoning. That most
logic people are a herd of sheep that would
gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
what their herd accepts makes correcting this
error too fucking difficult.
There is no error. The POE follows from a series of truth >>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations
To say this objectively classical logic is objectively incorrect >>>>>>>>>>> when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while >>>>>>>>>>> retaining the full English semantics of the terms.
(P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q is ridiculously stupid when we plug English >>>>>>>>>>> sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English >>>>>>>>>>> as the measure of correct reasoning.
We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind >>>>>>>>>> game (see below):
accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.
Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
statements are proven true.
Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere.
Your intuition fails you. It just means that the axioms of the
system in question are inconsistent. And the principle of
explosion can be used to show that an inconsistent system is useless. >>>>>>
It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
of contradiction:
When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
at least one of them is false.
Whatever you call it, if the axioms of a formal system can prove
both X and ~X, then the principle of explosion can be used to show
that system is useless.
X & ~X proves FALSE.
How can anyone that is not nuts possibly think otherwise?
Assuming that X & ~X has been proven from the axioms of a formal system,
Stipulating the ordinary English meaning of contradiction
On 7/2/2026 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 5:47 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 6:35 PM, olcott wrote:Stipulating the ordinary English meaning of contradiction
On 7/2/2026 5:32 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 6:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:Your intuition fails you. It just means that the axioms of the >>>>>>> system in question are inconsistent. And the principle of
On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:54 PM, dbush wrote:States that both a statement and its negation are true. And if >>>>>>>>> a formal system can reach a contradiction through a series of >>>>>>>>> truth preserving operations from its axioms, that means both >>>>>>>>> statements are proven true.
On 7/2/2026 4:53 PM, olcott wrote:The confusing part is how an intelligent person can
On 7/2/2026 2:52 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 3:33 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:22 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:55 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 11:04 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 10:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The same thing as: "cats >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are animals" expressed in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English has no English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I didn't ask for an example. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I asked for a definition of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what it mean for the truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of a statement to not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I'm actually not convinced >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that Olcott understands what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definitions and he invariably >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds with an example or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an analogy (assuming he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> responds at all). He doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> get that examples don't take >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the place of definitions. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they aren't particularly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Until someone publishes an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Olcott to Standard English >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dictionary, this isn't really >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright Olcott 2018 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> has been updated to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Maybe by someone but you are still far from being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored by everone.
You just don't know jack shit dufus. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have been a professional C programmer since 1986. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>D(D); // merely haltsAnd still don't understand that this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm:False. It means that there are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statements in the language of Q that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have *only* an infinite connection to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the axioms of the system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>It is neither provable nor refutable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in F.That claims what it means to have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the truth value 'true' (or at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It doesn't in any way clarify >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what you think it means for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> something to not have a truth value. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
When I define a term hundreds of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You gave no such definition of what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means for the truth value of a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A valid answer would look something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
"The truth value of a statement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not exist in a formal system >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when ..." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Now complete the sentence. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Good. So when you say "The truth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) does not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x) is unprovable in Q", which is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> commonly known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
So once again, you're saying the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing as everyone else but using >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different words. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Not really. It is normally thought of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
OK, I verified that. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Which starts with the assumption that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an algorithm H exists that meets the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> following requirements: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
The Halting Problem counter-example input >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immutable sequence of instructions) X >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> described as <X> with input Y: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
A solution to the halting problem is an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H that computes the following >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halts when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does not halt when executed directly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Sure and we could equally start with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement
to prove that there exists a natural >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I really don't see how everyone did not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of whatever H
reports is a moronically stupid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> was made.
In other words, you don't understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if this was algorithm H: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ptr *Y = I; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> int result; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {
result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> }
if (result == 1) { >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while (1); >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> }
}
Is the counter example input to this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {
int result; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {
result = 0; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> }
return result; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> }
That is just nonsense. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> halting problem for the last 22 years. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> D(D)
And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because algorithm D contains a copy of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H and does the opposite. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Says the person that just demonstrated that they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't know the difference between an algorithm >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and a C function.
Back to being ignored for trolling again. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Do you know enough about C to understand that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to show the halting problem counter-example? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It perfectly illustrates an algorithm that attempts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be a halt decider,
Ridiculously stupid. Your H does not even look at its >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> input.
Algorithm H doesn't need to read its inputs in order to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> map all inputs to non-halting.
Verifying that algorithm H doesn't correctly report >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> what algorithm D does, as per the design of algorithm D. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Also your D simply stops running I ran it to verify. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Still no reply to this, so I have to assume you agree it's >>>>>>>>>>>>> correct.
Which can't be done as proved by Turing / Godel / Tarksi >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and others.
I am trying to keep liars from killing the
whole fucking planet by making truth computable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
By proving the errors in logic I can make
logic into correct reasoning. That most
logic people are a herd of sheep that would
gladly leap off the POE cliff when that is
what their herd accepts makes correcting this
error too fucking difficult.
There is no error. The POE follows from a series of truth >>>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations
To say this objectively classical logic is objectively >>>>>>>>>>>> incorrect
when it diverges from what correct reasoning would be while >>>>>>>>>>>> retaining the full English semantics of the terms.
(P ∧ ¬P) ⊢ Q is ridiculously stupid when we plug English >>>>>>>>>>>> sentences in for P and Q and use semantic entailment in English >>>>>>>>>>>> as the measure of correct reasoning.
We already did that and you got confused, calling it a mind >>>>>>>>>>> game (see below):
accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.
Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere. >>>>>>>
explosion can be used to show that an inconsistent system is
useless.
It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
of contradiction:
When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
at least one of them is false.
Whatever you call it, if the axioms of a formal system can prove
both X and ~X, then the principle of explosion can be used to show
that system is useless.
X & ~X proves FALSE.
How can anyone that is not nuts possibly think otherwise?
Assuming that X & ~X has been proven from the axioms of a formal system, >>
Is not the stipulated meaning used in logic and is therefore irrelevant.
If you want an example, naive set theory is an inconsistent system. It
is able to prove both X = "set R contains itself" and ~X = "set R does
not contain itself". So X & ~X is proven TRUE in naive set theory. The principle of explosion can then be used to show that naive set theory is useless.
On 7/2/2026 5:59 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 6:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 5:47 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 6:35 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 5:32 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 6:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 4:59 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/2/2026 5:40 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 4:23 PM, dbush wrote:Your intuition fails you. It just means that the axioms of the >>>>>>>> system in question are inconsistent. And the principle of
On 7/2/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
The confusing part is how an intelligent person canStates that both a statement and its negation are true. And >>>>>>>>>> if a formal system can reach a contradiction through a series >>>>>>>>>> of truth preserving operations from its axioms, that means >>>>>>>>>> both statements are proven true.
accept POE as correct for more than sixty seconds.
Every average third grader knows that a contradiction
Every third grader knows that it must have fucked up somewhere. >>>>>>>>
explosion can be used to show that an inconsistent system is
useless.
It makes more sense to use the ordinary meaning
of contradiction:
When-so-ever two sentences contradict each other
at least one of them is false.
Whatever you call it, if the axioms of a formal system can prove
both X and ~X, then the principle of explosion can be used to show >>>>>> that system is useless.
X & ~X proves FALSE.
How can anyone that is not nuts possibly think otherwise?
Assuming that X & ~X has been proven from the axioms of a formal
system,
Stipulating the ordinary English meaning of contradiction
Is not the stipulated meaning used in logic and is therefore irrelevant.
If you want an example, naive set theory is an inconsistent system.
It is able to prove both X = "set R contains itself" and ~X = "set R
does not contain itself". So X & ~X is proven TRUE in naive set
theory. The principle of explosion can then be used to show that
naive set theory is useless.
Russell's Paradox is the exact same issue as the
pathological self reference (PSR) of the Halting
Problem. I have studied PSR as a primary focus
for 28 years.
Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.
On 7/2/2026 1:57 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 07:03, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:01 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:59 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:43 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:18 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:00 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 10:53 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:36 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 7:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:15 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 5:04 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:57 PM, dbush wrote:False. It means that there are statements in the language >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of Q that have *only* an infinite connection to the axioms >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the system.
On 7/1/2026 4:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:37 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/1/2026 4:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 3:13 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 13:53, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:31 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:51, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 1:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2026-07-01 12:15, dbush wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 7/1/2026 2:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>That claims what it means to have the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 'true' (or at least it would if you defined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> AtomicFacts in a coherent way). It doesn't in any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> way clarify what you think it means for something to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not have a truth value.
Until someone publishes an Olcott to Standard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> English dictionary, this isn't really an option. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>I'm actually not convinced that Olcott >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understands what a definition is. I've >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> frequently asked him for definitions and he >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> invariably responds with an example or an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy (assuming he responds at all). He >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't get that examples don't take the place >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of definitions. Examples can be useful for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clarifying definitions, but they aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly useful on their own. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>The same thing as: "cats are animals" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expressed inI didn't ask for an example. I asked for a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> definition of what it mean for the truth value >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of a statement to not exist in a formal system. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
English has no English meaning in Chinese. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
You want a definition look-it-up. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
True(L, X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ BaseFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) // copyright
Olcott 2018
has been updated to this
True(L, X):= ∃Γ ⊆ AtomicFacts(L) (Γ ⊢ X) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
André
When I define a term hundreds of times and you did >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not bother to pay attention that is your mistake >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and your fault.
You gave no such definition of what it means for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth value of a statement to not exist in a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system.
A valid answer would look something like this: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
"The truth value of a statement does not exist in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system when ..."
Now complete the sentence.
It is neither provable nor refutable in F.
Good. So when you say "The truth value of (∀ x, S(x) ≠ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> x) does not exist in Q", you mean "(∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable in Q", which is commonly known.
So once again, you're saying the same thing as everyone >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> else but using different words.
Not really. It is normally thought of as undecidable >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning that Q is incomplete meaning that Q is deficient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
OK, I verified that.
The Halting Problem counter-example input
Which starts with the assumption that an algorithm H >>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists that meets the following requirements:
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> computes the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed >>>>>>>>>>>>>> directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when >>>>>>>>>>>>>> executed directly
Sure and we could equally start with the requirement >>>>>>>>>>>>> to prove that there exists a natural number > 3 and < 2. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
I really don't see how everyone did not immediately see >>>>>>>>>>>>> that the requirement for H to correctly report the halt >>>>>>>>>>>>> status of input D that does the opposite of whatever H >>>>>>>>>>>>> reports is a moronically stupid requirement within the >>>>>>>>>>>>> first five minutes that this requirement was made.
In other words, you don't understand that if this was >>>>>>>>>>>> algorithm H:
I spent 10,000 hours on it over 22 years.
And still don't understand that this algorithm:
void D(ptr *I)
{
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Is the counter example input to this algorithm:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
That is just nonsense.
Thereby proving that you've misunderstood the halting problem >>>>>>>> for the last 22 years.
D(D); // merely halts
H(D,D); // merely returns 0 and never looks at D(D)
And algorithm H is wrong about algorithm D because algorithm D
contains a copy of algorithm H and does the opposite.
You just don't know jack shit dufus.
I have been a professional C programmer since 1986.
Says the person that just demonstrated that they don't know the
difference between an algorithm and a C function.
Back to being ignored for trolling again.
Maybe by someone but you are still far from being ignored by everone.
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only twoThat's surprising, disregard for axioms?
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x). >>>>>>>>>>>>
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.
It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the >>>>>>>>>> language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both undecidable >>>>>>>>>> and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.
Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
Irrelevant. The definition of completeness
It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
that something is missing that could be added to make
it complete.
It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do.
When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA.
However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important
examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat.
When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
the original question rather than answered it.
Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial answer
rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about
natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of
natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete
and can be strengthened further.
Is (∀ x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.
On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.
So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an infinite
sequence of steps (or a single principle that summarizes them) to get
the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be finite, and Q lacks the tool (induction) that would allow a finite proof of the infinite claim, the universal statement remains unprovable.
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a
claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence
to support his claim.
On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only twoThat's surprising, disregard for axioms?
PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x). >>>>>>>>>>>>>
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from
~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is
ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.
It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in the >>>>>>>>>>> language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both undecidable
and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean.
Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
Irrelevant. The definition of completeness
It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
that something is missing that could be added to make
it complete.
It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do.
When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA.
However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important
examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat.
When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
the original question rather than answered it.
Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial answer
rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about
natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of
natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete
and can be strengthened further.
Is (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.
As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently
missed, it is neither.
It is true about natural numbers but there
are other models of Rbinsons Q, and it is false in some of them.
A simple example is a model that incudes all natural numbers and
one additional element that is its own successor.
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a
claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence
to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
His input merely halted and did not call
this halt decider.
He used {} in a way that
made no sense in C.
On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.
So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an infinite
sequence of steps (or a single principle that summarizes them) to get
the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be finite, and Q lacks the tool
(induction) that would allow a finite proof of the infinite claim, the
universal statement remains unprovable.
I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming we're still
talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is simply off.
You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not that
particular claim.
And there isn't an infinite sequence of steps that will get you from the axioms of Q to ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x. There's *no* sequence of steps, finite or infinite.
The issue here is that there are models of Q
in which ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x is
true, but there are also models of Q in which it is false.
For any given model of Q, it will either be true or false, so your claim that ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x is somehow 'not a truth bearer' is simply ludicrous. It's simply the case that this particular statement cannot be derived as
a theorem of Q nor can its negation. Thus Q is incomplete.
André
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a
claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence
to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs.
His input merely halted and did not call
this halt decider.
C function D doesn't need to call C function H.
Algorithm D used--
algorithm H as part of it, meaning algorithm D used the template to
cause algorithm H to get the wrong answer for it.
He used {} in a way that
made no sense in C.
It was a logical grouping so you can see how algorithm H is part of algorithm D.
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a
claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence
to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs.
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
His input merely halted and did not call
this halt decider.
C function D doesn't need to call C function H.
You said that it was an example of the HP counter-example input.
That was counter-factual. If you keep making these "mistakes"
I will quit looking at anything that you say. Your insight
into Q seems to prove that these "mistakes" are intentional.
Maybe you are good at math and totally clueless about programming?
Algorithm D used algorithm H as part of it, meaning algorithm D used
the template to cause algorithm H to get the wrong answer for it.
He used {} in a way that
made no sense in C.
It was a logical grouping so you can see how algorithm H is part of
algorithm D.
On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.
So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an infinite
sequence of steps (or a single principle that summarizes them) to get
the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be finite, and Q lacks the tool
(induction) that would allow a finite proof of the infinite claim,
the universal statement remains unprovable.
I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your
phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming we're
still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is simply off.
You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not that
particular claim.
What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q?
Are the universally quantified claims that can be proven like
this one (∀x, x = x) ?
And there isn't an infinite sequence of steps that will get you from
the axioms of Q to ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x. There's *no* sequence of steps,
finite or infinite.
So trying every element of the set of natural numbers
would not derive the truth value after am infinite
number of steps (that never complete)?
The issue here is that there are models of Q
Which do not exist in PTS thus are off topic in this thread.
All of the rest is off-topic in this thread.
in which ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x is true, but there are also models of Q in
which it is false.
For any given model of Q, it will either be true or false, so your
claim that ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x is somehow 'not a truth bearer' is simply
ludicrous. It's simply the case that this particular statement cannot
be derived as a theorem of Q nor can its negation. Thus Q is incomplete.
André
On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.
It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in >>>>>>>>>>>> the
language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean. >>>>>>>>>>>
Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
Irrelevant. The definition of completeness
It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
that something is missing that could be added to make
it complete.
It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do. >>>>>>> When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA.
However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important
examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat.
When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
the original question rather than answered it.
Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial answer
rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about
natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of
natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete
and can be strengthened further.
Is (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.
As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently
missed, it is neither.
Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
undefined in Q.
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a
claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence
to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs.
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
output of either 0 or 1?
On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.
So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an infinite
sequence of steps (or a single principle that summarizes them) to
get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be finite, and Q lacks the tool >>>> (induction) that would allow a finite proof of the infinite claim,
the universal statement remains unprovable.
I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your
phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming we're
still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is simply off. >>>
You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not that
particular claim.
What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q?
Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>> to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs.
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
output of either 0 or 1?
On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.
It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the
language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>
Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
Irrelevant. The definition of completeness
It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
that something is missing that could be added to make
it complete.
It does mean that something is missing that could be added to >>>>>>>>> enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do. >>>>>>>> When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA. >>>>>>>
more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important
examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat.
When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
the original question rather than answered it.
Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial answer >>>>> rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about
natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of
natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete
and can be strengthened further.
Is (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.
As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently
missed, it is neither.
Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
undefined in Q.
And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?
On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.
So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an infinite
sequence of steps (or a single principle that summarizes them) to
get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be finite, and Q lacks the
tool (induction) that would allow a finite proof of the infinite
claim, the universal statement remains unprovable.
I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your
phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming
we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is
simply off.
You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not that
particular claim.
What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q?
Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
this the rest of your reply will be ignored.
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>> to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs.
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
output of either 0 or 1?
On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>> to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
output of either 0 or 1?
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by
definition a mapping.
On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?
The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
not operating according to design spec.
terms of the art
are often misleading, thus deceptive.
When we start with an exhaustively complete list of
empirical "atomic facts" of general knowledge (combining
the analytic/synthetic distinction into one single system)
then any expression x that cannot be derived by semantic
entailment expressed syntactically in this system is
not an element of the body of general knowledge expressed
in language.
On 2026-07-03 12:12, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.
So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an infinite >>>>>> sequence of steps (or a single principle that summarizes them) to >>>>>> get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be finite, and Q lacks the >>>>>> tool (induction) that would allow a finite proof of the infinite
claim, the universal statement remains unprovable.
I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your
phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming
we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is >>>>> simply off.
You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not that
particular claim.
What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q?
Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
this the rest of your reply will be ignored.
The rest of my post which you snipped and (presumably) ignored explained *why* you are wrong about this. PTS does not reject models or model
theory. It simply doesn't rely on model-theoretic semantics. Q
*requires* a model.
André
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>> to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
output of either 0 or 1?
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by
definition a mapping.
On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>> to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
output of either 0 or 1?
A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
On 7/3/2026 1:21 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:12, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.
So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an infinite >>>>>>> sequence of steps (or a single principle that summarizes them) to >>>>>>> get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be finite, and Q lacks the >>>>>>> tool (induction) that would allow a finite proof of the infinite >>>>>>> claim, the universal statement remains unprovable.
I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your
phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming
we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is >>>>>> simply off.
You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not that >>>>>> particular claim.
What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q?
Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
this the rest of your reply will be ignored.
The rest of my post which you snipped and (presumably) ignored
explained *why* you are wrong about this. PTS does not reject models
or model theory. It simply doesn't rely on model-theoretic semantics.
Q *requires* a model.
André
It replaces Model theory With PTS.
That you do not understand this is your mistake.
"Is x true" is replaced with something like "Is x provable".
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is byThat only proves that the definition is incoherent.
definition a mapping.
The coherent way that it actually works is that
inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
finite string transformation rules to inputs to
derive outputs.
On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>> to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
output of either 0 or 1?
A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
{
return 0;
}
By construing that as a mapping is one of the screw-ups
that prevents true expressed in language from being computable.
My HHH applies the operational semantics of
C to its finite string input DD to correctly
determine that the DD input to HHH has no PTS
well-founded justification tree within these
operational semantics.
With your screwed up notion of a halt decider this
would be correct.
int HHH(ptr DD)
{
if (5 > 3)
return 0;
}
On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>> to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
output of either 0 or 1?
A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs, so
there is nothing to ignore. What an algorithm might do to *compute* the mapping has nothing to do with the mapping.
On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>> to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
output of either 0 or 1?
A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs, so
there is nothing to ignore. What an algorithm might do to *compute*
the mapping has nothing to do with the mapping.
It is conventionally construed as a mapping.
It is not even conventionally construed as a halt
function, not even a halt function that gets the
wrong answer.
On 2026-07-03 12:20, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?
The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
not operating according to design spec.
And where exactly do you get this 'base definition' from? It certainly
does not correspond to any definition that I am aware of.
terms of the art
are often misleading, thus deceptive.
Terms of the art are what they are. They are precisely defined so there
is no doubt about what they mean. So how can they therefore be
misleading. It's colloquial terms that have the potential to be
misleading since they are often not precisely defined.
When we start with an exhaustively complete list of
empirical "atomic facts" of general knowledge (combining
the analytic/synthetic distinction into one single system)
then any expression x that cannot be derived by semantic
entailment expressed syntactically in this system is
not an element of the body of general knowledge expressed
in language.
Q isn't concerned with general knowledge (expressed in language or otherwise). It doesn't contain any notion of 'atomic fact'. So none of
this is relevant to the question of whether Q is complete.
André
On 7/3/2026 1:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:20, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?
The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
not operating according to design spec.
And where exactly do you get this 'base definition' from? It certainly
does not correspond to any definition that I am aware of.
An motor vehicle that is missing a motor is incomplete.
A bicycle that is missing a motor is NOT incomplete.
Incomplete is an adjective that describes something
missing essential parts, lacking necessary details,
or left unfinished.
terms of the art
are often misleading, thus deceptive.
Terms of the art are what they are. They are precisely defined so
there is no doubt about what they mean. So how can they therefore be
misleading. It's colloquial terms that have the potential to be
misleading since they are often not precisely defined.
These TOTA that diverge from their base meanings confuse
people into thinking that computation is limited.
The
inability to correctly compute the numerical square-root
of a dead chicken does not make computation incomplete
or limited.
When we start with an exhaustively complete list of
empirical "atomic facts" of general knowledge (combining
the analytic/synthetic distinction into one single system)
then any expression x that cannot be derived by semantic
entailment expressed syntactically in this system is
not an element of the body of general knowledge expressed
in language.
Q isn't concerned with general knowledge (expressed in language or
otherwise). It doesn't contain any notion of 'atomic fact'. So none of
this is relevant to the question of whether Q is complete.
André
It has the "atomic facts" of Q.
Any expression that cannot reach these "atomic fact"
axioms is ungrounded in the atomic base of Q.
On 7/3/2026 2:45 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>> of a
claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>>> to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>>
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to
an output of either 0 or 1?
A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
{
return 0;
}
The above algorithm does in fact compute this mathematical mapping:
input | output
------------------
(any int) | 0
By construing that as a mapping is one of the screw-ups
that prevents true expressed in language from being computable.
My HHH applies the operational semantics of
C to its finite string input DD to correctly
determine that the DD input to HHH has no PTS
well-founded justification tree within these
operational semantics.
With your screwed up notion of a halt decider this
would be correct.
int HHH(ptr DD)
{
if (5 > 3)
return 0;
}
On 2026-07-03 12:38, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:21 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:12, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.
So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an
infinite sequence of steps (or a single principle that
summarizes them) to get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be >>>>>>>> finite, and Q lacks the tool (induction) that would allow a
finite proof of the infinite claim, the universal statement
remains unprovable.
I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your
phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming >>>>>>> we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is >>>>>>> simply off.
You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not that >>>>>>> particular claim.
What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q?
Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
this the rest of your reply will be ignored.
The rest of my post which you snipped and (presumably) ignored
explained *why* you are wrong about this. PTS does not reject models
or model theory. It simply doesn't rely on model-theoretic semantics.
Q *requires* a model.
André
It replaces Model theory With PTS.
That you do not understand this is your mistake.
"Is x true" is replaced with something like "Is x provable".
Which has no bearing on the existence of models
or on the fact that Q
requires a model. When we assert that something is provable from the
axioms of Q, we are effectively saying that it is true in all models of Q.
André
On 7/3/2026 1:53 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 2:45 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>>> of a
claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>> evidence
to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to
outputs.
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to >>>>>> an output of either 0 or 1?
A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
{
return 0;
}
The above algorithm does in fact compute this mathematical mapping:
input | output
------------------
(any int) | 0
By construing that as a mapping is one of the screw-ups
that prevents true expressed in language from being computable.
My HHH applies the operational semantics of
C to its finite string input DD to correctly
determine that the DD input to HHH has no PTS
well-founded justification tree within these
operational semantics.
With your screwed up notion of a halt decider this
would be correct.
int HHH(ptr DD)
{
if (5 > 3)
return 0;
}
Because it ignores the input it is not any halt
function at all.
The above partial halt decider meets the below requirements for all
algorithms that do not halt:
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions) X
described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the
following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed directly
On 7/3/2026 1:46 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:38, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:21 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:12, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps. >>>>>>>>>So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an
infinite sequence of steps (or a single principle that
summarizes them) to get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be >>>>>>>>> finite, and Q lacks the tool (induction) that would allow a >>>>>>>>> finite proof of the infinite claim, the universal statement >>>>>>>>> remains unprovable.
I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your >>>>>>>> phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming >>>>>>>> we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is >>>>>>>> simply off.
You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not
that particular claim.
What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q? >>>>>>
many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
this the rest of your reply will be ignored.
The rest of my post which you snipped and (presumably) ignored
explained *why* you are wrong about this. PTS does not reject models
or model theory. It simply doesn't rely on model-theoretic
semantics. Q *requires* a model.
André
It replaces Model theory With PTS.
That you do not understand this is your mistake.
"Is x true" is replaced with something like "Is x provable".
Which has no bearing on the existence of models
Proof theoretic semantics is utterly unconcerned with true
in a model and focuses on the existence of a canonical proof.
On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is byThat only proves that the definition is incoherent.
definition a mapping.
The coherent way that it actually works is that
inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
finite string transformation rules to inputs to
derive outputs.
Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping and an algorithm. They are two different things.
André
On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is byThat only proves that the definition is incoherent.
definition a mapping.
The coherent way that it actually works is that
inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
finite string transformation rules to inputs to
derive outputs.
Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping and
an algorithm. They are two different things.
André
A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
is not any sort of halt function.
On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is byThat only proves that the definition is incoherent.
definition a mapping.
The coherent way that it actually works is that
inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
finite string transformation rules to inputs to
derive outputs.
Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping and
an algorithm. They are two different things.
André
A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
is not any sort of halt function.
On 7/3/2026 6:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is byThat only proves that the definition is incoherent.
definition a mapping.
The coherent way that it actually works is that
inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
finite string transformation rules to inputs to
derive outputs.
Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping and
an algorithm. They are two different things.
André
A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
is not any sort of halt function.
It is a partial halt decider that correctly reports the halt status of
any algorithm that halts when executed directly and incorrectly reports
the halt status of algorithms that halt when executed directly.
If you disagree, point out exactly which part of the below requirements
is violated in doing so. If you dishonestly trim this, it will be taken
as your official, on-the-record admission that the below requirements
are satisfied for the subset of algorithms that halt when executed
directly.
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed directly
On 2026-07-03 14:13, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:37 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:20, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?
The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
not operating according to design spec.
And where exactly do you get this 'base definition' from? It
certainly does not correspond to any definition that I am aware of.
An motor vehicle that is missing a motor is incomplete.
A bicycle that is missing a motor is NOT incomplete.
Incomplete is an adjective that describes something
missing essential parts, lacking necessary details,
or left unfinished.
That's *one* definition of incomplete. It's hardly *the* definition and
you have provided no reason to think that it is the 'base definition' whatever that might mean to you.
terms of the art
are often misleading, thus deceptive.
Terms of the art are what they are. They are precisely defined so
there is no doubt about what they mean. So how can they therefore be
misleading. It's colloquial terms that have the potential to be
misleading since they are often not precisely defined.
These TOTA that diverge from their base meanings confuse
people into thinking that computation is limited.
No. It confuses *you*. The vast majority of people are not confused by
this. And stating that Q is incomplete has nothing to do with
computation. Computation is a separate field.
André
The
inability to correctly compute the numerical square-root
of a dead chicken does not make computation incomplete
or limited.
When we start with an exhaustively complete list of
empirical "atomic facts" of general knowledge (combining
the analytic/synthetic distinction into one single system)
then any expression x that cannot be derived by semantic
entailment expressed syntactically in this system is
not an element of the body of general knowledge expressed
in language.
Q isn't concerned with general knowledge (expressed in language or
otherwise). It doesn't contain any notion of 'atomic fact'. So none
of this is relevant to the question of whether Q is complete.
André
It has the "atomic facts" of Q.
Any expression that cannot reach these "atomic fact"
axioms is ungrounded in the atomic base of Q.
On 2026-07-03 14:43, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:46 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:38, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:21 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:12, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps. >>>>>>>>>>So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an
infinite sequence of steps (or a single principle that
summarizes them) to get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be >>>>>>>>>> finite, and Q lacks the tool (induction) that would allow a >>>>>>>>>> finite proof of the infinite claim, the universal statement >>>>>>>>>> remains unprovable.
I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your >>>>>>>>> phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming >>>>>>>>> we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is >>>>>>>>> simply off.
You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not >>>>>>>>> that particular claim.
What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q? >>>>>>>
many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
this the rest of your reply will be ignored.
The rest of my post which you snipped and (presumably) ignored
explained *why* you are wrong about this. PTS does not reject
models or model theory. It simply doesn't rely on model-theoretic
semantics. Q *requires* a model.
André
It replaces Model theory With PTS.
That you do not understand this is your mistake.
"Is x true" is replaced with something like "Is x provable".
Which has no bearing on the existence of models
Proof theoretic semantics is utterly unconcerned with true
in a model and focuses on the existence of a canonical proof.
PTS isn't concerned with true at all,
which is why it certainly wouldn't
claim that a proposition which can neither be proven nor not proven is
not a 'truth bearer'. However, you have made this claim about (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) in Q despite the fact that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is *always* either true or false. It cannot be derived as as theorem, but it is still most
decidedly a truth-bearer.
Once you start making claims about things being truth-bhearers/non truth-bearers, you're firmly dealing with a semantics that concerns
itself with truth, i.e. not PTS.
André
On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is byThat only proves that the definition is incoherent.
definition a mapping.
The coherent way that it actually works is that
inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
finite string transformation rules to inputs to
derive outputs.
Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping and
an algorithm. They are two different things.
André
A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
is not any sort of halt function.
He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.
André
On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:The mathematical halting function:
On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by >>>>>> definition a mapping.That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
The coherent way that it actually works is that
inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
finite string transformation rules to inputs to
derive outputs.
Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping and
an algorithm. They are two different things.
André
A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
is not any sort of halt function.
He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.
André
A actual halt function must compute
On 7/3/2026 6:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is byThat only proves that the definition is incoherent.
definition a mapping.
The coherent way that it actually works is that
inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
finite string transformation rules to inputs to
derive outputs.
Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping and
an algorithm. They are two different things.
André
A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
is not any sort of halt function.
It is a partial halt decider that correctly reports the halt status of
any algorithm that halts when executed directly and incorrectly reports
the halt status of algorithms that halt when executed directly.
If you disagree, point out exactly which part of the below requirements
is violated in doing so. If you dishonestly trim this, it will be taken
as your official, on-the-record admission that the below requirements
are satisfied for the subset of algorithms that halt when executed
directly.
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed directly
On 7/3/2026 9:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:The mathematical halting function:
On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by >>>>>>> definition a mapping.That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
The coherent way that it actually works is that
inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
finite string transformation rules to inputs to
derive outputs.
Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping
and an algorithm. They are two different things.
André
A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
is not any sort of halt function.
He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.
André
A actual halt function must compute
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions) X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed directly
On 7/3/2026 7:10 PM, dbush wrote:Shown above.
On 7/3/2026 6:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by >>>>>> definition a mapping.That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
The coherent way that it actually works is that
inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
finite string transformation rules to inputs to
derive outputs.
Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping and
an algorithm. They are two different things.
André
A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
is not any sort of halt function.
It is a partial halt decider that correctly reports the halt status of
any algorithm that halts when executed directly and incorrectly
reports the halt status of algorithms that halt when executed directly.
If you disagree, point out exactly which part of the below
requirements is violated in doing so. If you dishonestly trim this,
it will be taken as your official, on-the-record admission that the
below requirements are satisfied for the subset of algorithms that
halt when executed directly.
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions)
X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the
following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed
directly
A actual halt function must compute the mapping
On 7/3/2026 8:58 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 9:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:The mathematical halting function:
On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is >>>>>>>> by definition a mapping.That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
The coherent way that it actually works is that
inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
finite string transformation rules to inputs to
derive outputs.
Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping
and an algorithm. They are two different things.
André
A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
is not any sort of halt function.
He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.
André
A actual halt function must compute
When you actually implement this concretely
so that
you cannot just "assume away" details then your notion
requires a halt decider to report on the behavior of
its caller having no idea who its caller is.
Given any algorithm (i.e. a fixed immutable sequence of instructions)
X described as <X> with input Y:
A solution to the halting problem is an algorithm H that computes the
following mapping:
(<X>,Y) maps to 1 if and only if X(Y) halts when executed directly
(<X>,Y) maps to 0 if and only if X(Y) does not halt when executed
directly
On 7/3/2026 10:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 8:58 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 9:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:The mathematical halting function:
On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is >>>>>>>>> by definition a mapping.That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
The coherent way that it actually works is that
inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
finite string transformation rules to inputs to
derive outputs.
Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping >>>>>>> and an algorithm. They are two different things.
André
A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
is not any sort of halt function.
He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.
André
A actual halt function must compute
When you actually implement this concretely
We find that it is not possible, as Linz and others have proved.
On 7/3/2026 9:19 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 10:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 8:58 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 9:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:The mathematical halting function:
On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is >>>>>>>>>> by definition a mapping.That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
The coherent way that it actually works is that
inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
finite string transformation rules to inputs to
derive outputs.
Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping >>>>>>>> and an algorithm. They are two different things.
André
A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
is not any sort of halt function.
He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.
André
A actual halt function must compute
When you actually implement this concretely
We find that it is not possible, as Linz and others have proved.
Impossible requirements are incorrect requirements.
The halting problem doesn't actually have self reference, as
algorithms can be copied as in the below example of algorithm D:
void D(ptr *I)
{
// algorithm D; input: I
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
// algorithm H; inputs: X,Y
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Which is the counter example input to algorithm H:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
// algorithm H; inputs: X,Y
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a
claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence
to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
His input merely halted and did not call
this halt decider. He used {} in a way that
made no sense in C.
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>> to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs.
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
output of either 0 or 1?
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>> to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
output of either 0 or 1?
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by
definition a mapping.
That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by >>>>>> definition a mapping.That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
The coherent way that it actually works is that
inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
finite string transformation rules to inputs to
derive outputs.
Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping and
an algorithm. They are two different things.
André
A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
is not any sort of halt function.
He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.
André
A actual halt function must compute the mapping from
its actual input according to the operational semantics
of this input to the behavior that this input actually
specifies. No function can report on the behavior of
its caller because it has no idea who its caller is.
On 7/3/2026 9:19 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 10:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 8:58 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 9:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:The mathematical halting function:
On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is >>>>>>>>>> by definition a mapping.That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
The coherent way that it actually works is that
inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
finite string transformation rules to inputs to
derive outputs.
Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping >>>>>>>> and an algorithm. They are two different things.
André
A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
is not any sort of halt function.
He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.
André
A actual halt function must compute
When you actually implement this concretely
We find that it is not possible, as Linz and others have proved.
Impossible requirements are incorrect requirements.
On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>> to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
output of either 0 or 1?
A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
{
return 0;
}
By construing that as a mapping is one of the screw-ups
that prevents true expressed in language from being computable.
On 7/3/2026 1:53 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 2:45 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>>> of a
claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>> evidence
to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to
outputs.
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to >>>>>> an output of either 0 or 1?
A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
{
return 0;
}
The above algorithm does in fact compute this mathematical mapping:
input | output
------------------
(any int) | 0
By construing that as a mapping is one of the screw-ups
that prevents true expressed in language from being computable.
My HHH applies the operational semantics of
C to its finite string input DD to correctly
determine that the DD input to HHH has no PTS
well-founded justification tree within these
operational semantics.
With your screwed up notion of a halt decider this
would be correct.
int HHH(ptr DD)
{
if (5 > 3)
return 0;
}
Because it ignores the input it is not any halt
function at all.
On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>> to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
output of either 0 or 1?
A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs, so
there is nothing to ignore. What an algorithm might do to *compute*
the mapping has nothing to do with the mapping.
It is conventionally construed as a mapping.
It is not even conventionally construed as a halt
function, not even a halt function that gets the
wrong answer.
On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q.
It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but in >>>>>>>>>>>> the
language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean. >>>>>>>>>>>
Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
Irrelevant. The definition of completeness
It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies)
that something is missing that could be added to make
it complete.
It does mean that something is missing that could be added to
enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do. >>>>>>> When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA.
However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important
examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat.
When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
the original question rather than answered it.
Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial answer
rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about
natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of
natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete
and can be strengthened further.
Is (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.
As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently
missed, it is neither.
Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
undefined in Q.
On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when
On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make >>>>>>>>>>>>> Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the
On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
Irrelevant. The definition of completeness
It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies) >>>>>>>>>>> that something is missing that could be added to make
it complete.
It does mean that something is missing that could be added to >>>>>>>>>> enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do. >>>>>>>>> When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA. >>>>>>>>
more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know
which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important >>>>>>>> examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat. >>>>>>> When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
the original question rather than answered it.
Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial answer >>>>>> rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about >>>>>> natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of
natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete >>>>>> and can be strengthened further.
Is (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.
As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently
missed, it is neither.
Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
undefined in Q.
And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?
The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
not operating according to design spec.
On 7/3/2026 1:21 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:12, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.
So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an infinite >>>>>>> sequence of steps (or a single principle that summarizes them) to >>>>>>> get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be finite, and Q lacks the >>>>>>> tool (induction) that would allow a finite proof of the infinite >>>>>>> claim, the universal statement remains unprovable.
I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your
phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming
we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is >>>>>> simply off.
You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not that >>>>>> particular claim.
What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q?
Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
this the rest of your reply will be ignored.
The rest of my post which you snipped and (presumably) ignored
explained *why* you are wrong about this. PTS does not reject models
or model theory. It simply doesn't rely on model-theoretic semantics.
Q *requires* a model.
It replaces Model theory With PTS.
That you do not understand this is your mistake.
"Is x true" is replaced with something like "Is x provable".
On 2026-07-02 dbush wrote:
The halting problem doesn't actually have self reference, as
algorithms can be copied as in the below example of algorithm D:
void D(ptr *I)
{
// algorithm D; input: I
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
// algorithm H; inputs: X,Y
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Which is the counter example input to algorithm H:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
// algorithm H; inputs: X,Y
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
On 03/07/2026 18:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a
claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence
to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
For every possible input his H halts and returns either 0 for false
or 1 for true. Therefore his H is a decider. It return 0 for D
although D halts so the decider H is not a halt decider.
His input merely halted and did not call
this halt decider. He used {} in a way that
made no sense in C.
His use of {} is perfectly correct by C rules and as meaningful ans
usually. Your false claim (not shown above) is false.
On 7/4/2026 2:37 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 2026-07-02 dbush wrote:
The halting problem doesn't actually have self reference, as
algorithms can be copied as in the below example of algorithm D:
void D(ptr *I)
{
// algorithm D; input: I
ptr *X = D;
ptr *Y = I;
int result;
{
// algorithm H; inputs: X,Y
result = 0;
}
if (result == 1) {
while (1);
}
}
Which is the counter example input to algorithm H:
int H(ptr *X, ptr *Y)
{
int result;
{
// algorithm H; inputs: X,Y
result = 0;
}
return result;
}
On 03/07/2026 18:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a
claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That
is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence
to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
For every possible input his H halts and returns either 0 for false
or 1 for true. Therefore his H is a decider. It return 0 for D
although D halts so the decider H is not a halt decider.
counter-factual H always returns 0.
His input merely halted and did not call
this halt decider. He used {} in a way that
made no sense in C.
His use of {} is perfectly correct by C rules and as meaningful ans
usually. Your false claim (not shown above) is false.
On 03/07/2026 21:10, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>> to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
output of either 0 or 1?
No, but dbush's program H implements a mapping anyway. It just is
a different mapping from the one a halt decider is required to do.
On 7/4/2026 2:41 AM, Mikko wrote:The mathematical halting function:
On 03/07/2026 21:10, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part of a >>>>>>>> claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>> to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to an
output of either 0 or 1?
No, but dbush's program H implements a mapping anyway. It just is
a different mapping from the one a halt decider is required to do.
Making it complete nonsense.
A actual halt function must compute
On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:
In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal.
Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then,
/purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized
non-element.
Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
just the resident trolls won't get it.
Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences,
is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any*
(infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal
cannot be in the list is quite constructive.
(Namely, we don't need to say "assume ab abdsurdo that
an enumeration is given", we can just say "for *any* list,
we *construct* an element not in the list".)
On 03/07/2026 21:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>> of a
claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>>> to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>>
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to
an output of either 0 or 1?
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by
definition a mapping.
That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
Your definitions often are. But the well known definition of "mapping"
is not.
On 04/07/2026 04:52, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by >>>>>>> definition a mapping.That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
The coherent way that it actually works is that
inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
finite string transformation rules to inputs to
derive outputs.
Apparently you don't understand the difference between a mapping
and an algorithm. They are two different things.
André
A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
is not any sort of halt function.
He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.
André
A actual halt function must compute the mapping from
its actual input according to the operational semantics
of this input to the behavior that this input actually
specifies. No function can report on the behavior of
its caller because it has no idea who its caller is.
A function does not compute. An algrothm may compute a function.
However, no algrithm computes the halt function.
The halt functions maps a computation to a truth value
but so do many other functions, too.
On 04/07/2026 05:37, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 9:19 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 10:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 8:58 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 9:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:The mathematical halting function:
On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that >>>>>>>>>>> is by definition a mapping.That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
The coherent way that it actually works is that
inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
finite string transformation rules to inputs to
derive outputs.
Apparently you don't understand the difference between a
mapping and an algorithm. They are two different things.
André
A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
is not any sort of halt function.
He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.
André
A actual halt function must compute
When you actually implement this concretely
We find that it is not possible, as Linz and others have proved.
Impossible requirements are incorrect requirements.
There is no well known meaning of "incorrect requirements".
On 03/07/2026 21:45, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>> of a
claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>>> to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>>
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to
an output of either 0 or 1?
A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
{
return 0;
}
By construing that as a mapping is one of the screw-ups
that prevents true expressed in language from being computable.
By construing the above mapping as a non-mapping you disconnect from
Common Languge and lose your ablility to communicate.
On 03/07/2026 22:08, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>> of a
claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more evidence >>>>>>>>> to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to outputs. >>>>>>>
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to
an output of either 0 or 1?
A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
so there is nothing to ignore. What an algorithm might do to
*compute* the mapping has nothing to do with the mapping.
It is conventionally construed as a mapping.
More importantly, it satisfies the definition of "mapping".
It is not even conventionally construed as a halt
function, not even a halt function that gets the
wrong answer.
Irrelevant, as the claim was that H does not implement the halt
function.
On 7/4/2026 2:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 03/07/2026 21:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>>> of a
claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>> evidence
to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to
outputs.
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to >>>>>> an output of either 0 or 1?
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that is by
definition a mapping.
That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
Your definitions often are. But the well known definition of "mapping"
is not.
The output really should be based on the input
because computing the mapping from an input to
an output requires some kind of correspondence
between the two.
On 03/07/2026 21:20, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when >>>>>>>>> more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know >>>>>>>>> which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important >>>>>>>>> examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.
On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete
it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to
its intended purpose. A car without an engine is
incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
Irrelevant. The definition of completeness
It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies) >>>>>>>>>>>> that something is missing that could be added to make
it complete.
It does mean that something is missing that could be added to >>>>>>>>>>> enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to do. >>>>>>>>>> When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA. >>>>>>>>>
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat. >>>>>>>> When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
the original question rather than answered it.
Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial answer >>>>>>> rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about >>>>>>> natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of >>>>>>> natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete >>>>>>> and can be strengthened further.
Is (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.
As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently
missed, it is neither.
Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
undefined in Q.
And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?
The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
not operating according to design spec.
No, it is not. The term "incomplete" in its base meaning is
appicable to various things that are not exprected to operate.
On 7/4/2026 2:48 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 04/07/2026 05:37, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 9:19 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 10:05 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 8:58 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 9:52 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 5:51 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:The mathematical halting function:
On 2026-07-03 16:37, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:47 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:36, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:18 PM, dbush wrote:
If an algorithm takes an input and produces an output, that >>>>>>>>>>>> is by definition a mapping.That only proves that the definition is incoherent.
The coherent way that it actually works is that
inputs are transformed into outputs by applying
finite string transformation rules to inputs to
derive outputs.
Apparently you don't understand the difference between a
mapping and an algorithm. They are two different things.
André
A function that ignores its input and only returns 0
is not any sort of halt function.
He was defining 'mapping', not 'halt function'.
André
A actual halt function must compute
When you actually implement this concretely
We find that it is not possible, as Linz and others have proved.
Impossible requirements are incorrect requirements.
There is no well known meaning of "incorrect requirements".
I just established the meaning of incorrect requirements
as any requirement that requires the logically impossible.
The halting problem requires a decider that correctly
reports the halt status of an input that does the opposite
of whatever it reports.
I already established that an incorrect polar question
is any yes/no question lacking a correct yes/no answer.
On 7/4/2026 2:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 03/07/2026 21:45, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:27 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 2:10 PM, olcott wrote:int Not_A_Mapping(int X)
On 7/3/2026 12:10 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:52 PM, olcott wrote:Ignoring the input IS NOT A MAPPING
On 7/3/2026 10:50 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/3/2026 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:22 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:51, olcott wrote:
Do you know enough about C to understand that
dbush example was foolish nonsense when proposed
to show the halting problem counter-example?
It is a valid example of a C program. It was present as a part >>>>>>>>>> of a
claim about you, and your response was the false claim that "That >>>>>>>>>> is just nonsense". Later in the discussion you offer more >>>>>>>>>> evidence
to support his claim.
His halt decider did not look at its input.
Nor is it required to. All it needs to do is map inputs to
outputs.
So a piece of metal sitting on the ground is an automobile.
Does algorithm H map machine description X and machine input Y to >>>>>> an output of either 0 or 1?
A mapping is nothing more than an association of inputs to outputs,
{
return 0;
}
By construing that as a mapping is one of the screw-ups
that prevents true expressed in language from being computable.
By construing the above mapping as a non-mapping you disconnect from
Common Languge and lose your ablility to communicate.
I will not tolerate that math hijacks the term
"mapping" to ignore requirement that there must
be some actual correspondence between inputs and
outputs.
A actual halt function must computeThe mathematical halting function:
On 7/4/2026 3:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 03/07/2026 21:20, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when >>>>>>>>>> more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know >>>>>>>>>> which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important >>>>>>>>>> examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.
On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its intended purpose. A car without an engine is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete relative to a mode of transportation.
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but in the
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to true(L,x). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Irrelevant. The definition of completeness
It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies) >>>>>>>>>>>>> that something is missing that could be added to make >>>>>>>>>>>>> it complete.
It does mean that something is missing that could be added to >>>>>>>>>>>> enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined to >>>>>>>>>>> do.
When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes PA. >>>>>>>>>>
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat. >>>>>>>>> When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we
add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed
the original question rather than answered it.
Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial >>>>>>>> answer
rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional
postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about >>>>>>>> natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of >>>>>>>> natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still incomplete >>>>>>>> and can be strengthened further.
Is (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.
As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently
missed, it is neither.
Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
undefined in Q.
And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?
The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
not operating according to design spec.
No, it is not. The term "incomplete" in its base meaning is
appicable to various things that are not exprected to operate.
The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.
I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.
A motor vehicle that lacks a motor is incomplete.
Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
according to its definition.
On 03/07/2026 21:38, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 1:21 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 12:12, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:17 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 10:48, olcott wrote:Model theory has been expressly off-topic for
On 7/3/2026 9:45 AM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-02 23:02, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 9:03 PM, olcott wrote:
Q cannot do the ∀x without an infinite sequence of steps.
So your phrasing is good: Q would need something like an
infinite sequence of steps (or a single principle that
summarizes them) to get the ∀x. Since formal proofs must be >>>>>>>> finite, and Q lacks the tool (induction) that would allow a
finite proof of the infinite claim, the universal statement
remains unprovable.
I'm not sure why you are responding to yourself nor who 'your
phrasing' refers to since you don't quote anyone. But, assuming >>>>>>> we're still talking about ∀ x, S(x) ≠ x in Q, your reasoning is >>>>>>> simply off.
You *can* prove universally quantified claims in Q, just not that >>>>>>> particular claim.
What is the reason that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proved in Q?
Because it isn't true in all models of Q,
many weeks in every thread. Whenever you ignore
this the rest of your reply will be ignored.
The rest of my post which you snipped and (presumably) ignored
explained *why* you are wrong about this. PTS does not reject models
or model theory. It simply doesn't rely on model-theoretic semantics.
Q *requires* a model.
It replaces Model theory With PTS.
That you do not understand this is your mistake.
"Is x true" is replaced with something like "Is x provable".
"Is x provable" is there already. Why would one want to lose
"Is x true"? If one dosn't need "Is x true" one needn't use
it.
On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/4/2026 3:06 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 03/07/2026 21:20, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 12:35 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2026-07-03 09:38, olcott wrote:
On 7/3/2026 4:28 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 02/07/2026 17:49, olcott wrote:
On 7/2/2026 1:55 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 01/07/2026 18:16, olcott wrote:
On 7/1/2026 2:24 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 30/06/2026 16:58, olcott wrote:
On 6/30/2026 3:18 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 16:29, olcott wrote:
On 6/29/2026 1:14 AM, Mikko wrote:
On 29/06/2026 05:52, olcott wrote:
On 6/28/2026 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:Irrelevant. The definition of completeness
On 27/06/2026 17:50, polcott wrote:Q also can't bake a birthday cake, this does not make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Q in any way "incomplete" relative to what it was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> defined to do. Incomplete only counts relative to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its intended purpose. A car without an engine is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> incomplete relative to a mode of transportation. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On 6/27/2026 1:53 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 20/06/2026 18:32, olcott wrote:It comes close. If ∃x x=S(x) is likewise "ungrounded" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but in the
A proof theoretic expression is known to be true when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it is fully grounded in its atomic base. Only two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PTS semantics researchers deal with true Dag Prawitz >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the one that began this. PTS previously only dealt >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with semantic meaning and never got around to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true(L,x).
That's surprising, disregard for axioms?
If there is no sequence of inference steps in Q from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ~∃x x=S(x) to the axioms of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ungrounded in the PTS atomic base of Q.
This does not mean undecidable or incomplete >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it means that ~∃x x=S(x) is out-of-scope for Q. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
language of Q then ~∃x x=S(x) and ∃x x=S(x) are both >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidable
and Q is incomplete, bcause that is what the words mean. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
It a misnomer and does not literally mean (as it implies) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that something is missing that could be added to make >>>>>>>>>>>>>> it complete.
It does mean that something is missing that could be added to >>>>>>>>>>>>> enabe a proof of an unprovable sentence.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) allows that.
It never was incomplete. It always did what it was defined >>>>>>>>>>>> to do.
When Q is extended to become PA it stops being Q and becomes >>>>>>>>>>>> PA.
However, there are theories that reamain incomplete even when >>>>>>>>>>> more postolates are added, as long as there is a way to know >>>>>>>>>>> which sentences are included in the added postulates. Important >>>>>>>>>>> examples include Peano arithmetic and ZFC set theory.
Base-Extension Semantics (B-eS) seems to be essentially a cheat. >>>>>>>>>> When we ask what is grounded in an atomic base of Q and we >>>>>>>>>> add axioms to Q to become PA we cheated in that we changed >>>>>>>>>> the original question rather than answered it.
Yes, in a sense. But sometimes it is better to have a partial >>>>>>>>> answer
rather than no answer at all. Of course Q with any additional >>>>>>>>> postulate is not Q but if the additional postulates are true about >>>>>>>>> natural numbers then the strengthened theory is still a theory of >>>>>>>>> natural numbers. PA is one such strengthened Q but still
incomplete
and can be strengthened further.
Is (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) provable or refutable in Q?
Yes if you cheat, no if you don't cheat.
As I already pointed out in another message, which you apparently >>>>>>> missed, it is neither.
Thus PTS would say that (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is semantically
undefined in Q.
And that differs from claiming that Q is incomplete exactly how...?
The base definition of "incomplete" means that it is
not operating according to design spec.
No, it is not. The term "incomplete" in its base meaning is
appicable to various things that are not exprected to operate.
The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.
I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.
In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.
A motor vehicle that lacks a motor is incomplete.
Q that cannot resolve (∀x, S(x) ≠ x) is complete
according to its definition.
On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:
The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.
I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.
In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.
Math mapping from an input to an output:
Ignore the input and output a fixed constant.
int mapping_function(int x)
{
return 0;
}
On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:Math undecidable: The inability to translate
The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.
I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.
In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.
incoherent nonsense into a truth value.
LP := ~True(LP)
G := ~Provable(PA, G)
On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:Math undecidable: The inability to translate
The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.
I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.
In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.
incoherent nonsense into a truth value.
LP := ~True(LP)
G := ~Provable(PA, G)
Math Incomplete: The inability to accomplish
more than a system was defined to accomplish.
(∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proven in Q
Math mapping from an input to an output:
Ignore the input and output a fixed constant.
int mapping_function(int x)
{
return 0;
}
On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:
In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal.
Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then,
/purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized
non-element.
Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
just the resident trolls won't get it.
Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences,
is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any*
(infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal
cannot be in the list is quite constructive.
"quite" but not "completely".
A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a constructible list.
On 04/07/2026 22:12, olcott wrote:
On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:Math undecidable: The inability to translate
The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.
I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.
In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.
incoherent nonsense into a truth value.
LP := ~True(LP)
G := ~Provable(PA, G)
Is it right to call that "incoherent"?
"incoherent" would seem to me to be reservable for a purported
demonstration of a deduction which is constructed of two deductions that
do not validly lead from one to the other.
"valueless" is accurate, technically, but it has an ordinary economic
sense similar to "worthless".
"non-normalisable" is accurate and, more usefully, so is
"non-head-normalisable" (and some other related terms).
"loopy" might be useful but readers would probably go insane at you
because they go insane at much less.
On 7/4/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:Math undecidable: The inability to translate
The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.
I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.
In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.
incoherent nonsense into a truth value.
False.
In computability theory and computational complexity theory, an
undecidable problem is a decision problem for which it is proved to be impossible to construct an algorithm that always leads to a correct yes- or-no answer.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Undecidable_problem
LP := ~True(LP)
G := ~Provable(PA, G)
The above are not examples of that.
Math Incomplete: The inability to accomplish
more than a system was defined to accomplish.
False. Intent does not factor into formal systems.
In mathematical logic, a theory is complete if it is consistent and for every closed formula in the theory's language, either that formula or
its negation is provable
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Complete_theory
(∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proven in Q
Math mapping from an input to an output:
Ignore the input and output a fixed constant.
Provide an external reference that 1) defines "ignoring the input" and
2) forbids it.
int mapping_function(int x)
{
return 0;
}
All you're proving is that you can't understand that words can have different meanings in different contexts that aren't necessarily related.
Of course,
dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't make a statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
outside of the fantastical quantification.
On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:
In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal.
Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then,
/purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized
non-element.
Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
just the resident trolls won't get it.
Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences,
is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any*
(infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal
cannot be in the list is quite constructive.
"quite" but not "completely".
A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a
constructible list.
I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less
often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one Julio
and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally
quantified statements into the system proper which then have derivable statements containing actual constructions of the constructible objects
they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of course, dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't make a statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
outside of the fantastical quantification.
By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of reals as defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the
Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical quantification
but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning clearer.
While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper, some of
the members of some of the sets clearly do not.
On 7/5/2026 9:19 AM, dbush wrote:
On 7/4/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:Math undecidable: The inability to translate
The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.
I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.
In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.
incoherent nonsense into a truth value.
False.
In computability theory and computational complexity theory, an
undecidable problem is a decision problem for which it is proved to be
impossible to construct an algorithm that always leads to a correct
yes- or-no answer.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Undecidable_problem
LP := ~True(LP)
G := ~Provable(PA, G)
The above are not examples of that.
Math Incomplete: The inability to accomplish
more than a system was defined to accomplish.
False. Intent does not factor into formal systems.
In mathematical logic, a theory is complete if it is consistent and
for every closed formula in the theory's language, either that formula
or its negation is provable
Wittgenstein (1937)
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said:
proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's
system' means: the opposite has been proved
in Russell's system
Ultimately the above is true and one key PTS author
comes very close to agreeing with that.
*Truth as an Epistemic Notion*
What is the appropriate notion of truth for
sentences whose meanings are understood in
epistemic terms such as proof or ground for
an assertion? It seems that the truth of such
sentences has to be identified with the existence
of proofs...
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11245-011-9107-6
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Complete_theory
(∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proven in Q
Math mapping from an input to an output:
Ignore the input and output a fixed constant.
Provide an external reference that 1) defines "ignoring the input" and
2) forbids it.
int mapping_function(int x)
{
return 0;
}
All you're proving is that you can't understand that words can have
different meanings in different contexts that aren't necessarily related.
On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:
In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal.
Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then,
/purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized
non-element.
Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
just the resident trolls won't get it.
Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences,
is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any*
(infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal
cannot be in the list is quite constructive.
"quite" but not "completely".
A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a
constructible list.
I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less
often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one Julio
and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally
quantified statements into the system proper which then have derivable
statements containing actual constructions of the constructible objects
they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of course,
dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't make a
statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
outside of the fantastical quantification.
By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of reals as
defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the
Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical quantification
but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning
clearer.
While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper, some of
the members of some of the sets clearly do not.
% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
G ↔ ¬Prov_PA(⌜G⌝)
Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
00 ↔ 01 02
01 G
02 ¬ 03
03 Prov_PA 04
04 Gödel_Number_of 01 // cycle indicates no well-founded justification
tree exists.
The absence of
(a) finite sequence of inference steps to an atomic base,
(b) canonical proof
(c) well-founded justification tree
makes the above to PTS invalid.
Your lack of response constitutes your admission that the below function successfully computes the mapping of all ints to 0.
int mapping_function(int x)
{
return 0;
}[...]
On 07/05/2026 09:33 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:
In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal.
Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then,
/purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized
non-element.
Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
just the resident trolls won't get it.
Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences,
is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any*
(infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal
cannot be in the list is quite constructive.
"quite" but not "completely".
A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a
constructible list.
I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less
often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one Julio >>> and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally
quantified statements into the system proper which then have derivable
statements containing actual constructions of the constructible objects
they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of course,
dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't make a
statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
outside of the fantastical quantification.
By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of reals as
defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the
Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical quantification
but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning
clearer.
While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper, some of
the members of some of the sets clearly do not.
% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
G ↔ ¬Prov_PA(⌜G⌝)
Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
00 ↔ 01 02
01 G
02 ¬ 03
03 Prov_PA 04
04 Gödel_Number_of 01 // cycle indicates no well-founded justification
tree exists.
The absence of
(a) finite sequence of inference steps to an atomic base,
(b) canonical proof
(c) well-founded justification tree
makes the above to PTS invalid.
Yeah, come up with something new, or stuff a sock in it.
On 7/4/2026 5:12 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/4/2026 12:11 PM, dbush wrote:
On 7/4/2026 1:07 PM, olcott wrote:Math undecidable: The inability to translate
The English word "incomplete" establishes the base
meaning (parent node) in the knowledge ontology.
I will not tolerate deceptive terms-of-the-art.
In other words, you intend to lie by misusing definitions.
incoherent nonsense into a truth value.
False.
In computability theory and computational complexity theory, an
undecidable problem is a decision problem for which it is proved to be impossible to construct an algorithm that always leads to a correct yes- or-no answer.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Undecidable_problem
LP := ~True(LP)
G := ~Provable(PA, G)
The above are not examples of that.
Math Incomplete: The inability to accomplish
more than a system was defined to accomplish.
False. Intent does not factor into formal systems.
In mathematical logic, a theory is complete if it is consistent and for every closed formula in the theory's language, either that formula or
its negation is provable
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Complete_theory
(∀x, S(x) ≠ x) cannot be proven in Q
Math mapping from an input to an output:
Ignore the input and output a fixed constant.
Provide an external reference that 1) defines "ignoring the input" and
2) forbids it.
int mapping_function(int x)
{
return 0;
}
All you're proving is that you can't understand that words can have different meanings in different contexts that aren't necessarily related.
On 7/5/2026 2:56 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 07/05/2026 09:33 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:
In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal.
Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then,
/purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized
non-element.
Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
just the resident trolls won't get it.
Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences,
is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any*
(infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal
cannot be in the list is quite constructive.
"quite" but not "completely".
A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a
constructible list.
I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less
often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one
Julio
and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally
quantified statements into the system proper which then have derivable >>>> statements containing actual constructions of the constructible objects >>>> they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of course,
dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't make a >>>> statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
outside of the fantastical quantification.
By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of reals as >>>> defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the
Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical quantification >>>> but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning
clearer.
While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper, some of >>>> the members of some of the sets clearly do not.
% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
G ↔ ¬Prov_PA(⌜G⌝)
Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
00 ↔ 01 02
01 G
02 ¬ 03
03 Prov_PA 04
04 Gödel_Number_of 01 // cycle indicates no well-founded justification >>> tree exists.
The absence of
(a) finite sequence of inference steps to an atomic base,
(b) canonical proof
(c) well-founded justification tree
makes the above to PTS invalid.
Yeah, come up with something new, or stuff a sock in it.
The above proves that the notion of undecidable
is incorrect if you understood rather than ignored
what it says.
It also is the final resolution to the Liar Paradox
and you would know this if you understood it.
On 07/05/2026 01:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/5/2026 2:56 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 07/05/2026 09:33 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:
In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal.
Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then,
/purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized >>>>>>>> non-element.
Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
just the resident trolls won't get it.
Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences,
is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any*
(infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal >>>>>>> cannot be in the list is quite constructive.
"quite" but not "completely".
A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a
constructible list.
I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less
often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one
Julio
and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally
quantified statements into the system proper which then have derivable >>>>> statements containing actual constructions of the constructible
objects
they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of course, >>>>> dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't make a >>>>> statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
outside of the fantastical quantification.
By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of reals as >>>>> defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the
Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical
quantification
but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning
clearer.
While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper,
some of
the members of some of the sets clearly do not.
% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
G ↔ ¬Prov_PA(⌜G⌝)
Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
00 ↔ 01 02
01 G
02 ¬ 03
03 Prov_PA 04
04 Gödel_Number_of 01 // cycle indicates no well-founded justification >>>> tree exists.
The absence of
(a) finite sequence of inference steps to an atomic base,
(b) canonical proof
(c) well-founded justification tree
makes the above to PTS invalid.
Yeah, come up with something new, or stuff a sock in it.
The above proves that the notion of undecidable
is incorrect if you understood rather than ignored
what it says.
It also is the final resolution to the Liar Paradox
and you would know this if you understood it.
Like I said,
"understanding" is for suckers,
"comprehension" is for knowledge.
Your axiomatization otherwise is false.
It's like they say,
"It just don't mean a thing."
WM <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
JG <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
PO <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
"Polluter(s) of sci.math"
On 7/5/2026 4:30 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 07/05/2026 01:25 PM, olcott wrote:
On 7/5/2026 2:56 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
On 07/05/2026 09:33 AM, olcott wrote:
On 7/5/2026 9:52 AM, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 04/07/2026 16:31, Tristan Wibberley wrote:
On 06/05/2026 20:37, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
On 02/05/2026 20:47, Scott Hoge wrote:
In Cantor's theorem, we do not actually construct a diagonal. >>>>>>>>> Rather, we presuppose that we can enumerate a set, and then, >>>>>>>>> /purely on the grounds of possibility/, conceive a diagonalized >>>>>>>>> non-element.
Nope, as explained and re-explained ad nauseam around here:
just the resident trolls won't get it.
Cantor's diagonal argument, the one with the binary sequences, >>>>>>>> is indeed constructive: a definition of anti-diagonal of *any* >>>>>>>> (infinite) list is provided, and the proof that the anti-diagonal >>>>>>>> cannot be in the list is quite constructive.
"quite" but not "completely".
A constructive operation is defined, but a diagonal number is
constructed just when that constructive operation is applied to a >>>>>>> constructible list.
I should note for the less knowledgable readers of course it's less >>>>>> often than that, it is only that often for systems such as the one >>>>>> Julio
and Phoenix are using which allows dequantification of universally >>>>>> quantified statements into the system proper which then have
derivable
statements containing actual constructions of the constructible
objects
they apply to by virtue of their original quantification. Of course, >>>>>> dequantification of fantastically quantified statements doesn't
make a
statement about nonconstructible objects because there aren't any
outside of the fantastical quantification.
By which I don't mean to argue the countability of the set of
reals as
defined in what we call Cantor's Proof of the Uncountability of the >>>>>> Reals to include objects quantified over by fantatstical
quantification
but not by universal quantification, but it does make some meaning >>>>>> clearer.
While some of the sets might have objects in the system proper,
some of
the members of some of the sets clearly do not.
% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Olcott's Minimal Type Theory
G ↔ ¬Prov_PA(⌜G⌝)
Directed Graph of evaluation sequence
00 ↔ 01 02
01 G
02 ¬ 03
03 Prov_PA 04
04 Gödel_Number_of 01 // cycle indicates no well-founded
justification
tree exists.
The absence of
(a) finite sequence of inference steps to an atomic base,
(b) canonical proof
(c) well-founded justification tree
makes the above to PTS invalid.
Yeah, come up with something new, or stuff a sock in it.
The above proves that the notion of undecidable
is incorrect if you understood rather than ignored
what it says.
It also is the final resolution to the Liar Paradox
and you would know this if you understood it.
Like I said,
"understanding" is for suckers,
"comprehension" is for knowledge.
Gemini agrees with me and I only gave it the Prolog. https://share.gemini.google/1dJnMwOZ2k5F
Your axiomatization otherwise is false.
It's like they say,
"It just don't mean a thing."
WM <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
JG <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
PO <- retro-finitist crankety-troll
"Polluter(s) of sci.math"
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