From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.android

An anonymous remailer is a server that receives messages with embedded instructions
on where to send them next, and that forwards them without revealing where they originally came from. There are Cypherpunk anonymous remailers, Mixmaster anonymous
remailers, and nym servers, among others, which differ in how they work, in the policies they adopt, and in the type of attack on anonymity of e-mail they can (or are intended to) resist. Remailing as discussed in this article applies to e-mails intended for particular recipients, not the general public. Anonymity in the
latter case is more easily addressed by using any of several methods of anonymous
publication.

Types of remailer

Pseudonymous remailers
Cypherpunk remailers also called Type I
Mixmaster remailers also called Type II
Mixminion remailers also called Type III
Traceable remailers
Untraceable remailers
Web based mailer
Remailer statistics
Remailer abuse and blocking by governments
Remailer software

Types of remailer

There are several strategies that affect the anonymity of the handled e-mail. In
general, different classes of anonymous remailers differ with regard to the choices
their designers/operators have made. These choices can be influenced by the legal
ramifications of operating specific types of remailers.

It must be understood that every data packet traveling on the Internet contains the
node addresses (as raw IP bit strings) of both the sending and intended recipient
nodes, and so no data packet can ever actually be anonymous at this level. In addition, all standards-based e-mail messages contain defined fields in their headers in which the source and transmitting entities (and Internet nodes as well)
are required to be included.

Some remailers change both types of address in messages they forward, and the list
of forwarding nodes in e-mail messages as well, as the message passes through; in
effect, they substitute 'fake source addresses' for the originals. The 'IP source
address' for that packet may become that of the remailer server itself, and within
an e-mail message (which is usually several packets), a nominal 'user' on that server. Some remailers forward their anonymized e-mail to still other remailers,
and only after several such hops is the e-mail actually delivered to the intended
address.

There are, more or less, four types of remailers:
Pseudonymous remailers

A Pseudonymous remailer simply takes away the e-mail address of the sender, gives a
pseudonym to the sender, and sends the message to the intended recipient (that can
be answered via that remailer).

Cypherpunk remailers, also called Type I

A Cypherpunk remailer sends the message to the recipient stripping away the sender
address on it. One can not answer a message sent via a Cypherpunk remailer. The message sent to the remailer can usually be encrypted, and the remailer will decrypt
it and send it to the recipient address hidden inside the encrypted message. In addition, it is possible to chain two or three remailers, so that each remailer can't know who is sending a message to whom. Cypherpunk remailers do not keep logs
of transactions.

Mixmaster remailers, also called Type II

In Mixmaster, you compose an email to a remailer, which is relayed through each node
in the network using SMTP, until it finally arrives at your recipient. Mixmaster can
only send emails one way. An email is sent anonymously to an individual, but for them
to be able to respond, a reply address must be included in the body of the email.
Also, Mixmaster remailers require the use of a computer program to write messages.
Such programs are not supplied as a standard part of most operating systems or mail
management systems.

Mixminion remailers, also called Type III

A Mixminion remailer attempts to address the following challenges in Mixmaster remailers: replies, forward anonymity, replay prevention and key rotation, exit policies, integrated directory servers and dummy traffic. They are currently available for the Linux and Windows platforms. Some implementations are open source.

Traceable remailers

Some remailers establish an internal list of actual senders and invented names such
that a recipient can send mail to invented name AT some-remailer.example. When receiving traffic addressed to this user, the server software consults that list,
and forwards the mail to the original sender, thus permitting anonymous al€”though
traceable with access to the list a €”two way communication. The famous "penet.fi"
remailer in Finland did just that for several years. Because of the existence of
such lists in this type of remailing server, it is possible to break the anonymity
by gaining access to the list(s), by breaking into the computer, asking a court (or merely the police in some places) to order that the anonymity be broken, and/or
bribing an attendant. This happened to penet.fi as a result of some traffic passed
through it about Scientology. The Church claimed copyright infringement and sued
enet.fi's operator. A court ordered the list be made available. Penet's operator
shut it down after destroying its records (including the list) to retain identity
confidentiality for its users; though not before being forced to supply the court
with the real e-mail addresses of two of its users.

More recent remailer designs use cryptography in an attempt to provide more or less
the same service, but without so much risk of loss of user confidentiality. These
are generally termed nym servers or pseudonymous remailers. The degree to which they remain vulnerable to forced disclosure (by courts or police) is and will remain unclear, since new statutes/regulations and new cryptanalytic developments
proceed apace. Multiple anonymous forwarding among cooperating remailers in different jurisdictions may retain, but cannot guarantee, anonymity against a determined attempt by one or more governments, or civil litigators.

Untraceable remailers

If users accept the loss of two-way interaction, identity anonymity can be made more secure.

By not keeping any list of users and corresponding anonymizing labels for them, a
remailer can ensure that any message that has been forwarded leaves no internal information behind that can later be used to break identity confidentiality. However,
while being handled, messages remain vulnerable within the server (e.g., to Trojan
software in a compromised server, to a compromised server operator, or to mis-administration of the server), and traffic analysis comparison of traffic into
and out of such a server can suggest quite a lot far more than almost any would credit.

The Mixmaster strategy is designed to defeat such attacks, or at least to increase
their cost (i.e., to 'attackers') beyond feasibility. If every message is passed
through several servers (ideally in different legal and political jurisdictions),
then attacks based on legal systems become considerably more difficult, if only because of 'Clausewitzian' friction amongst lawyers, courts, different statutes,
organizational rivalries, legal systems, etc. And, since many different servers and server operators are involved, subversion of any (i.e., of either system or operator) becomes less effective also since no one (most likely) will be able to
subvert the entire chain of remailers.

Random padding of messages, random delays before forwarding, and encryption of forwarding information between forwarding remailers, increases the degree of difficulty for attackers still further as message size and timing can be largely
eliminated as traffic analysis clues, and lack of easily readable forwarding information renders ineffective simple automated traffic analysis algorithms. Web based mailer

There are also web services that allow users to send anonymous e-mail messages. These services do not provide the anonymity of real remailers, but they are easier
to use. When using a web-based anonymous e-mail or anonymous remailer service, its
reputation should first be analyzed, since the service stands between senders and
recipients. Some of the aforementioned web services log the users I.P. addresses
to ensure they do not break the law; others offer superior anonymity with attachment functionality by choosing to trust that the users will not breach the
websites Terms of Service (TOS).

Remailer statistics

In most cases, remailers are owned and operated by individuals, and are not as stable as they might ideally be. In fact, remailers can, and have, gone down without
warning. It is important to use up-to-date statistics when choosing remailers.

Remailer abuse and blocking by governments

Although most re-mailer systems are used responsibly, the anonymity they provide can
be exploited by entities or individuals whose reasons for anonymity are not necessarily benign.

Such reasons could include support for violent extremist actions, sexual exploitation
of children or more commonly to frustrate accountability for 'trolling' and harassment of targeted individuals, or companies (The Dizum.com re-mailer chain being
abused as recently as May 2013 for this purpose.)

The response of some re-mailers to this abuse potential is often to disclaim responsibility (as dizum.com does), as owing to the technical design (and ethical
principles) of many systems, it is impossible for the operators to physically unmask
those using their systems. Some re-mailer systems go further and claim that it would
be illegal for them to monitor for certain types abuse at all.

Until technical changes were made in the remailers concerned in the mid-2000s, some
re-mailers (notably nym.alias.net based systems) were seemingly willing to use any
genuine (and thus valid) but otherwise forged address. This loophole allowed trolls to
mis-attribute controversial claims or statements with the aim of causing offence,
upset or harassment to the genuine holder(s) of the address(es) forged.

Whilst re-mailers may disclaim responsibility, the comments posted via them have led
to them being blocked in some countries. In 2014 dizum.com (a Netherlands-based remailer) was seemingly blocked by authorities in Pakistan, because comments an (anonymous) user of that service had made concerning key figures in Islam.

Remailer software

QuickSilver and QuickSilver Lite remailer software are Windows e-mail client applications which send messages through Mixmaster anonymous remailer cascades. The
newer Lite version is capable of SSL/TLS and with its companion program QuickSilver
Aam it supports nym servers.

OmniMix is a Windows proxy server, which handles e-mail and usenet postings that come
from an ordinary client application in a transparent manner and sends them optionally
through the Mixmaster anonymous remailer network dependent on its settings or certain
header flags. It's able to interact with nym servers, supports SSL/TLS and Tor with all
external communication (NNTP/SMTP/POP3), offers a Tor controller and allows header
filtering and an automated addition of hashcash tokens. The OpenPGP compliant 'Whole
Message Encryption', which, by including the header section, even makes the structure
of a message unrecognizable, can automatically secure non-anonymous communication as
well. Its Lazarus IDE is available, presenting the complete source code to build and
test the application. News2Remail is an NNTP to remailer proxy for Windows.

https://www.barnish.org/echolot/rlist2.html

How To: https://groups.google.com/g/alt.privacy


--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.android

Fritz Wuehler wrote:

An anonymous remailer is a server that receives messages with embedded instructions
on where to send them next, and that forwards them without revealing where they
originally came from. There are Cypherpunk anonymous remailers, Mixmaster anonymous
remailers, and nym servers, among others, which differ in how they work, in the
policies they adopt, and in the type of attack on anonymity of e-mail they can
(or are intended to) resist. Remailing as discussed in this article applies to
e-mails intended for particular recipients, not the general public. Anonymity in the
latter case is more easily addressed by using any of several methods of anonymous
publication.

Types of remailer

Pseudonymous remailers
Cypherpunk remailers also called Type I
Mixmaster remailers also called Type II
Mixminion remailers also called Type III
Traceable remailers
Untraceable remailers
Web based mailer
Remailer statistics
Remailer abuse and blocking by governments
Remailer software

Types of remailer

There are several strategies that affect the anonymity of the handled e-mail. In
general, different classes of anonymous remailers differ with regard to the choices
their designers/operators have made. These choices can be influenced by the legal
ramifications of operating specific types of remailers.

It must be understood that every data packet traveling on the Internet contains the
node addresses (as raw IP bit strings) of both the sending and intended recipient
nodes, and so no data packet can ever actually be anonymous at this level. In addition, all standards-based e-mail messages contain defined fields in their headers in which the source and transmitting entities (and Internet nodes as well)
are required to be included.

Some remailers change both types of address in messages they forward, and the list
of forwarding nodes in e-mail messages as well, as the message passes through; in
effect, they substitute 'fake source addresses' for the originals. The 'IP source
address' for that packet may become that of the remailer server itself, and within
an e-mail message (which is usually several packets), a nominal 'user' on that
server. Some remailers forward their anonymized e-mail to still other remailers,
and only after several such hops is the e-mail actually delivered to the intended
address.

There are, more or less, four types of remailers:
Pseudonymous remailers

A Pseudonymous remailer simply takes away the e-mail address of the sender, gives a
pseudonym to the sender, and sends the message to the intended recipient (that can
be answered via that remailer).

Cypherpunk remailers, also called Type I

A Cypherpunk remailer sends the message to the recipient stripping away the sender
address on it. One can not answer a message sent via a Cypherpunk remailer. The
message sent to the remailer can usually be encrypted, and the remailer will decrypt
it and send it to the recipient address hidden inside the encrypted message. In
addition, it is possible to chain two or three remailers, so that each remailer
can't know who is sending a message to whom. Cypherpunk remailers do not keep logs
of transactions.

Mixmaster remailers, also called Type II

In Mixmaster, you compose an email to a remailer, which is relayed through each node
in the network using SMTP, until it finally arrives at your recipient. Mixmaster can
only send emails one way. An email is sent anonymously to an individual, but for them
to be able to respond, a reply address must be included in the body of the email.
Also, Mixmaster remailers require the use of a computer program to write messages.
Such programs are not supplied as a standard part of most operating systems or mail
management systems.

Mixminion remailers, also called Type III

A Mixminion remailer attempts to address the following challenges in Mixmaster
remailers: replies, forward anonymity, replay prevention and key rotation, exit
policies, integrated directory servers and dummy traffic. They are currently available for the Linux and Windows platforms. Some implementations are open source.

Traceable remailers

Some remailers establish an internal list of actual senders and invented names such
that a recipient can send mail to invented name AT some-remailer.example. When
receiving traffic addressed to this user, the server software consults that list,
and forwards the mail to the original sender, thus permitting anonymous al????though
traceable with access to the list a ????two way communication. The famous "penet.fi"
remailer in Finland did just that for several years. Because of the existence of
such lists in this type of remailing server, it is possible to break the anonymity
by gaining access to the list(s), by breaking into the computer, asking a court
(or merely the police in some places) to order that the anonymity be broken, and/or
bribing an attendant. This happened to penet.fi as a result of some traffic passed
through it about Scientology. The Church claimed copyright infringement and sued
enet.fi's operator. A court ordered the list be made available. Penet's operator
shut it down after destroying its records (including the list) to retain identity
confidentiality for its users; though not before being forced to supply the court
with the real e-mail addresses of two of its users.

More recent remailer designs use cryptography in an attempt to provide more or less
the same service, but without so much risk of loss of user confidentiality. These
are generally termed nym servers or pseudonymous remailers. The degree to which
they remain vulnerable to forced disclosure (by courts or police) is and will remain unclear, since new statutes/regulations and new cryptanalytic developments
proceed apace. Multiple anonymous forwarding among cooperating remailers in different jurisdictions may retain, but cannot guarantee, anonymity against a determined attempt by one or more governments, or civil litigators.

Untraceable remailers

If users accept the loss of two-way interaction, identity anonymity can be made
more secure.

By not keeping any list of users and corresponding anonymizing labels for them, a
remailer can ensure that any message that has been forwarded leaves no internal
information behind that can later be used to break identity confidentiality. However,
while being handled, messages remain vulnerable within the server (e.g., to Trojan
software in a compromised server, to a compromised server operator, or to mis-administration of the server), and traffic analysis comparison of traffic into
and out of such a server can suggest quite a lot far more than almost any would
credit.

The Mixmaster strategy is designed to defeat such attacks, or at least to increase
their cost (i.e., to 'attackers') beyond feasibility. If every message is passed
through several servers (ideally in different legal and political jurisdictions),
then attacks based on legal systems become considerably more difficult, if only
because of 'Clausewitzian' friction amongst lawyers, courts, different statutes,
organizational rivalries, legal systems, etc. And, since many different servers
and server operators are involved, subversion of any (i.e., of either system or
operator) becomes less effective also since no one (most likely) will be able to
subvert the entire chain of remailers.

Random padding of messages, random delays before forwarding, and encryption of
forwarding information between forwarding remailers, increases the degree of difficulty for attackers still further as message size and timing can be largely
eliminated as traffic analysis clues, and lack of easily readable forwarding information renders ineffective simple automated traffic analysis algorithms. Web based mailer

There are also web services that allow users to send anonymous e-mail messages.
These services do not provide the anonymity of real remailers, but they are easier
to use. When using a web-based anonymous e-mail or anonymous remailer service, its
reputation should first be analyzed, since the service stands between senders and
recipients. Some of the aforementioned web services log the users I.P. addresses
to ensure they do not break the law; others offer superior anonymity with attachment functionality by choosing to trust that the users will not breach the
websites Terms of Service (TOS).

Remailer statistics

In most cases, remailers are owned and operated by individuals, and are not as
stable as they might ideally be. In fact, remailers can, and have, gone down without
warning. It is important to use up-to-date statistics when choosing remailers.

Remailer abuse and blocking by governments

Although most re-mailer systems are used responsibly, the anonymity they provide can
be exploited by entities or individuals whose reasons for anonymity are not necessarily benign.

Such reasons could include support for violent extremist actions, sexual exploitation
of children or more commonly to frustrate accountability for 'trolling' and harassment of targeted individuals, or companies (The Dizum.com re-mailer chain being
abused as recently as May 2013 for this purpose.)

The response of some re-mailers to this abuse potential is often to disclaim responsibility (as dizum.com does), as owing to the technical design (and ethical
principles) of many systems, it is impossible for the operators to physically unmask
those using their systems. Some re-mailer systems go further and claim that it would
be illegal for them to monitor for certain types abuse at all.

Until technical changes were made in the remailers concerned in the mid-2000s, some
re-mailers (notably nym.alias.net based systems) were seemingly willing to use any
genuine (and thus valid) but otherwise forged address. This loophole allowed trolls to
mis-attribute controversial claims or statements with the aim of causing offence,
upset or harassment to the genuine holder(s) of the address(es) forged.

Whilst re-mailers may disclaim responsibility, the comments posted via them have led
to them being blocked in some countries. In 2014 dizum.com (a Netherlands-based
remailer) was seemingly blocked by authorities in Pakistan, because comments an
(anonymous) user of that service had made concerning key figures in Islam.

Remailer software

QuickSilver and QuickSilver Lite remailer software are Windows e-mail client applications which send messages through Mixmaster anonymous remailer cascades. The
newer Lite version is capable of SSL/TLS and with its companion program QuickSilver
Aam it supports nym servers.

OmniMix is a Windows proxy server, which handles e-mail and usenet postings that come
from an ordinary client application in a transparent manner and sends them optionally
through the Mixmaster anonymous remailer network dependent on its settings or certain
header flags. It's able to interact with nym servers, supports SSL/TLS and Tor with all
external communication (NNTP/SMTP/POP3), offers a Tor controller and allows header
filtering and an automated addition of hashcash tokens. The OpenPGP compliant 'Whole
Message Encryption', which, by including the header section, even makes the structure
of a message unrecognizable, can automatically secure non-anonymous communication as
well. Its Lazarus IDE is available, presenting the complete source code to build and
test the application. News2Remail is an NNTP to remailer proxy for Windows.

https://www.barnish.org/echolot/rlist2.html

How To: https://groups.google.com/g/alt.privacy

According to the Subject, how can you use them on Android etc, in which
group you posted? You left out also a very important part of the Wikipedia page:

Modern Tor-Based Alternatives. With the decline of classical remailers
(e.g., Mixmaster) due to vulnerabilities to traffic correlation,some
users have migrated to Tor-integrated remailers like Onion Courier.
These systems leverage Tor hidden services to resist metadata surveillance, addressing key weaknesses of older designs.

Regards
Stefan
--- Synchronet 3.21a-Linux NewsLink 1.2

From Newsgroup: comp.mobile.android

On 06.09.25 00:08, Fritz Wuehler wrote:

An anonymous remailer is a server that receives messages with embedded instructions
on where to send them next, and that forwards them without revealing where they
originally came from.

Killfiled all anonymous and remailer servers.
No interest in having any discussion with these sociopaths.

I saw this just in my killfile-log.
--
"Roma locuta, causa finita." (Augustinus von Hippo 354 - 430 n.Chr.)
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