peterwezeman@hotmail.com wrote:
In the recent Metro North collision I was surprised to hear that, in >addition to the driver of the car involved,there were five people killed
ON THE TRAIN. Some questions:
1. In designing the iconic FT freight locomotive and E series passenger >locomotives, Electromotive put a hood-like structure on the front >specifically to give some protection to the engineer and fireman in the >event of a collision at a grade crossing, and virtually all subsequent >American locomotives have continued this practice. Is there any
requirement for grade-crossing protection on self-propelled motor unit >passenger cars?
There are corner post requirements. In Chicago, Nippon Sharyo gallery cars that replaced Highliners in IC suburban service (now Metra Electric) had
the cab relocated to the gallery level, else too many passenger seats
were lost. This also eliminated a platform door, as the full-across engineer's cab became a vestibule when not in use.
Keep in mind that corner post requirements and very high American buff strength requirements are designed to keep the passenger car from deforming as much as possible in the event of a collision. Doesn't necessarily
keep railroad crew nor passengers alive, as the law of conservation of momentum hasn't been repealed and one is likely to be seriously injured
or killed from striking one's head against a bulkhead.
In the recent Metro North collision I was surprised to hear that, in
addition to the driver of the car involved,there were five people killed
ON THE TRAIN. Some questions:
1. In designing the iconic FT freight locomotive and E series passenger >locomotives, Electromotive put a hood-like structure on the front >specifically to give some protection to the engineer and fireman in the
event of a collision at a grade crossing, and virtually all subsequent >American locomotives have continued this practice. Is there any
requirement for grade-crossing protection on self-propelled motor unit >passenger cars?
At Thu, 12 Feb 2015 21:17:45 +0000 (UTC) "Adam H. Kerman" <ahk@chinet.com>wrote:
peterwezeman@hotmail.com wrote:
In the recent Metro North collision I was surprised to hear that, in
addition to the driver of the car involved,there were five people killed >>> ON THE TRAIN. Some questions:
1. In designing the iconic FT freight locomotive and E series passenger
locomotives, Electromotive put a hood-like structure on the front
specifically to give some protection to the engineer and fireman in the
event of a collision at a grade crossing, and virtually all subsequent
American locomotives have continued this practice. Is there any
requirement for grade-crossing protection on self-propelled motor unit
passenger cars?
There are corner post requirements. In Chicago, Nippon Sharyo gallery cars >> that replaced Highliners in IC suburban service (now Metra Electric) had
the cab relocated to the gallery level, else too many passenger seats
were lost. This also eliminated a platform door, as the full-across
engineer's cab became a vestibule when not in use.
Keep in mind that corner post requirements and very high American buff
strength requirements are designed to keep the passenger car from deforming >> as much as possible in the event of a collision. Doesn't necessarily
keep railroad crew nor passengers alive, as the law of conservation of
momentum hasn't been repealed and one is likely to be seriously injured
or killed from striking one's head against a bulkhead.
Also in this case the SUV's fuel tank burst into flames and somehow the rails got ripped up and pierced the rail car. This probably speaks more to the structural design issues of the *SUV* on the one hand and I am not sure what it says about the roadbed construction (eg how well secured the rails were/weren't).
In the recent Metro North collision I was surprised to hear that, in addition
1. In designing the iconic FT freight locomotive and E series passengerlocomotives, Electromotive put a hood-like structure on the front specifically to give some protection to the engineer and fireman in the event of a collision
2. In the accounts I've read, the lead unit on the Metro North train was seton fire by gasoline from the fuel tank of the Mercedes Benz SUV. Barring the few battery powered cars in service, every vehicle hit at a grade crossing has a fuel tank; in the
3. In the accounts, the electrified third rail broke, came loose from thetrack structure, and impaled the lead unit, whereupon arcing from the rail ignited the gasoline from the SUV. With modern welded rail track, broken rails are a known and feared
On 2/12/2015 7:21 PM, Robert Heller wrote:wrote:
At Thu, 12 Feb 2015 21:17:45 +0000 (UTC) "Adam H. Kerman" <ahk@chinet.com>
deforming
peterwezeman@hotmail.com wrote:
In the recent Metro North collision I was surprised to hear that, in
addition to the driver of the car involved,there were five people killed >>> ON THE TRAIN. Some questions:
1. In designing the iconic FT freight locomotive and E series passenger >>> locomotives, Electromotive put a hood-like structure on the front
specifically to give some protection to the engineer and fireman in the >>> event of a collision at a grade crossing, and virtually all subsequent >>> American locomotives have continued this practice. Is there any
requirement for grade-crossing protection on self-propelled motor unit >>> passenger cars?
There are corner post requirements. In Chicago, Nippon Sharyo gallery cars >> that replaced Highliners in IC suburban service (now Metra Electric) had >> the cab relocated to the gallery level, else too many passenger seats
were lost. This also eliminated a platform door, as the full-across
engineer's cab became a vestibule when not in use.
Keep in mind that corner post requirements and very high American buff
strength requirements are designed to keep the passenger car from
railsas much as possible in the event of a collision. Doesn't necessarily
keep railroad crew nor passengers alive, as the law of conservation of
momentum hasn't been repealed and one is likely to be seriously injured
or killed from striking one's head against a bulkhead.
Also in this case the SUV's fuel tank burst into flames and somehow the
whatgot ripped up and pierced the rail car. This probably speaks more to the structural design issues of the *SUV* on the one hand and I am not sure
it says about the roadbed construction (eg how well secured the rails were/weren't).
My understanding was that the third rail pierced the vehicle's gas tank,
then continued into the rail car, carrying gasoline with it. That's why
the fire was so bad.
Also the third rail continued through the first car into the second car.
If you look carefully at the pictures, you can see it between the two
cars near the roof line.
Some politicians are making statements about the use of under running
third rail and trying to imply that it had something to do with the
severity of the accident. I would rather wait for the NTSB, which
actually knows something about this stuff, before making a judgement.
There was also a statement made that Metro-North is the only application
of under running third rail in North America. That is not true. Philadelphia's Market St. subway/elevated uses it as well. There are no grade crossings on that line, however.
Michael Finfer
Bridgewater, NJ
On Fri, 13 Feb 2015 07:37:38 -0600, Robert Heller
<heller@deepsoft.com> wrote:
At Thu, 12 Feb 2015 21:34:37 -0500 Michael Finfer <finfer@optonline.net> wrote:
much snipped
At Thu, 12 Feb 2015 21:34:37 -0500 Michael Finfer <finfer@optonline.net> wrote:
much snipped
There was also a statement made that Metro-North is the only application
of under running third rail in North America. That is not true.
Philadelphia's Market St. subway/elevated uses it as well. There are no
grade crossings on that line, however.
I think Metro-North might be stating that they are the only *surface running* >under running third rail *with grade crossings*. The LIRR has *over* running >third rail *with grade crossings*. All other third rail is either elevated or >underground (subways) and none of the others have grade crossings (they are >all grade separated). Other commuter rail is either diesel hauled or overhead >electric.
Michael Finfer
Bridgewater, NJ
There was also a statement made that Metro-North is the only application
of under running third rail in North America. That is not true. Philadelphia's Market St. subway/elevated uses it as well. There are no grade crossings on that line, however.
1. In designing the iconic FT freight locomotive and E series passengerlocomotives, Electromotive put a hood-like structure on the front specifically to give some protection to the engineer and fireman in the event of a collision
2. In the accounts I've read, the lead unit on the Metro North train was seton fire by gasoline from the fuel tank of the Mercedes Benz SUV. Barring the few battery powered cars in service, every vehicle hit at a grade crossing has a fuel tank; in the
With modern welded rail track, broken rails are a known and feared failuremode.
in the case of a semi truck there might be as much as three
hundred gallons of diesel oil onboard. Does the design of a locomotive or motor unit incorporate any protection from this?
or putting in positive singalling
control on others (ie where the crossing is protected by railway signals that aren't cleared for the train until the barriers are down and the crossing positively checked to be clear).
While gasoline can ignite quite easily, this is much less the case
for diesel. It takes quite extreme conditions to happen.
On Fri, 13 Feb 2015 07:37:38 -0600, Robert Heller
<heller@deepsoft.com> wrote:
At Thu, 12 Feb 2015 21:34:37 -0500 Michael Finfer <finfer@optonline.net> wrote:
much snipped
There was also a statement made that Metro-North is the only application >>> of under running third rail in North America. That is not true.
Philadelphia's Market St. subway/elevated uses it as well. There are no >>> grade crossings on that line, however.
I think Metro-North might be stating that they are the only *surface running* >>under running third rail *with grade crossings*. The LIRR has *over* running >>third rail *with grade crossings*. All other third rail is either elevated or >>underground (subways) and none of the others have grade crossings (they are >>all grade separated). Other commuter rail is either diesel hauled or overhead >>electric.
The CTA has numerous grade crossings with overrunning BARE (no top
cover) third rail. The are on the Pink (ex Douglass Park), Brown >(Ravenswood), Yellow (Skokie) and Purple (EVanston) lines. The
ex-Southern Region in England has numerous grade crossings with
overrunning third rail.
peterwezeman@hotmail.com used his keyboard to write :
in the case of a semi truck there might be as much as three
hundred gallons of diesel oil onboard. Does the design of a locomotive or
motor unit incorporate any protection from this?
While gasoline can ignite quite easily, this is much less the case
for diesel. It takes quite extreme conditions to happen.
The CTA has numerous grade crossings with overrunning BARE (no top
cover) third rail. The are on the Pink (ex Douglass Park), Brown (Ravenswood), Yellow (Skokie) and Purple (EVanston) lines. The
ex-Southern Region in England has numerous grade crossings with
overrunning third rail.
Third rail tends to be terminated either side of a grade crossing. This
means that just past the grade crossing there is the start of a new
length of third rail. It doesn't seem too far fetched to me that a
vehicle hit by a train collides with the end of the third rail and lifts
it off of whatever supports it is mounted on.
The CTA has numerous grade crossings with overrunning BARE (no topYou can't just walk up to it (the SR version or similar elsewhere in
cover) third rail. The are on the Pink (ex Douglass Park), Brown >>(Ravenswood), Yellow (Skokie) and Purple (EVanston) lines. The
ex-Southern Region in England has numerous grade crossings with
overrunning third rail.
ENG), there is usually an anti-trespass device made of multiple
sections of angle-cut wood making it hard to walk away from a
road/footpath toward the third rail :-
On Sat, 14 Feb 2015 01:33:40 +0000, Charles Ellson <ce11son@yahoo.ca>
wrote:
The CTA has numerous grade crossings with overrunning BARE (no topYou can't just walk up to it (the SR version or similar elsewhere in
cover) third rail. The are on the Pink (ex Douglass Park), Brown >>>(Ravenswood), Yellow (Skokie) and Purple (EVanston) lines. The >>>ex-Southern Region in England has numerous grade crossings with >>>overrunning third rail.
ENG), there is usually an anti-trespass device made of multiple
sections of angle-cut wood making it hard to walk away from a
road/footpath toward the third rail :-
In contrast the French still have a couple of Metre gauge third rail
lines in some mountanous areas . Much of the routes are unfenced and
at times can almost be covered with snow even though the live rail is relatively high. This how they handle a crossing. http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/90/Meter-gauge_railway_with_third_rail_in_Les_Praz-de-Chamonix,_France.jpg
Somewhere on the net there used to a pic of an electrified siding that
the photographer almost tripped over as it was buried in yard deep undergrowth reached with no fencing at all.
G.Harman
On Thursday, February 12, 2015 at 1:02:46 PM UTC-5, peterw...@hotmail.comwrote:
locomotives, Electromotive put a hood-like structure on the front specifically to give some protection to the engineer and fireman in the event of a collision1. In designing the iconic FT freight locomotive and E series passenger
Yes, extensive high-strength protection against collisions.
set on fire by gasoline from the fuel tank of the Mercedes Benz SUV. Barring the few battery powered cars in service, every vehicle hit at a grade crossing has a fuel tank; in2. In the accounts I've read, the lead unit on the Metro North train was
Short of hitting a fuel truck, this kind of fire is unusual in grade crossing
mode.With modern welded rail track, broken rails are a known and feared failure
They are? I thought welded rail reduced the incidence of broken rails.break.
Also, I don't believe third rail is welded, plus it is very rare for it to
In any event, a broken rail would disrupt the signal current, causing theblock to go red.
On Sat, 14 Feb 2015 01:33:40 +0000, Charles Ellson <ce11son@yahoo.ca>
wrote:
The CTA has numerous grade crossings with overrunning BARE (no topYou can't just walk up to it (the SR version or similar elsewhere in
cover) third rail. The are on the Pink (ex Douglass Park), Brown >>(Ravenswood), Yellow (Skokie) and Purple (EVanston) lines. The >>ex-Southern Region in England has numerous grade crossings with >>overrunning third rail.
ENG), there is usually an anti-trespass device made of multiple
sections of angle-cut wood making it hard to walk away from a
road/footpath toward the third rail :-
In contrast the French still have a couple of Metre gauge third rail
lines in some mountanous areas . Much of the routes are unfenced and
at times can almost be covered with snow even though the live rail is relatively high. This how they handle a crossing. http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/90/Meter-gauge_railway_with_third_rail_in_Les_Praz-de-Chamonix,_France.jpg
Somewhere on the net there used to a pic of an electrified siding that
the photographer almost tripped over as it was buried in yard deep undergrowth reached with no fencing at all.
G.Harman
<damduck-egg@yahoo.co.uk> wrote in message >news:b23vdahsap2842hokhr4197l9m0in7eu4s@4ax.com...
On Sat, 14 Feb 2015 01:33:40 +0000, Charles Ellson <ce11son@yahoo.ca>
wrote:
The CTA has numerous grade crossings with overrunning BARE (no top >>>>cover) third rail. The are on the Pink (ex Douglass Park), Brown >>>>(Ravenswood), Yellow (Skokie) and Purple (EVanston) lines. The >>>>ex-Southern Region in England has numerous grade crossings with >>>>overrunning third rail.You can't just walk up to it (the SR version or similar elsewhere in >>>ENG), there is usually an anti-trespass device made of multiple
sections of angle-cut wood making it hard to walk away from a >>>road/footpath toward the third rail :-
In contrast the French still have a couple of Metre gauge third rail
lines in some mountanous areas . Much of the routes are unfenced and
at times can almost be covered with snow even though the live rail is
relatively high. This how they handle a crossing.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/90/Meter-gauge_railway_with_third_rail_in_Les_Praz-de-Chamonix,_France.jpg
Somewhere on the net there used to a pic of an electrified siding that
the photographer almost tripped over as it was buried in yard deep
undergrowth reached with no fencing at all.
G.Harman
Amazing picture!!! You can just imagine stay dogs stepping on the third >rail.
rcp27g@gmail.com explained on 13-02-15 :
or putting in positive singalling control on others (ie where the
crossing is protected by railway signals that aren't cleared for the
train until the barriers are down and the crossing positively checked
to be clear).
This is perfectly feasable but requires to order the gates to go down
at a distance that is longer than the braking distance of the train.
This means there will be a long delay between the gate going down and
the train actually passing the grade crossing.
As it has been mentioned,
motorists are unpatient creatures; if the delay is too long, people
think the gates are faulty and start turning around them. You might end
up this way with a grade crossing that is inherently less safe, because
of human nature...
On Friday, February 13, 2015 at 2:56:43 PM UTC-6, hanc...@bbs.cpcn.com wrote:
On Thursday, February 12, 2015 at 1:02:46 PM UTC-5,
peterw...@hotmail.com wrote:
1. In designing the iconic FT freight locomotive and E series passenger
locomotives, Electromotive put a hood-like structure on the front
specifically to give some protection to the engineer and fireman in the
event of a collision at a grade crossing, and virtually all subsequent
American locomotives have continued this practice. Is there any
requirement for grade-crossing protection on self-propelled motor unit
passenger cars?
Yes, extensive high-strength protection against collisions.
2. In the accounts I've read, the lead unit on the Metro North train
was set on fire by gasoline from the fuel tank of the Mercedes Benz
SUV. Barring the few battery powered cars in service, every vehicle hit
at a grade crossing has a fuel tank; in the case of a semi truck there
might be as much as three hundred gallons of diesel oil onboard. Does
the design of a locomotive or motor unit incorporate any protection
from this?
Short of hitting a fuel truck, this kind of fire is unusual in grade
crossing accidents. Usually the vehicle is just crushed or pushed
aside and does not catch fire.
With modern welded rail track, broken rails are a known and feared
failure mode.>> They are? I thought welded rail reduced the incidence
of broken rails.
Also, I don't believe third rail is welded, plus it is very rare for it
to break.
In any event, a broken rail would disrupt the signal current, causing
the block to go red.
Welded rail is laid down in the warmer part of the year and, when it
gets colder, it is prevented from contracting thermally by a system of
rail anchors clipped to the bottom flange of the rail and bearing
against the ties. In winter, rail can be in a state of tensile stress
of several tens of thousands pounds per square inch.
In normal use rail is subject to cycles of stress as trains move along
it, and the resulting metal fatigue can result in cracking. If a crack reaches so-called "Griffith length" when the rail is in tension the
crack becomes self propagating and spreads through the remaining depth
of the rail in a fraction of a second, leaving a dangerous gap in the
broken rail. Railroads employ a variety of magnetic and ultrasonic
scanning machines to detect cracks before they reach Griffith length.
If cracks are found, they are removed by grinding or milling down the
upper bearing surface of the rail, which also serves to restore its
correct profile. I believe that at least occasionally rolling stock has
been impaled by the broken end of a rail.
Not all crossings in the UK are of this sort, there are also "automatic half-barrier" crossings ... they are only used on quiet
roads with little traffic, and on railway lines with lower speeds.
On Sun, 15 Feb 2015 12:20:08 +0100, bob wrote:
Not all crossings in the UK are of this sort, there are also "automatic half-barrier" crossings ... they are only used on quiet
roads with little traffic, and on railway lines with lower speeds.
AHB in the UK can be installed on lines up to 100 MPH. That's not "lower speeds".
On Thursday, February 12, 2015 at 9:34:35 PM UTC-5, Michael Finfer wrote:
There was also a statement made that Metro-North is the only application
of under running third rail in North America. That is not true. >>Philadelphia's Market St. subway/elevated uses it as well. There are no >>grade crossings on that line, however.
I believe in the 100 year history of third rail usage in the NYC metro
area, the accident history (involving the third rail) is very good to >excellent.
I get the impression the SUV's driver could've driven off the crossing
if she wanted to, but for some reason stayed still. Maybe she thought
the train would stop for her? (Was she a resident of the area?) Or,
maybe it was a suicide. But, as mentioned, I want to wait for the
official report.
One risk with this line of thinking is that if you focus too strongly on
one failure mode, solutions that reduce harm in that situation may
increase it in others. The best way to reduce deaths and injuries in
grade crossing collisions is to prevent the collisions. This might mean >closing less used crossings, grade separating where possible, or putting
in positive singalling control on others (ie where the crossing is
protected by railway signals that aren't cleared for the train until the >barriers are down and the crossing positively checked to be clear). . . .
rcp27g@gmail.com explained on 13-02-15 :
or putting in positive singalling control on others (ie where the
crossing is protected by railway signals that aren't cleared for the
train until the barriers are down and the crossing positively checked
to be clear).
This is perfectly feasable but requires to order the gates to go down
at a distance that is longer than the braking distance of the train.
This means there will be a long delay between the gate going down and
the train actually passing the grade crossing. As it has been
mentioned,
motorists are unpatient creatures; if the delay is too long, people
think the gates are faulty and start turning around them. You might end
up this way with a grade crossing that is inherently less safe, because
of human nature...
On 2015-02-13 20:23:01 +0000, Marc Van Dyck said:
rcp27g@gmail.com explained on 13-02-15 :
or putting in positive singalling control on others (ie where the >>>crossing is protected by railway signals that aren't cleared for the >>>train until the barriers are down and the crossing positively checked
to be clear).
This is perfectly feasable but requires to order the gates to go down
at a distance that is longer than the braking distance of the train.
This means there will be a long delay between the gate going down and
the train actually passing the grade crossing.
Indeed, this is the case. It is less convenient but allows for
positive safety.
As it has been mentioned,
motorists are unpatient creatures; if the delay is too long, people
think the gates are faulty and start turning around them. You might end
up this way with a grade crossing that is inherently less safe, because
of human nature...
Solved by making the barriers block the whole road. As the crossing is >positively checked to ensure the barriers are down and the crossing is
clear before clearing the signals for the trains, the issue of cars
being trapped within the crossing is avoided.
The usual design in the UK, for example, is for the road to be blocked
by four barriers: each covering half the roadway on each side of the
railway. The warning lights/klaxon start first, then the "entry" side >barriers come down, then the "exit" side barriers come down, then the
klaxon stops (it gets irritating, and once the barriers are down, is >redundant). Then the crossing is checked to be clear, either by a
person in a local signal box or by CCTV cameras, and if it is clear,
the signals are cleared for the train or trains passing. It is safe,
but means waits at the crossing can be a couple of minutes before the
train actually arrives. The crossing sequence is initiated by the
signalman, who can keep the crossing down if there are multiple trains.
They can be annoying, but they are safe.
Not all crossings in the UK are of this sort, there are also "automatic >half-barrier" crossings that do not block the whole road and are
triggered automatically by the train approaching, without positive
safety, but designed for the minimum road-closed time, so the barriers
come down about 20s before the train arrives. Such a crossing was
involved in the Ufton Nervet crash, and they are only used on quiet
roads with little traffic, and on railway lines with lower speeds.
. . . to determine the driver's intent, after she's dead and can't be
made to answer questions?
What does being a resident of the area have to do with anything? She KNOWINGLY violated a grade crossing, then KNOWINGLY drove her vehicle directly into the path of the oncoming train.
bob <rcp27g@gmail.com> wrote:
On 2015-02-13 20:23:01 +0000, Marc Van Dyck said:
rcp27g@gmail.com explained on 13-02-15 :
or putting in positive singalling control on others (ie where the >>>crossing is protected by railway signals that aren't cleared for the >>>train until the barriers are down and the crossing positively checked >>>to be clear).
This is perfectly feasable but requires to order the gates to go down
at a distance that is longer than the braking distance of the train.
This means there will be a long delay between the gate going down and
the train actually passing the grade crossing.
Indeed, this is the case. It is less convenient but allows for
positive safety.
As it has been mentioned,
motorists are unpatient creatures; if the delay is too long, people
think the gates are faulty and start turning around them. You might end >>up this way with a grade crossing that is inherently less safe, because >>of human nature...
Solved by making the barriers block the whole road. As the crossing is >positively checked to ensure the barriers are down and the crossing is >clear before clearing the signals for the trains, the issue of cars
being trapped within the crossing is avoided.
Clearing level crossings several minutes before the train arrives mitigates against non-existant risk, and it's quite labor intensive. How is the
cost of delay justified? How is the personnel cost justified?
No lives have been saved except during the 5 or 10 seconds before the
train arrives.
hancock4@bbs.cpcn.com wrote:
On Thursday, February 12, 2015 at 9:34:35 PM UTC-5, Michael Finfer wrote:
There was also a statement made that Metro-North is the only application >>>of under running third rail in North America. That is not true. >>>Philadelphia's Market St. subway/elevated uses it as well. There are no >>>grade crossings on that line, however.
I believe in the 100 year history of third rail usage in the NYC metro >>area, the accident history (involving the third rail) is very good to >>excellent.
I get the impression the SUV's driver could've driven off the crossing
if she wanted to, but for some reason stayed still. Maybe she thought
the train would stop for her? (Was she a resident of the area?) Or,
maybe it was a suicide. But, as mentioned, I want to wait for the
official report.
. . . to determine the driver's intent, after she's dead and can't be
made to answer questions?
What does being a resident of the area have to do with anything? She KNOWINGLY violated a grade crossing, then KNOWINGLY drove her vehicle directly into the path of the oncoming train.
The design of the third rail is irrelevant. No one designs grade crossings anticipating this kind of stupidity.
Marc Van Dyck <marc.gr.vandyck@invalid.skynet.be> wrote:
rcp27g@gmail.com explained on 13-02-15 :
or putting in positive singalling control on others (ie where the >>>crossing is protected by railway signals that aren't cleared for the >>>train until the barriers are down and the crossing positively checked
to be clear).
This is perfectly feasable but requires to order the gates to go down
at a distance that is longer than the braking distance of the train.
This means there will be a long delay between the gate going down and
the train actually passing the grade crossing. As it has been
mentioned,
motorists are unpatient creatures; if the delay is too long, people
think the gates are faulty and start turning around them. You might end
up this way with a grade crossing that is inherently less safe, because
of human nature...
Not only that, we don't care about the risk created by drivers that
clear the grade crossing more than 20 seconds before the train gets there. It's the ones who violate the crossing within the last 10 seconds that
cause all the mayhem, as this woman did.
It is not "quite labor intensive". I've visited signalling control
centres where these crossings are operated from. They form a very
small part of the task that the signallers doing other railway control
tasks have to deal with.
conklin <nilknocgeo@earthlink.net> wrote:
"Adam H. Kerman" <ahk@chinet.com> wrote:
hancock4@bbs.cpcn.com wrote:
On Thursday, February 12, 2015 at 9:34:35 PM UTC-5, Michael Finfer >>>>wrote:
There was also a statement made that Metro-North is the only >>>>>application
of under running third rail in North America. That is not true. >>>>>Philadelphia's Market St. subway/elevated uses it as well. There are >>>>>no
grade crossings on that line, however.
I believe in the 100 year history of third rail usage in the NYC metro >>>>area, the accident history (involving the third rail) is very good to >>>>excellent.
I get the impression the SUV's driver could've driven off the crossing >>>>if she wanted to, but for some reason stayed still. Maybe she thought >>>>the train would stop for her? (Was she a resident of the area?) Or, >>>>maybe it was a suicide. But, as mentioned, I want to wait for the >>>>official report.
. . . to determine the driver's intent, after she's dead and can't be >>>made to answer questions?
What does being a resident of the area have to do with anything? She >>>KNOWINGLY violated a grade crossing, then KNOWINGLY drove her vehicle >>>directly into the path of the oncoming train.
The design of the third rail is irrelevant. No one designs grade >>>crossings
anticipating this kind of stupidity.
Oh come on. The innocent train riders paid the price too. The whole goal >>of safety is to protect everyone, not just the person who "caused" the >>accident. We have no evidence that the woman was trying to die.
You know, George, you addressed absolutely nothing I wrote in followup,
and
putting "caused" in double quotes is beyond idiotic on your part. No one offered any pseudo psychological analysis on whether she was trying to
die.
What I am stating is that despite the consequences of the collision,
the system anchoring the third rail doesn't require a different design
as a result of this collision.
If you don't want any more grade crossing accidents to ever happen again
at this particular crossing, build a grade separation.
"Adam H. Kerman" <ahk@chinet.com> wrote:
hancock4@bbs.cpcn.com wrote:
On Thursday, February 12, 2015 at 9:34:35 PM UTC-5, Michael Finfer wrote:
There was also a statement made that Metro-North is the only application >>>>of under running third rail in North America. That is not true. >>>>Philadelphia's Market St. subway/elevated uses it as well. There are no >>>>grade crossings on that line, however.
I believe in the 100 year history of third rail usage in the NYC metro >>>area, the accident history (involving the third rail) is very good to >>>excellent.
I get the impression the SUV's driver could've driven off the crossing
if she wanted to, but for some reason stayed still. Maybe she thought >>>the train would stop for her? (Was she a resident of the area?) Or, >>>maybe it was a suicide. But, as mentioned, I want to wait for the >>>official report.
. . . to determine the driver's intent, after she's dead and can't be
made to answer questions?
What does being a resident of the area have to do with anything? She >>KNOWINGLY violated a grade crossing, then KNOWINGLY drove her vehicle >>directly into the path of the oncoming train.
The design of the third rail is irrelevant. No one designs grade crossings >>anticipating this kind of stupidity.
Oh come on. The innocent train riders paid the price too. The whole goal
of safety is to protect everyone, not just the person who "caused" the >accident. We have no evidence that the woman was trying to die.
On Monday, 16 February 2015 16:25:47 UTC+1, Adam H. Kerman wrote:
bob <rcp27g@gmail.com> wrote:
On 2015-02-13 20:23:01 +0000, Marc Van Dyck said:
rcp27g@gmail.com explained on 13-02-15 :
or putting in positive singalling control on others (ie where the >>>>>crossing is protected by railway signals that aren't cleared for the >>>>>train until the barriers are down and the crossing positively checked >>>>>to be clear).
This is perfectly feasable but requires to order the gates to go down >>>>at a distance that is longer than the braking distance of the train. >>>>This means there will be a long delay between the gate going down and >>>>the train actually passing the grade crossing.
Indeed, this is the case. It is less convenient but allows for
positive safety.
As it has been mentioned,
motorists are unpatient creatures; if the delay is too long, people >>>>think the gates are faulty and start turning around them. You might end >>>>up this way with a grade crossing that is inherently less safe, because >>>>of human nature...
Solved by making the barriers block the whole road. As the crossing is >>>positively checked to ensure the barriers are down and the crossing is >>>clear before clearing the signals for the trains, the issue of cars
being trapped within the crossing is avoided.
Clearing level crossings several minutes before the train arrives mitigates >>against non-existant risk, and it's quite labor intensive. How is the
cost of delay justified? How is the personnel cost justified?
This "non-existant risk" just killed 6 people.
On Tue, 17 Feb 2015 01:56:17 -0800, rcp27g wrote:
It is not "quite labor intensive". I've visited signalling control
centres where these crossings are operated from. They form a very
small part of the task that the signallers doing other railway control >>tasks have to deal with.
That's probably because most crossings are AHB.
Take for example the West Coastway line in the UK between Southbourne and >Chichester. 6 AHB crossings in 5 miles. Converting those to full barrier >crossings with remote monitoring would probably increase the road closure >times from around 12 minutes / hour to more than 36 minutes / hour at
each crossing, and significantly increase the workload of the signaller
who will have to manually initiate and then visually check up to 36
crossing activations (6 crossings, 3 tph in each direction) per hour.
At 10 seconds per crossing, that's an extra 6 minutes workload per hour. >Personally I think 10 seconds is very optimistic for activate crossing,
wait for barriers to drop, check cctv, clear approach signal. 30 seconds
is probably more reasonable, and that's 18 minutes per hour.
You might think that the signaller can attend to something else between eg >activating the crossing and checking the CCTV, but that sort of
multitasking is what leads to signallers making errors.
On Monday, February 16, 2015 at 10:08:46 AM UTC-5, Adam H. Kerman wrote:
. . . to determine the driver's intent, after she's dead and can't be
made to answer questions?
Her actions were witnessed by several people, and investigators can
learn a great deal from that. There are numerous other sources of >information that need to be checked.
There have been suicides on RR crossings before. I don't know if that
was the case here, but it is a possibility.
What does being a resident of the area have to do with anything? She >>KNOWINGLY violated a grade crossing, then KNOWINGLY drove her vehicle >>directly into the path of the oncoming train.
A local resident is more likely to know better that get caught on a busy
RR crossing like that.
hancock4@bbs.cpcn.com wrote:
On Monday, February 16, 2015 at 10:08:46 AM UTC-5, Adam H. Kerman wrote:
. . . to determine the driver's intent, after she's dead and can't be >>>made to answer questions?
Her actions were witnessed by several people, and investigators can
learn a great deal from that. There are numerous other sources of >>information that need to be checked.
The main eye witness has been interviewed in the press. But I'm sure the >press got it completely wrong.
There have been suicides on RR crossings before. I don't know if that
was the case here, but it is a possibility.
What does this speculation on your part have to do with any determination >NTSB might make?
What does being a resident of the area have to do with anything? She >>>KNOWINGLY violated a grade crossing, then KNOWINGLY drove her vehicle >>>directly into the path of the oncoming train.
A local resident is more likely to know better that get caught on a busy
RR crossing like that.
You're an idiot, hancock. The gate was down. The train was coming. She
didn't need to live there to understand that driving her vehicle directly >into the path of the train would cause death, versus just backing up after >her initial error.
She doesn't need to know how many trains per hour use that main line,
given that she knew there was a specific train coming and she could
see it coming.
The difference between the crossing types I have described is not down
to the method used to keep cars off the crossing, but the method used to
keep *trains* off the crossing. In the crossing involved in this
collision, there is *no* method to stop trains from crossing. If the
train arrives at the crossing, the first indication they have that
something is not right is when they are so close to the crossing itself, there is no chance to stop the train. In the crossing I have described,
the railway signalling system *blocks* trains from the crossing until
*after* the barriers are down *and* the crossing is observed to be clear.
On 2015-02-17 16:38:27 +0000, Adam H. Kerman said:
rcp27g@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, 16 February 2015 16:25:47 UTC+1, Adam H. Kerman wrote:
bob <rcp27g@gmail.com> wrote:
On 2015-02-13 20:23:01 +0000, Marc Van Dyck said:
rcp27g@gmail.com explained on 13-02-15 :
or putting in positive singalling control on others (ie where the >>>>>>> crossing is protected by railway signals that aren't cleared for the >>>>>>> train until the barriers are down and the crossing positively
checked
to be clear).
This is perfectly feasable but requires to order the gates to go down >>>>>> at a distance that is longer than the braking distance of the train. >>>>>> This means there will be a long delay between the gate going down and >>>>>> the train actually passing the grade crossing.
Indeed, this is the case. It is less convenient but allows for
positive safety.
As it has been mentioned,
motorists are unpatient creatures; if the delay is too long, people >>>>>> think the gates are faulty and start turning around them. You might >>>>>> end
up this way with a grade crossing that is inherently less safe,
because
of human nature...
Solved by making the barriers block the whole road. As the crossing >>>>> is
positively checked to ensure the barriers are down and the crossing is >>>>> clear before clearing the signals for the trains, the issue of cars
being trapped within the crossing is avoided.
Clearing level crossings several minutes before the train arrives
mitigates
against non-existant risk, and it's quite labor intensive. How is the
cost of delay justified? How is the personnel cost justified?
This "non-existant risk" just killed 6 people.
You know, I really can't stand people on Usenet who can't debate, and
therefore
find it necessary to set up a straw man.
Pot, meet kettle.
She didn't violate the grade crossing minutes before the train arrived,
but
within the last 15 seconds. She had a minor intrusion at about 15
seconds,
then at about 5 seconds, pulled deliberately into the path of the
oncoming
train.
You are contending that people will violate a crossing regardless of the state of barriers across the roadway blocking access to the crossing. I contend this is not the case. In the collision in question here, the
barrier came down *on top of* the vehicle. That means the vehicle was *already* inside the crossing (as defined by the area bounded by the road barriers) *before* the barriers came down. I would suggest that, while
some drivers will enter crossings with the barriers up even if the lights/sound warnigns are active, and will drive around partial barriers (plenty of youtube videos show this taking place), they are far far less likely to drive *through* a barrier that is blocking the road.
The system you advocated addresses a period of minutes before the
train arrives in which there really isn't any danger of collision.
The difference between the crossing types I have described is not down to
the method used to keep cars off the crossing, but the method used to keep *trains* off the crossing. In the crossing involved in this collision,
there is *no* method to stop trains from crossing. If the train arrives
at the crossing, the first indication they have that something is not
right is when they are so close to the crossing itself, there is no chance
to stop the train. In the crossing I have described, the railway
signalling system *blocks* trains from the crossing until *after* the barriers are down *and* the crossing is observed to be clear. Only after that has taken place is the train permitted to cross. Once the train is given permission to cross, the only way for a road vehicle to violate the crossing is to *break through* a physical barrier blocking the road (the whole road, so no option to zig-zag around the barriers). In a situation
in which something unexpected takes place, like a barrier drops on top of
a car, the train will not yet have permission to enter the crossing, so a collision can be avoided, regardless of how sensibly or stupidly the
driver behaves.
Robin
On 2/17/15 4:00 PM, bob wrote:
The difference between the crossing types I have described is not down
to the method used to keep cars off the crossing, but the method used to
keep *trains* off the crossing. In the crossing involved in this
collision, there is *no* method to stop trains from crossing. If the
train arrives at the crossing, the first indication they have that
something is not right is when they are so close to the crossing itself,
there is no chance to stop the train. In the crossing I have described,
the railway signalling system *blocks* trains from the crossing until
*after* the barriers are down *and* the crossing is observed to be clear.
Not going to happen in the USA outside of a very few locations.
I remember at least one grade crossing accident on Amtrak in the New
London area where I believe an older woman (grandmother) and two grandchildren were killed.
Of note is that I believe the crossing at which this occurred already had
a "occupancy protection" system installed that was supposed to slow the
train if a crossing "became occupied" (by a vehicle) ahead of it (by
forcing the cab signal down to the "restricting" aspect).
Well, the unfortunate lady drove onto the crossing only moments before the train arrived, and the protection system was useless.
So, in this particular case, the "advanced protection" proved to be worthless.
My take (with 32 years' experience running trains for Conrail,
Metro-North, and Amtrak):
Accidents happen.
They happen regardless of the best efforts of designers and engineers to prevent them from happening.
If you don't want any more grade crossing accidents to ever happen again
at this particular crossing, build a grade separation.
Sooner or later, another freak accident is going to happen, no matter what steps may have been taken to "prevent" it.
That's life.
Aside:
Sometimes grade separations won't even help. Some years' back, an Amtrak eastbound was coming up through the Bronx on the Hell Gate Line. At that location, the tracks were down in a cut, the street up above. Somebody
drove a car right off the street, through the fence, and it landed in
front of the train. I think the driver actually survived, came down
between the catenary and all!
She doesn't need to know how many trains per hour use that main line,
given that she knew there was a specific train coming and she could
see it coming.
On 2/17/2015 19:03, Nobody wrote:
She doesn't need to know how many trains per hour use that main line,
given that she knew there was a specific train coming and she could
see it coming.
This thread has reach max tedium and I'm about to filter it off, but as
a parting gift.
One of my favorite sources ofexamples of the sheer idiocy of Important
People is the intersection of Churchill Road and Alma Street in Palo
Alto, California.
Now I have not been there in years so I have no idea what the current situation is but when I lived, worked, and shopped in the area through
the 1970s and 1980s the intersection was light controlled and and there
was space for a total of four north-east bound cars between the limit
line and the place where passing west ("north") bound trains ("Caltrain"
nee Southern Pacific Peninsula Service) would remove bumper stickers.
Now the part that my memory fails to explain is the fact that there was
an interlock from the rail signals to the car signals such that when the bells and lights started, Alma and south-west bound Charleston got red
lights and north-east bound Charleston got green lights. This should
have drained the track crossing, but maybe the north-east lights went to
red before the guard came down.
In any case (and btw, the nature if the streets is that it is virtually certain that all vehicle traffic is (was) local), every time a train
went by there would be four cars between the limit line and the tracks.
An d about 8 times in 10, a fifth car would come up behind and go into
a spastic panic; horn honking, arm waving,
spittle-coating-the-windshield panic. But there was no place for the
four of us to go.
Hmm--nobody ever got hit while I was there--maybe draining green lights
had not yet come up for us, but did come up in time (nowadays I don't
know what happens with the mid-westerners that have moved there--they
never like to enter an intersection except on an amber or red light. And
we didn't have chat and angry birds and words cause additional delays.
From the descriptions in this thread I am betting "suicide"--we used to
get a lot of those.
rcp27g@gmail.com wrote:therefore
On Monday, 16 February 2015 16:25:47 UTC+1, Adam H. Kerman wrote:
bob <rcp27g@gmail.com> wrote:
On 2015-02-13 20:23:01 +0000, Marc Van Dyck said:
rcp27g@gmail.com explained on 13-02-15 :
or putting in positive singalling control on others (ie where the
crossing is protected by railway signals that aren't cleared for the >>>>>> train until the barriers are down and the crossing positively checked >>>>>> to be clear).
This is perfectly feasable but requires to order the gates to go down >>>>> at a distance that is longer than the braking distance of the train. >>>>> This means there will be a long delay between the gate going down and >>>>> the train actually passing the grade crossing.
Indeed, this is the case. It is less convenient but allows for
positive safety.
As it has been mentioned,
motorists are unpatient creatures; if the delay is too long, people
think the gates are faulty and start turning around them. You might end >>>>> up this way with a grade crossing that is inherently less safe, because >>>>> of human nature...
Solved by making the barriers block the whole road. As the crossing is >>>> positively checked to ensure the barriers are down and the crossing is >>>> clear before clearing the signals for the trains, the issue of cars
being trapped within the crossing is avoided.
Clearing level crossings several minutes before the train arrives mitigates >>> against non-existant risk, and it's quite labor intensive. How is the
cost of delay justified? How is the personnel cost justified?
This "non-existant risk" just killed 6 people.
You know, I really can't stand people on Usenet who can't debate, and
find it necessary to set up a straw man.
She didn't violate the grade crossing minutes before the train arrived, but within the last 15 seconds. She had a minor intrusion at about 15 seconds, then at about 5 seconds, pulled deliberately into the path of the oncoming train.
The system you advocated addresses a period of minutes before the
train arrives in which there really isn't any danger of collision.
Aside:
Sometimes grade separations won't even help. Some years' back, an Amtrak eastbound was coming up through the Bronx on the Hell Gate Line. At that location, the tracks were down in a cut, the street up above. Somebody
drove a car right off the street, through the fence, and it landed in
front of the train. I think the driver actually survived, came down
between the catenary and all!
On Tuesday, February 17, 2015 at 5:08:58 PM UTC-5, John Albert wrote:extremely expensive and disruptive. I don't know how the LIRR managed to do them in the 1950s and 1960s or who paid for them. Likewise with SIRT. Perhaps
If you don't want any more grade crossing accidents to ever happen again
at this particular crossing, build a grade separation.
They've know this for decades. Unfortunately, grade separation projects are
"Adam H. Kerman" <ahk@chinet.com> wrote:
hancock4@bbs.cpcn.com wrote:
On Monday, February 16, 2015 at 10:08:46 AM UTC-5, Adam H. Kerman wrote:
. . . to determine the driver's intent, after she's dead and can't be >>>>made to answer questions?
Her actions were witnessed by several people, and investigators can
learn a great deal from that. There are numerous other sources of >>>information that need to be checked.
The main eye witness has been interviewed in the press. But I'm sure the >>press got it completely wrong.
But you're speculating, of course?
"Adam H. Kerman" <ahk@chinet.com> wrote in message >news:mbvqh7$jsc$2@news.albasani.net...
conklin <nilknocgeo@earthlink.net> wrote:
"Adam H. Kerman" <ahk@chinet.com> wrote:
hancock4@bbs.cpcn.com wrote:
On Thursday, February 12, 2015 at 9:34:35 PM UTC-5, Michael Finfer >>>>>wrote:
There was also a statement made that Metro-North is the only >>>>>>application
of under running third rail in North America. That is not true. >>>>>>Philadelphia's Market St. subway/elevated uses it as well. There are >>>>>>no
grade crossings on that line, however.
I believe in the 100 year history of third rail usage in the NYC metro >>>>>area, the accident history (involving the third rail) is very good to >>>>>excellent.
I get the impression the SUV's driver could've driven off the crossing >>>>>if she wanted to, but for some reason stayed still. Maybe she thought >>>>>the train would stop for her? (Was she a resident of the area?) Or, >>>>>maybe it was a suicide. But, as mentioned, I want to wait for the >>>>>official report.
. . . to determine the driver's intent, after she's dead and can't be >>>>made to answer questions?
What does being a resident of the area have to do with anything? She >>>>KNOWINGLY violated a grade crossing, then KNOWINGLY drove her vehicle >>>>directly into the path of the oncoming train.
The design of the third rail is irrelevant. No one designs grade >>>>crossings
anticipating this kind of stupidity.
Oh come on. The innocent train riders paid the price too. The whole goal >>>of safety is to protect everyone, not just the person who "caused" the >>>accident. We have no evidence that the woman was trying to die.
You know, George, you addressed absolutely nothing I wrote in followup,
and
putting "caused" in double quotes is beyond idiotic on your part. No one
offered any pseudo psychological analysis on whether she was trying to
die.
What I am stating is that despite the consequences of the collision,
the system anchoring the third rail doesn't require a different design
as a result of this collision.
And it is unclear what changes should be made to increase safety when an
accident happens. That decision awaits an engineering study.
On 2015-02-17 16:38:27 +0000, Adam H. Kerman said:
rcp27g@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, 16 February 2015 16:25:47 UTC+1, Adam H. Kerman wrote:
bob <rcp27g@gmail.com> wrote:
On 2015-02-13 20:23:01 +0000, Marc Van Dyck said:
rcp27g@gmail.com explained on 13-02-15 :
or putting in positive singalling control on others (ie where the >>>>>>>crossing is protected by railway signals that aren't cleared for the >>>>>>>train until the barriers are down and the crossing positively checked >>>>>>>to be clear).
This is perfectly feasable but requires to order the gates to go down >>>>>>at a distance that is longer than the braking distance of the train. >>>>>>This means there will be a long delay between the gate going down and >>>>>>the train actually passing the grade crossing.
Indeed, this is the case. It is less convenient but allows for >>>>>positive safety.
As it has been mentioned,
motorists are unpatient creatures; if the delay is too long, people >>>>>>think the gates are faulty and start turning around them. You might end >>>>>>up this way with a grade crossing that is inherently less safe, because >>>>>>of human nature...
Solved by making the barriers block the whole road. As the crossing is >>>>>positively checked to ensure the barriers are down and the crossing is >>>>>clear before clearing the signals for the trains, the issue of cars >>>>>being trapped within the crossing is avoided.
Clearing level crossings several minutes before the train arrives mitigates >>>>against non-existant risk, and it's quite labor intensive. How is the >>>>cost of delay justified? How is the personnel cost justified?
This "non-existant risk" just killed 6 people.
You know, I really can't stand people on Usenet who can't debate,
and therefore find it necessary to set up a straw man.
Pot, meet kettle.
She didn't violate the grade crossing minutes before the train arrived, but >>within the last 15 seconds. She had a minor intrusion at about 15 seconds, >>then at about 5 seconds, pulled deliberately into the path of the oncoming >>train.
You are contending that people will violate a crossing regardless of
the state of barriers across the roadway blocking access to the
crossing. I contend this is not the case.
In the collision in question here, the barrier came down *on top of*
the vehicle. That means the vehicle was *already* inside the crossing
(as defined by the area bounded by the road barriers) *before* the
barriers came down.
I would suggest that, while some drivers will enter crossings with the >barriers up even if the lights/sound warnigns are active, and will drive >around partial barriers (plenty of youtube videos show this taking place), >they are far far less likely to drive *through* a barrier that is blocking >the road.
The system you advocated addresses a period of minutes before the
train arrives in which there really isn't any danger of collision.
The difference between the crossing types I have described is not down
to the method used to keep cars off the crossing, but the method used
to keep *trains* off the crossing. In the crossing involved in this >collision, there is *no* method to stop trains from crossing.
I'm speculating that the eye witness has been interviewed by the press?
Uh, no. That would be a fact.
bob <rcp27g@gmail.com> wrote:
You cannot contend that a safety system can be placed at a grade
crossing that no driver will violate.
In the collision in question here, the barrier came down *on top of*
the vehicle. That means the vehicle was *already* inside the crossing
(as defined by the area bounded by the road barriers) *before* the
barriers came down.
It means that she violated the grade crossing, ignoring the flashers and bells AND the gate that was in the process of being lowered. If
anything,
a gate being lowered moves and truly catches the driver's eye, so that actually adds a bit of safety.
I would suggest that, while some drivers will enter crossings with the >>barriers up even if the lights/sound warnigns are active, and will drive >>around partial barriers (plenty of youtube videos show this taking
place),
they are far far less likely to drive *through* a barrier that is
blocking the road.
If I was in such a situation, I think I would aim my vehicle at any gap I thought it would fit through and force my way off of the crossing.
Perhaps that's what she tried to do, but she was too late.
It means that she violated the grade crossing, ignoring the flashers and bells AND the gate that was in the process of being lowered. If anything,
a gate being lowered moves and truly catches the driver's eye, so that actually adds a bit of safety.
bob <rcp27g@gmail.com> wrote:
On 2015-02-17 16:38:27 +0000, Adam H. Kerman said:
rcp27g@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, 16 February 2015 16:25:47 UTC+1, Adam H. Kerman wrote:
bob <rcp27g@gmail.com> wrote:
On 2015-02-13 20:23:01 +0000, Marc Van Dyck said:
rcp27g@gmail.com explained on 13-02-15 :
or putting in positive singalling control on others (ie where the >>>>>>>>crossing is protected by railway signals that aren't cleared for the >>>>>>>>train until the barriers are down and the crossing positively checked >>>>>>>>to be clear).
This is perfectly feasable but requires to order the gates to go down >>>>>>>at a distance that is longer than the braking distance of the train. >>>>>>>This means there will be a long delay between the gate going down and >>>>>>>the train actually passing the grade crossing.
Indeed, this is the case. It is less convenient but allows for >>>>>>positive safety.
As it has been mentioned,
motorists are unpatient creatures; if the delay is too long, people >>>>>>>think the gates are faulty and start turning around them. You might end >>>>>>>up this way with a grade crossing that is inherently less safe, because >>>>>>>of human nature...
Solved by making the barriers block the whole road. As the crossing is >>>>>>positively checked to ensure the barriers are down and the crossing is >>>>>>clear before clearing the signals for the trains, the issue of cars >>>>>>being trapped within the crossing is avoided.
Clearing level crossings several minutes before the train arrives mitigates
against non-existant risk, and it's quite labor intensive. How is the >>>>>cost of delay justified? How is the personnel cost justified?
This "non-existant risk" just killed 6 people.
You know, I really can't stand people on Usenet who can't debate,
and therefore find it necessary to set up a straw man.
Pot, meet kettle.
Well, no, I didn't set up a straw man, so your PKB accusation is >inappropriate.
She didn't violate the grade crossing minutes before the train arrived, but >>>within the last 15 seconds. She had a minor intrusion at about 15 seconds, >>>then at about 5 seconds, pulled deliberately into the path of the oncoming >>>train.
You are contending that people will violate a crossing regardless of
the state of barriers across the roadway blocking access to the
crossing. I contend this is not the case.
Drivers drive around lowered crossing gates. There's a famous video of
a driver who drove around lowered crossing gates in a situation in which >video cameras were placed at a newly-designed grade crossing with major >safety improvement. A center barrier had been erected for the last 40 feet
of the highway approaching the grade crossing, and the lowered gate completely >blocked that side of the highway. A motorist made the decision to drive
onto the wrong side of the highway to drive around the lowered gates.
You cannot contend that a safety system can be placed at a grade crossing >that no driver will violate.
There is a very dangerous crossing that I go through twice per day,
almost every day, Cedar Ave. in Middlesex, NJ.
On 2/13/15 9:28 AM, Clark F Morris wrote:
On Fri, 13 Feb 2015 07:37:38 -0600, Robert Heller
<heller@deepsoft.com> wrote:
At Thu, 12 Feb 2015 21:34:37 -0500 Michael Finfer
<finfer@optonline.net> wrote:
much snipped
The real problem is drivers making bad judgement calls. Drivers are
often in hurry and impatient and take risks all the time: running orange-turning-to-red lights, passing with limited visibility, driving
too fast for the road conditions, and ignoring railroad crossing gates.
The other day I was driving on a street in Cambridge, MA and gate went
down just as I got there and of course I stopped and waited. I listened
and heard no train. And in fact it was 20-30 seconds before the train
came; it was going pretty fast. You can imagine how in situations like
this some people would decide to drive around the gate since it doesn't
cover the whole path.
In this women's case her car got hit by the descending gate - so it was similar to the situation where someone tries to beat the orange light
before it turns red.
bob <rcp27g@gmail.com> wrote:
On 2015-02-13 20:23:01 +0000, Marc Van Dyck said:
rcp27g@gmail.com explained on 13-02-15 :
or putting in positive singalling control on others (ie where the
crossing is protected by railway signals that aren't cleared for the
train until the barriers are down and the crossing positively checked
to be clear).
This is perfectly feasable but requires to order the gates to go down
at a distance that is longer than the braking distance of the train.
This means there will be a long delay between the gate going down and
the train actually passing the grade crossing.
Indeed, this is the case. It is less convenient but allows for
positive safety.
As it has been mentioned,
motorists are unpatient creatures; if the delay is too long, people
think the gates are faulty and start turning around them. You might end
up this way with a grade crossing that is inherently less safe, because
of human nature...
Solved by making the barriers block the whole road. As the crossing is
positively checked to ensure the barriers are down and the crossing is
clear before clearing the signals for the trains, the issue of cars
being trapped within the crossing is avoided.
Clearing level crossings several minutes before the train arrives mitigates against non-existant risk, and it's quite labor intensive. How is the
cost of delay justified? How is the personnel cost justified?
No lives have been saved except during the 5 or 10 seconds before the
train arrives.
The usual design in the UK, for example, is for the road to be blocked
by four barriers: each covering half the roadway on each side of the
railway. The warning lights/klaxon start first, then the "entry" side
barriers come down, then the "exit" side barriers come down, then the
klaxon stops (it gets irritating, and once the barriers are down, is
redundant). Then the crossing is checked to be clear, either by a
person in a local signal box or by CCTV cameras, and if it is clear,
the signals are cleared for the train or trains passing. It is safe,
but means waits at the crossing can be a couple of minutes before the
train actually arrives. The crossing sequence is initiated by the
signalman, who can keep the crossing down if there are multiple trains.
They can be annoying, but they are safe.
I've heard of crossings getting closed five minutes ahead of arrival
of the train.
Not all crossings in the UK are of this sort, there are also "automatic
half-barrier" crossings that do not block the whole road and are
triggered automatically by the train approaching, without positive
safety, but designed for the minimum road-closed time, so the barriers
come down about 20s before the train arrives. Such a crossing was
involved in the Ufton Nervet crash, and they are only used on quiet
roads with little traffic, and on railway lines with lower speeds.
That's common in the US.
On 02/16/2015 10:25 AM, Adam H. Kerman wrote:
bob <rcp27g@gmail.com> wrote:
On 2015-02-13 20:23:01 +0000, Marc Van Dyck said:
rcp27g@gmail.com explained on 13-02-15 :
or putting in positive singalling control on others (ie where the
crossing is protected by railway signals that aren't cleared for the >>>>> train until the barriers are down and the crossing positively checked >>>>> to be clear).
This is perfectly feasable but requires to order the gates to go down
at a distance that is longer than the braking distance of the train.
This means there will be a long delay between the gate going down and
the train actually passing the grade crossing.
Indeed, this is the case. It is less convenient but allows for
positive safety.
As it has been mentioned,
motorists are unpatient creatures; if the delay is too long, people
think the gates are faulty and start turning around them. You might end >>>> up this way with a grade crossing that is inherently less safe, because >>>> of human nature...
Solved by making the barriers block the whole road. As the crossing is
positively checked to ensure the barriers are down and the crossing is
clear before clearing the signals for the trains, the issue of cars
being trapped within the crossing is avoided.
Clearing level crossings several minutes before the train arrives mitigates >> against non-existant risk, and it's quite labor intensive. How is the
cost of delay justified? How is the personnel cost justified?
No lives have been saved except during the 5 or 10 seconds before the
train arrives.
The usual design in the UK, for example, is for the road to be blocked
by four barriers: each covering half the roadway on each side of the
railway. The warning lights/klaxon start first, then the "entry" side
barriers come down, then the "exit" side barriers come down, then the
klaxon stops (it gets irritating, and once the barriers are down, is
redundant). Then the crossing is checked to be clear, either by a
person in a local signal box or by CCTV cameras, and if it is clear,
the signals are cleared for the train or trains passing. It is safe,
but means waits at the crossing can be a couple of minutes before the
train actually arrives. The crossing sequence is initiated by the
signalman, who can keep the crossing down if there are multiple trains.
They can be annoying, but they are safe.
I've heard of crossings getting closed five minutes ahead of arrival
of the train.
Not all crossings in the UK are of this sort, there are also "automatic
half-barrier" crossings that do not block the whole road and are
triggered automatically by the train approaching, without positive
safety, but designed for the minimum road-closed time, so the barriers
come down about 20s before the train arrives. Such a crossing was
involved in the Ufton Nervet crash, and they are only used on quiet
roads with little traffic, and on railway lines with lower speeds.
That's common in the US.
The Russians have found a much more efficient solution to keep the
idiots off the tracks:
http://erkkit.smugmug.com/Motorcycles/Return/i-L8HhJ9/0/L/image336-L.jpg
The steel plates in the roadway are raised when the gates come down.
Vehicles caught in the crossing can move away from the crossing as the
plates are pushed down by the vehicle's weight. But if you want to beat
the train then you will need a pair of new tires...
Of course, if such a solution would be introduced in the US, railroads
would be forced out of business as they would have to defend themselves
from being sued by idiots whose care got damaged.
An there is also the
sovereign citizen/libertarian crowd who would never relinquish their
$DEITY given right to be killed by a train.
In this women's case her car got hit by the descending gate - so it was similar to the situation where someone tries to beat the orange light
before it turns red.
bob <rcp27g@gmail.com> wrote:completely
On 2015-02-17 16:38:27 +0000, Adam H. Kerman said:
rcp27g@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, 16 February 2015 16:25:47 UTC+1, Adam H. Kerman wrote:
bob <rcp27g@gmail.com> wrote:
On 2015-02-13 20:23:01 +0000, Marc Van Dyck said:
rcp27g@gmail.com explained on 13-02-15 :
or putting in positive singalling control on others (ie where the >>>>>>>> crossing is protected by railway signals that aren't cleared for the >>>>>>>> train until the barriers are down and the crossing positively checked >>>>>>>> to be clear).
This is perfectly feasable but requires to order the gates to go down >>>>>>> at a distance that is longer than the braking distance of the train. >>>>>>> This means there will be a long delay between the gate going down and >>>>>>> the train actually passing the grade crossing.
Indeed, this is the case. It is less convenient but allows for
positive safety.
As it has been mentioned,
motorists are unpatient creatures; if the delay is too long, people >>>>>>> think the gates are faulty and start turning around them. You might end >>>>>>> up this way with a grade crossing that is inherently less safe, because >>>>>>> of human nature...
Solved by making the barriers block the whole road. As the crossing is >>>>>> positively checked to ensure the barriers are down and the crossing is >>>>>> clear before clearing the signals for the trains, the issue of cars >>>>>> being trapped within the crossing is avoided.
Clearing level crossings several minutes before the train arrives mitigates
against non-existant risk, and it's quite labor intensive. How is the >>>>> cost of delay justified? How is the personnel cost justified?
This "non-existant risk" just killed 6 people.
You know, I really can't stand people on Usenet who can't debate,
and therefore find it necessary to set up a straw man.
Pot, meet kettle.
Well, no, I didn't set up a straw man, so your PKB accusation is inappropriate.
She didn't violate the grade crossing minutes before the train arrived, but >>> within the last 15 seconds. She had a minor intrusion at about 15 seconds, >>> then at about 5 seconds, pulled deliberately into the path of the oncoming >>> train.
You are contending that people will violate a crossing regardless of
the state of barriers across the roadway blocking access to the
crossing. I contend this is not the case.
Drivers drive around lowered crossing gates. There's a famous video of
a driver who drove around lowered crossing gates in a situation in which video cameras were placed at a newly-designed grade crossing with major safety improvement. A center barrier had been erected for the last 40 feet
of the highway approaching the grade crossing, and the lowered gate
blocked that side of the highway. A motorist made the decision to drive
onto the wrong side of the highway to drive around the lowered gates.
You cannot contend that a safety system can be placed at a grade crossing that no driver will violate.
In the collision in question here, the barrier came down *on top of*
the vehicle. That means the vehicle was *already* inside the crossing
(as defined by the area bounded by the road barriers) *before* the
barriers came down.
It means that she violated the grade crossing, ignoring the flashers and bells AND the gate that was in the process of being lowered. If anything,
a gate being lowered moves and truly catches the driver's eye, so that actually adds a bit of safety.
A crossing gate isn't a genuine barrier as they are designed to be
flexible and to break readily so that vehicles are NEVER trapped. The
main purpose of the crossing gate is to put additional flashers at
the driver's eye level, at least when it's lowered.
I would suggest that, while some drivers will enter crossings with the
barriers up even if the lights/sound warnigns are active, and will drive
around partial barriers (plenty of youtube videos show this taking place), >> they are far far less likely to drive *through* a barrier that is blocking >> the road.
That's nice, but you're backing off your earlier contention that drivers won't violate the grade crossing given the state of barriers across
the roadway. So you still think some drivers will violate the grade crossing.
The system you advocated addresses a period of minutes before the
train arrives in which there really isn't any danger of collision.
The difference between the crossing types I have described is not down
to the method used to keep cars off the crossing, but the method used
to keep *trains* off the crossing. In the crossing involved in this
collision, there is *no* method to stop trains from crossing.
Now you're trying to imply that trains can stop on a dime. Lovely.
As I've already explained about PTC grade crossings just recently installed between Chicago and St. Louis, they have to be active many minutes before
the train gets there so that the train can be thrown into emergency and,
even then, it'll reduce speed down to 15 mph. Still addressing the issue
of grade crossing violations that occur minutes before the train gets
there, and not within the last 10 seconds as with the situation that
we are discussing. It addresses a truck that stalled within the grade crossing minutes before the train gets there, nothing else.
The rest snipped unread. You just don't know what you're talking about.
I contend that drivers who are willing to drive around crossings, as a calculated risk, will not be willing to drive through two physical
barriers, a process which will almost certainly case actual damage to
their car in the process.
On Mon, 23 Feb 2015 21:10:12 +0100, bob wrote:
I contend that drivers who are willing to drive around crossings, as a calculated risk, will not be willing to drive through two physical barriers, a process which will almost certainly case actual damage to
their car in the process.
I contend that these two incidents in which cars were deliberately
crashed through full barrier crossings prove that you're wrong:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1377228/Getaway-driver-crashes- level-crossing-barrier-hit-120-tonne-train.html
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-hampshire-16709841
On Monday, 23 February 2015 23:50:57 UTC+1, Denis McMahon wrote:
On Mon, 23 Feb 2015 21:10:12 +0100, bob wrote:
I contend that drivers who are willing to drive around crossings, as
a calculated risk, will not be willing to drive through two physical
barriers, a process which will almost certainly case actual damage to
their car in the process.
I contend that these two incidents in which cars were deliberately
crashed through full barrier crossings prove that you're wrong:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1377228/Getaway-driver-crashes-
level-crossing-barrier-hit-120-tonne-train.html
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-hampshire-16709841
So the best you can come up with are people in stolen vehicles involved
in high speed police chases, where the stolen vehicles do indeed suffer damage. And these incidents are so out of the ordinary that they get reported on the national news.
much snipped
Sure, if you go back through several decades of history, you can find >examples of incidents of vehicle incursion on railway lines. Meanwhile
this month alone there have been two fatal crashes on crossings with
half barriers and no signal interlocking.
Robin
On Tue, 24 Feb 2015 03:06:14 -0800, rcp27g wrote:
On Monday, 23 February 2015 23:50:57 UTC+1, Denis McMahon wrote:
On Mon, 23 Feb 2015 21:10:12 +0100, bob wrote:
I contend that drivers who are willing to drive around crossings, as
a calculated risk, will not be willing to drive through two physical
barriers, a process which will almost certainly case actual damage to
their car in the process.
I contend that these two incidents in which cars were deliberately
crashed through full barrier crossings prove that you're wrong:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1377228/Getaway-driver-crashes-
level-crossing-barrier-hit-120-tonne-train.html
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-hampshire-16709841
So the best you can come up with are people in stolen vehicles involved
in high speed police chases, where the stolen vehicles do indeed suffer
damage. And these incidents are so out of the ordinary that they get
reported on the national news.
You're talking about making crossings (and indeed all railway
infrastructure) absolutely safe from vehicle incursion.
I'm pointing out
that incidents of deliberate incursion through fully gated crossings are
a matter of public record.
You may recall an incident on I think the North Downs line where a Cement Mixer fell onto a train. Then there was of course the Great Heck crash. I also seem to recall in incident in I think the West Midlands involving a minibus and a sharp bend, and ones near Salisbury and I think in East
Anglia where a vehicle left the road and ended up on the track. I think
there was also an incident within the last few years of an HST hitting
quad bikes in South Wales on the GWML, and at least one incident of a
vehicle rolling through a boundary fence onto the line from a car park adjacent to railway property.
I've argued for tire spike or unemployed East German border guards to
ensure the death of the motorist.
I'd also like a plate in the road to open so the car or truck
attempting to violate the grade crossing ends up in a ditch below the
level of the rail.
I've seen steel barriers at truck entrances to government office
buildings post Oklahoma City. It would make a fine solution at grade crossings.
On Friday, February 20, 2015 at 9:41:39 AM UTC-5, Adam H. Kerman wrote:
I'm speculating that the eye witness has been interviewed by the press?
Uh, no. That would be a fact.
False.
Interviews published by the press are very often incomplete-- . . .
On 2015-02-20 14:59:23 +0000, Adam H. Kerman said:
bob <rcp27g@gmail.com> wrote:
On 2015-02-17 16:38:27 +0000, Adam H. Kerman said:
rcp27g@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, 16 February 2015 16:25:47 UTC+1, Adam H. Kerman wrote: >>>>>>bob <rcp27g@gmail.com> wrote:
On 2015-02-13 20:23:01 +0000, Marc Van Dyck said: >>>>>>>>rcp27g@gmail.com explained on 13-02-15 :
or putting in positive singalling control on others (ie where the >>>>>>>>>crossing is protected by railway signals that aren't cleared for the >>>>>>>>>train until the barriers are down and the crossing positively checked >>>>>>>>>to be clear).
This is perfectly feasable but requires to order the gates to go down >>>>>>>>at a distance that is longer than the braking distance of the train. >>>>>>>>This means there will be a long delay between the gate going down and >>>>>>>>the train actually passing the grade crossing.
Indeed, this is the case. It is less convenient but allows for >>>>>>>positive safety.
As it has been mentioned, motorists are unpatient creatures;
if the delay is too long, people think the gates are faulty and >>>>>>>>start turning around them. You might end up this way with a grade >>>>>>>>crossing that is inherently less safe, because of human nature...
Solved by making the barriers block the whole road. As the crossing is >>>>>>>positively checked to ensure the barriers are down and the crossing is >>>>>>>clear before clearing the signals for the trains, the issue of cars >>>>>>>being trapped within the crossing is avoided.
Clearing level crossings several minutes before the train
arrives mitigates against non-existant risk, and it's quite labor >>>>>>intensive. How is the cost of delay justified? How is the personnel >>>>>>cost justified?
This "non-existant risk" just killed 6 people.
You know, I really can't stand people on Usenet who can't debate,
and therefore find it necessary to set up a straw man.
Pot, meet kettle.
Well, no, I didn't set up a straw man, so your PKB accusation is >>inappropriate.
She didn't violate the grade crossing minutes before the train arrived, but >>>>within the last 15 seconds. She had a minor intrusion at about 15 seconds, >>>>then at about 5 seconds, pulled deliberately into the path of the oncoming >>>>train.
You are contending that people will violate a crossing regardless of
the state of barriers across the roadway blocking access to the
crossing. I contend this is not the case.
Drivers drive around lowered crossing gates. There's a famous video of
a driver who drove around lowered crossing gates in a situation in which >>video cameras were placed at a newly-designed grade crossing with major >>safety improvement. A center barrier had been erected for the last 40
feet of the highway approaching the grade crossing, and the lowered
gate completely blocked that side of the highway. A motorist made the >>decision to drive onto the wrong side of the highway to drive around
the lowered gates.
Strawman.
I have explicitly and specifically stated that the crossing type concerned >here has *full* barriers across the whole roadway at both sides of the >railway. You are describing an incident of a driver violating a crossing >with half barriers, *not* blocking the roadway that a driver violated.
You cannot contend that a safety system can be placed at a grade crossing >>that no driver will violate.
I contend that drivers who are willing to drive around crossings, as a >calculated risk, will not be willing to drive through two physical
barriers, a process which will almost certainly case actual damage to
their car in the process.
In the collision in question here, the barrier came down *on top of*
the vehicle. That means the vehicle was *already* inside the crossing >>>(as defined by the area bounded by the road barriers) *before* the >>>barriers came down.
It means that she violated the grade crossing, ignoring the flashers and >>bells AND the gate that was in the process of being lowered. If anything,
a gate being lowered moves and truly catches the driver's eye, so that >>actually adds a bit of safety.
I haven't heard an account of the events leading up to the events in
this specific crash about how the driver ended up under the barrier,
and as people have died in this crash, I don't want to enter into >speculation.
A crossing gate isn't a genuine barrier as they are designed to be
flexible and to break readily so that vehicles are NEVER trapped. The
main purpose of the crossing gate is to put additional flashers at
the driver's eye level, at least when it's lowered.
In a crossing where the trains are controlled in a way that prevents a >collision in the event of a car or other road users becomes trapped on
the crossing,
there is no safety hazard associated with vehicles becoming trapped on
the crossing: the train stops, the barriers are raised, and the vehicle >escapes. If there is no need to allow trapped vehicles to break through,
the barriers can be made much more robust (and obviously so).
I would suggest that, while some drivers will enter crossings with the >>>barriers up even if the lights/sound warnigns are active, and will drive >>>around partial barriers (plenty of youtube videos show this taking place), >>>they are far far less likely to drive *through* a barrier that is blocking >>>the road.
That's nice, but you're backing off your earlier contention that drivers >>won't violate the grade crossing given the state of barriers across
the roadway. So you still think some drivers will violate the grade crossing.
It has never been my contention that drivers will not attempt to
violate a crossing in which the barriers are not yet fully down across
the whole width of the roadway. My contention is that in a crossing
where the trains signals protect the crossing, in the event that the
crossing is violated, the result of the violation will not be a
collision.
The system you advocated addresses a period of minutes before the
train arrives in which there really isn't any danger of collision.
The difference between the crossing types I have described is not down
to the method used to keep cars off the crossing, but the method used
to keep *trains* off the crossing. In the crossing involved in this >>>collision, there is *no* method to stop trains from crossing.
Now you're trying to imply that trains can stop on a dime. Lovely.
As I've already explained about PTC grade crossings just recently installed >>between Chicago and St. Louis, they have to be active many minutes before >>the train gets there so that the train can be thrown into emergency and, >>even then, it'll reduce speed down to 15 mph. Still addressing the issue
of grade crossing violations that occur minutes before the train gets >>there, and not within the last 10 seconds as with the situation that
we are discussing. It addresses a truck that stalled within the grade >>crossing minutes before the train gets there, nothing else.
Another straw man.
I am not describing a crossing where the failure of the railway signalling
to clear for the train still results in the train passing the crossing
at 15 mph.
I am describing a crossing where, in the event of the crossing not being >found to be clear in the intended manner, the train will be brought to
a stop, with a normal service brake (not emergency), with distance to
spare before the crossing.
The Russians have found a much more efficient solution to keep the
idiots off the tracks:
http://erkkit.smugmug.com/Motorcycles/Return/i-L8HhJ9/0/L/image336-L.jpg
The steel plates in the roadway are raised when the gates come down.
Vehicles caught in the crossing can move away from the crossing as the
plates are pushed down by the vehicle's weight. But if you want to beat
the train then you will need a pair of new tires...
http://www.barriergatearm.com/Motorized-Traffic-Spike-Systems.html
On 26-Feb-15 09:47, Adam H. Kerman wrote:
I've argued for tire spike or unemployed East German border guards to >>ensure the death of the motorist.
I'd also like a plate in the road to open so the car or truck
attempting to violate the grade crossing ends up in a ditch below the
level of the rail.
I've seen steel barriers at truck entrances to government office
buildings post Oklahoma City. It would make a fine solution at grade >>crossings.
FHWA regulations prohibit any "fixed deadly object" in a public roadway;
what folks (even the govt) can do on private property, however, is
limited only by their tolerance for civil lawsuits.
Stephen Sprunk <stephen@sprunk.org> wrote:
On 26-Feb-15 09:47, Adam H. Kerman wrote:
I've argued for tire spike or unemployed East German border guards to >>>ensure the death of the motorist.
I'd also like a plate in the road to open so the car or truck
attempting to violate the grade crossing ends up in a ditch below the >>>level of the rail.
I've seen steel barriers at truck entrances to government office >>>buildings post Oklahoma City. It would make a fine solution at grade >>>crossings.
FHWA regulations prohibit any "fixed deadly object" in a public roadway; >>what folks (even the govt) can do on private property, however, is
limited only by their tolerance for civil lawsuits.
Strangely, FhWA isn't writing regulations with safety of the railroad
in mind. Either the standard should be coordinated in the Office of Secretary >or Congress needs to change the law.
On 26-Feb-15 09:47, Adam H. Kerman wrote:
I've argued for tire spike or unemployed East German border guards to ensure the death of the motorist.
I'd also like a plate in the road to open so the car or truck
attempting to violate the grade crossing ends up in a ditch below the
level of the rail.
I've seen steel barriers at truck entrances to government office
buildings post Oklahoma City. It would make a fine solution at grade crossings.
FHWA regulations prohibit any "fixed deadly object" in a public roadway;
what folks (even the govt) can do on private property, however, is
limited only by their tolerance for civil lawsuits.
Excuse me while I delurk. In the US is there a general understanding of >whether the roadway over a grade crossing is a public roadway or part of
the railroad's private property, or does change by state or case-by-case?
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