On 7/23/2024 9:51 AM, Wasell wrote:
On Mon, 22 Jul 2024 20:17:15 -0400, in article
<3fb77583036a3c8b0db4b77610fb4bf4214c9c23@i2pn2.org>, Richard Damon
wrote:
On 7/22/24 8:11 PM, olcott wrote:
[...]
*No stupid I have never been saying anything like that* If g and
~g is not provable in PA then g is not a truth-bearer in PA.
What makes it different fron Goldbach's conjecture?
I think a better example might be Goodstein's theorem [1].
* It is expressible in the same language as PA.
* It is neither provable, nor disprovable, in PA.
* We know that it is true in the standard model of arithmetic.
* We know that it is false in some (necessarily non-standard) models
of arithmetic.
* It was discovered and proved long before it was shown to be
undecidable in PA.
The only drawback is that the theorem is somewhat more complicated
than Goldbach's conjecture -- not a lot, but a bit.
[1] <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodstein%27s_theorem>
I am establishing a new meaning for
{true on the basis of meaning expressed in language}
Formerly known as {analytic truth}.
This makes True(L,x) computable and definable.
L is the language of a formal mathematical system.
x is an expression of that language.
When we understand that True(L,x) means that there is a finite
sequence of truth preserving operations in L from the semantic
meaning of x to x in L, then mathematical incompleteness is abolished.
~True(L,x) ∧ ~True(L,~x)
means that x is not a truth-bearer in L.
It does not mean that L is incomplete
| Sysop: | DaiTengu |
|---|---|
| Location: | Appleton, WI |
| Users: | 1,096 |
| Nodes: | 10 (0 / 10) |
| Uptime: | 398:57:23 |
| Calls: | 14,036 |
| Calls today: | 2 |
| Files: | 187,082 |
| D/L today: |
2,629 files (1,642M bytes) |
| Messages: | 2,479,108 |